


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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1582



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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20 April 1981

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No. 1582

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Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 80 (signed to press 4 Dec 80) pp 1-2

[Full-text translated articles published in this issue of the JPRS report are indicated with an asterisk (\*). Article with double asterisk (\*\*) indicates full-text translation will be published in the JPRS series USSR REPORT: ENERGY.]

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## ARMED FORCES

### MILITARY REGULATIONS: GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 20, Oct 80 signed to press 26 Sep 80 pp 32-22

[Article by Col Justice V. A. Korneyev: "The Fighting Man and the Law"]

[Text] [Question] What are the distinctive features of the new edition of the 4 March 1980 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase: "On the Procedure for Examining Citizen Proposals, Statements and Complaints", and how are its requirements being implemented in the USSR armed forces?

[Answer] The Communist Party thinks that with the consistent development of socialist democracy the further improvement in the handling of letters from citizens, the thorough perfection of its forms and methods, and the strict observance of the procedures and periods for examining them which are prescribed by law are acquiring ever larger significance. In light of these party requirements, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has introduced changes and additions in the new edition which flow from the Constitution of the USSR and experience of many years standing.

It is pointed out in the ukase that the addressing of proposals, statements and complaints to state and public organs by citizens is an important way to exercise and protect personal rights and strengthen the bonds of the state apparatus with the population and a substantial source of the information needed to solve current and future questions in state, economic, social, and cultural organizational development. Since it is one of the forms for the workers' participation in control, the citizens' appeals contribute to strengthening popular control over the activity of state and public organs and to the struggle against red tape, bureaucratism and other shortcomings in their work.

The Leninist principles about a tactful and careful attitude toward each proposal, statement and complaint have been further developed in the new edition of the ukase. The decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and the instructions of comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, on improving the handling of workers' letters and the reception of people have also found reflection in it.

The changes and additions which have been introduced ensure the necessary conditions for USSR citizens to exercise the rights proclaimed and guaranteed by the Constitution of the USSR and Soviet laws to submit in written and oral form to state organs

and public organizations proposals for improving the latter's activity, to criticize shortcomings in work, to send statements, and to complain about the actions of officials and state and public organs. In evaluating the changes and additions introduced in the ukase, L. I. Brezhnev pointed out in his address to the 4 March 1980 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium that they will serve to further strengthen socialist law and democracy. Every Soviet individual, he said, must be confident that any sound proposal, statement or complaint will be examined carefully and that a fair decision will be made.

A new instruction on the procedure for examining proposals, statements and complaints and for receiving visitors in the troop units and establishments of the army and navy has been put into effect in accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase.

[Question] What is the procedure for handling the proposals, statements and complaints of Soviet army and navy servicemen?

[Answer] The procedure for handling servicemen's proposals, statements and complaints is defined by the Internal Service Regulation (Article 5), the Disciplinary Regulation of the USSR Armed Forces (Articles 110-119) and by the instruction.

On service questions, a serviceman must turn to his immediate chief and only with his permission to the next higher chief. On personal questions, a serviceman must also as a rule turn to his immediate superior but in cases of special need he can turn to the senior chief.

If a serviceman detects embezzlement, damages to military equipment, an unlawful expenditure of financial resources, abuses in supplying the troops, deficiencies in the condition of equipment, or other items which inflict losses on the USSR armed forces, then he is required to report this through command channels but he can also send a written proposal or statement to eliminate these shortcomings to the senior chief up to and including the USSR Minister of Defense.

Every serviceman has the right to submit a complaint about the illegal actions and orders of commanders (chiefs) with respect to himself, violations of the rights and privileges prescribed for service, or the failure to give him his authorized allowances.

The complaint is submitted to the immediate chief of that person whose actions are being complained about, but if the submitter of the complaint does not know whose fault it is that his rights are being violated, then the complaint is sent through command channels.

A complaint can be stated orally or submitted in written form. A complaint on a regimental commander, the commander of a ship of the first class, and chiefs senior to them is only submitted in written form with the exception of complaints made during an inquiry. A serviceman has the right to submit a complaint only for himself personally. It is forbidden to submit group complaints or complaints for others. One cannot submit a complaint when one is on duty (with the exception of complaints submitted during an interrogation of servicemen), on guard, on watch, on a combat tour of duty, on the daily duty detail, and at classes. It is forbidden to complain

about the severity of disciplinary punishment if the commander (chief) has not exceeded the disciplinary authority granted him. During an interrogation of servicemen, a complaint can be stated orally or submitted in written form directly to the person conducting the inquiry. Servicemen who are absent for some reason or other during the inquiry can submit a complaint in written form directly to the chief who conducted the inquiry.

[Question] Tell us about the procedure and periods for reviewing and settling proposals, statements and complaints.

[Answer] Proposals, statements and complaints are reviewed and settled within the periods prescribed by law. The commander (chief) familiarizes himself with their content and determines the following: Is he competent to solve the questions raised in it or does it pertain to the competency of another organ; is it possible to resolve the complaint essentially without delay or must the facts stated in it be checked. Other questions which arise from the content of the complaint can also be resolved during the review process.

The commander (chief) reflects the results of his review in his decision. If necessary, he designates a responsible person and establishes the time for carrying it out.

The making of a final decision and the giving of an answer to the author on the substance of the questions posed by him are understood under "resolution" of the complaint (proposal, statement).

A commander (chief) is required to review a letter, which is received, within a three-day period, and if the proposal (statement, complaint) is admitted to be correct, to take immediate measures to carry out the proposal or to satisfy the request of the one who submitted the complaint (statement).

Commanders (chiefs), who do not have the authority to solve questions raised in letters, send these letters (or extracts from them) through command channels or send them to the appropriate state and public organs, enterprises, establishments, or organizations. In doing this, letters from servicemen are sent immediately after the review, but letters from members of the families of servicemen, workers and employees of the Soviet army and navy, and other citizens are sent no later than five days afterwards. The submitter is informed without fail that his letter has been sent to another organ or to another official.

For the sake of an objective and correct settlement of the letters, it is forbidden to send for review complaints and statements to those persons whose actions are being complained about.

In order to ensure the most rapid resolution of proposals, statements and complaints, definite periods for making a final decision on them have been prescribed by law.

Proposals (statements, complaints) from servicemen and statements and complaints from members of their families are resolved: in the directorates of districts, groups of forces, fleets, and the Ministry of Defense -- during the period up to 15 days after their arrival; in units and establishments (institutions) -- without delay, but no later than seven days after their arrival.



In those cases where it is necessary to conduct a special check, demand and obtain additional material, and take other steps to resolve the proposal, statement or complaint, the period for settling them can be extended as an exception by the commander of a unit or ship (the chief of an establishment or institution) by no more than 15 days -- with the reporting of this to the author of the letter.

[Question] How is a private reception of servicemen and other citizens in the troop units and establishments of the Soviet army and navy organized?

[Answer] In accordance with Article 56 of the Internal Service Regulation (Article 16 of the instruction), commanders (chiefs) are required to hold a private reception for servicemen, the members of their families, Soviet army and navy workers and employees, and other citizens on both service and personal matters no less than twice a month. In exceptional cases the conducting of a reception for visitors can be entrusted to an official who is competent to solve the subjects which are being broached.

The reception must be conducted on the date and at the time prescribed by the order -- when necessary -- in the evening. Visitors who come from other population centers must be received also on days not set aside for the reception. The time and place of the reception is given to personnel. A place for the reception is set aside -- where possible -- in premises where a pass is not required for entry. The reception of visitors is registered in the Visitor Book. The decision on a statement or complaint is announced to the visitor, entered in the above mentioned book, and authenticated with the signature of the one making it. If questions which are not within the jurisdiction of the given troop unit or establishment and if questions which cannot be resolved by the one making the decision are posed during the private reception, explanations are given to the visitor on where he should address his proposal or complaint.

[Question] What kind of responsibility is there for a violation of the prescribed procedure for reviewing proposals, statements, and complaints?

[Answer] A violation of the prescribed procedure for reviewing letters, red tape, and a bureaucratic attitude toward proposals, statements and complaints entail disciplinary responsibility with regard to the guilty persons. The same actions by officials, which have caused considerable harm to state or public interests or to the rights and interests of servicemen or other citizens which are protected by law, and the persecution by officials of servicemen or other citizens in connection with their submission of complaints or statement entail criminal responsibility in accordance with the appropriate articles in the criminal codes of the union republics concerning official misdemeanors.

One who deliberately submits a false complaint or statement for slanderous purposes is answerable in accordance with the laws in force.

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## ARMED FORCES

### INDOCTRINATION OUTLINE: BUILDING COMMUNISM

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 80 (signed to press 4 Dec 80) pp 64-71

[Article by Col F. Zenovskiy: "Communism--The Highest Goal of the Party and People"\*)]

[Text] This subject begins the section of the study plan "Our Goal is Communism." Its study will help the students gain a more complete notion of communism as a socioeconomic formation and about the developed socialist society which has been built in the USSR by our people under the leadership of the CPSU. In the exercise it is essential to describe to the men extensively and effectively the successes of the Soviet people in carrying out the decisions of the 25th Party Congress and the quotas of the Tenth Five-Year Plan. The material of the subject will make it possible for the soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers to more profoundly understand the tasks of dependably defending the socialist victories and properly greeting the 26th CPSU Congress.

Six hours are assigned for the exercise. This time should be utilized as follows: 2 hours for a lecture (narration), 2 hours for independent work by the students and 2 hours for a seminar (talk).

In the lecture (narration) it is recommended that the following basic questions be taken up: 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the ways for building communism in our nation. A developed socialist society--an essential stage in communist construction. 2. The successes of the Soviet people in carrying out the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the plans of the Tenth Five-Year Plan. 3. The tasks of the men of the Army and Navy in securely defending the peaceful creative labor of the Soviet people.

In a short introduction it is essential to point out that the Soviet people are successfully completing the Tenth Five-Year Plan and are entering the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan and are preparing to properly greet the 26th CPSU Congress. The

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\*Materials for political exercises on the subject "Communism--The Highest Goal of the Party and People. The Successful Fulfillment of the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the Plans of the Tenth Five-Year Plan by the Soviet People."

June and October (1980) plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, the speeches at them by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the Fourth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Tenth Sitting, and the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee for the 26th Party Congress "Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990" have caused a new influx of political and professional activeness by the workers. In responding in deeds to the constant concern of the party for the flourishing of the socialist motherland, the Soviet people have set the pregress shock watch.

The Soviet Armed Forces are the dependable guard of the peaceful creative labor of the Soviet people. The men of the Army and Navy are proud in the awareness of their high and honorable mission. They are constantly struggling to improve their military skills in every possible way, to strengthen discipline and organization, to raise vigilance and combat readiness and to unconditionally carry out the high socialist obligations assumed in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress. In a single combat formation with the men of the fraternal armies of the socialist commonwealth, the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces is vigilantly protecting the revolutionary victories of socialism.

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Ways for Building Socialism in Our Nation.  
A Developed Socialist Society--An Essential Stage in Communist Construction

In beginning to give the material on the first question, it is essential to point out that the dream of a just society in which there will be no room for the suppression of man by man arose long ago. The progressive minds of mankind have repeatedly put forward plans for a society where, in their opinion, justice and equality would reign and reason would be triumphant. However the paths proposed by them for social changes in a society were unrealistic and unattainable.

The only dependable way to destroy the exploiting system and create a classless society was pointed out to mankind by K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin. They elaborated the theory of scientific communism. What is the sense of this teaching and what are its basic provisions? What is communism?

Communism is a classless social system with unified nationalized ownership of the means of production, with full social equality for all members of society, where along with the all-round development of people the productive forces will grow on the basis of constantly developing science and technology, where all the springs of social wealth will flow in full stream and where the great principle of "from each according to his abilities and to each according to his needs" will be realized. Communism is a high organized society of free and aware workers in which social self-government has been established and where labor for the good of society becomes for everyone the prime vital need and an aware necessity, and the abilities of each will be employed with the greatest benefit for the people.

High communist awareness, industriousness and discipline, dedication to social interests are inseparable qualities for a man of a communist society.

Communism ensures the continuous development of social production and a rise in labor productivity on a basis of rapid scientific-technical progress. It arms man with the most advanced and powerful equipment, it raises the dominance of man over

nature to an enormous height and provides an opportunity to control its spontaneous forces evermore fully. A higher level of the planned organization of the entire social economy is achieved and there is the more efficient and reasonable use of the material wealth and labor resources for satisfying the needs of the members of society.

Under communism there will be no classes, the socioeconomic and cultural differences between the city and countryside will disappear and in terms of the development level of the productive forces and the nature of labor, the forms of production relationships, domestic conditions and the degree of prosperity of the population the countryside will rise up to the level of the city. With the victory of communism there will be an organic unification of mental and physical labor in the production activities of people. The intelligentsia will cease being a separate social stratum and the workers of physical labor will rise up to the level of people engaged in mental labor in terms of the cultural and technical level.

Thus, communism will put an end to the dividing of society into classes and social strata, while all history of mankind, with the exception of primitive times, has been a history of a class society. The dividing into opposing classes led to the exploitation of man by man, to class struggle and antagonism between nations and states.

Under communism, all people will have an equal status in society, the same relationship to the means of production and equal conditions for labor and distribution. They will be actively involved in the management of social affairs. Harmonious relationships will be established between the individual and society on a basis of a unity of social and personal interests. The needs of people, with all their enormous diversity, will express the healthy and reasonable demands of a well-rounded person.

To provide continuous progress of society and to offer each member of society the material and cultural good for his growing needs and individual requests and tastes—this is the aim of communist production. The needs of people will be satisfied from social funds. Consumer goods will be in the full possession and disposal of each member of society.

A communist society based upon highly organized production and developed equipment changes the nature of labor but does not free the members of a society from labor. It in no way will be a society of anarchy, idleness and emptiness. Each able-bodied person will participate in social labor and ensure the continuous growth of the material and spiritual wealth of society. Due to the change in the nature of labor and to the greater technical equipping of it and due to the high level of awareness, all members of society will develop an inner need to work voluntarily and by inclination for the social good.

Communist production requires high organization, clarity and discipline which are achieved not by coercion but rather on a basis of the understanding of social duty. They are determined by the entire way of life of the communist society. Labor and discipline will not be a burden for man; labor activities cease being solely a means for existence and will be turned into true creativity and a source of joy.

Communism represents a higher form for the organization of social life. All production will be combined harmoniously into a common planned economy and into a single pace of social labor.

Under communism there will be the ever-greater drawing together of nations on a basis of the full commonness of economic, political and spiritual interests, fraternal friendship and cooperation.

Communism is a system where the capabilities and talents, the finest moral qualities of a free man flourish and are fully disclosed. Family relationships will be finally purged of material considerations and will be based completely upon feelings of reciprocal love and friendship.

Socialism is the first phase of a communist society. Precisely this social order replaces capitalism. But this does not occur spontaneously but rather is won in a stubborn class struggle. A socialist revolution and the establishing of a dictatorship of the proletariat are the only possible path for the overthrow of capitalism.

K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin scientifically proved that socialist revolutions are the natural result of the extreme exacerbation of all the contradictions of a capitalist society, and above all the basic one, the contradiction between the social nature of production and the private capitalist form of the appropriation of its results. Historical experience has fully confirmed this conclusion.

It is essential to point out that proletarian revolutions are not made by order and the prerequisites for them mature unevenly. In analyzing the higher and last stage of capitalism, imperialism, V. I. Lenin reached the inspired conclusion that a socialist revolution can be victorious initially in several countries or even in one individual bourgeois country. And events subsequently developed in precisely this manner. The revolution occurred initially in Russia and then the capitalist world lost another 15 states which began the path of socialist development.

The fundamental question of any revolution is the question of power, and for a socialist revolution, the winning of power by the working class and the establishing of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Either the power of the working class acting in alliance with all the working people or the power of the bourgeoisie. No third path is given. The dictatorship of the proletariat is essential to suppress the resistance of the overthrown classes, to build a socialist society and to organize its defense against imperialist aggressors. Without the dictatorship of the proletariat a transition from capitalism to socialism is impossible. "Development forward, that is, toward communism," emphasized V. I. Lenin, "occurs through the dictatorship of the proletariat and there can be no other way as it is impossible to break the resistance of the capitalist exploiters by any other means" (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 33, p 88).

The social basis of this dictatorship is the alliance of the working class and the working peasantry with the leading role of the proletariat and its party. The teachings about the party are a component part of Lenin's theory of a socialist revolution. Precisely the Marxist party acts as the vanguard in the struggle of all the workers to overthrow the rule of the exploiters and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat and to build socialism and communism. This is why V. I. Lenin



taught that "without a party that is iron and tempered in the struggle..., which is able to follow the mood of the masses and influence it, it is impossible to successfully conduct such a struggle" (PSS, Vol 41, p 27).

The Bolshevik party created by Lenin in Russia became a truly militant Marxist party. It raised up the working masses of the Russian Empire to storm the power of the landowners and capitalists, it overthrew this power and, having established a dictatorship of the proletariat, created a new type of state, a Soviet socialist state, the basic weapon for building socialism and communism and for defending the revolutionary victories of the people. "We have the right to be proud," wrote V. I. Lenin, "and consider ourselves fortunate that we were the first to overthrow in one corner of the world that wild beast, capitalism, which covered the world in blood and brought mankind to hunger and despair..." (PSS, Vol 36, p 478).

The Great October Socialist Revolution led our country to the path of socialism. The path which the Soviet people had to follow was difficult and untrodden. The reactionary forces of the old world did everything to strangle Soviet power. The Soviet republic had to live through a great deal, the intervention and Civil War, conspiracies and subversion, sabotage and terror. The construction of socialism was impeded by the economic and cultural backwardness of the nation. The victorious workers and peasants did not have the skills of state administration or experience in building a new society. The difficulties were exacerbated by the fact that for almost 30 years the USSR was the world's only socialist state and was subjected to fierce attacks of the hostile capitalist encirclement. For this reason the class struggle in our nation during the transitional period from capitalism to socialism had a very intense and acute nature.

In such a complex situation the party of the working class needed exceptional strength, monolithic organization and solidarity and a firm belief in its own forces and in the forces of the people. And the party was up to the situation. Under the leadership of V. I. Lenin it worked out and implemented a plan for building socialism in our nation. The industrialization of the USSR was a feat of the working class and all the people. The transition of the Soviet countryside to a large-scale socialist system marked a great revolution in economic relationships and in the way of life of the peasantry. During the years of the construction of socialism, our country in which a majority of the population was illiterate accomplished an unprecedented ascent to the heights of science and culture. Thus, as the Party Program has pointed out, socialism the inevitability of which was scientifically predicted by Marx and Engels and the plan for building of which was outlined by Lenin became a reality in the Soviet Union. Mankind gained a really existing socialist society and a practically tested science for its construction. The highway to socialism was built. Many peoples are already following it. Sooner or later all peoples will follow it.

Socialism once and for all put an end to private ownership and the exploitation of man by man. In the USSR two friendly classes remain, the working class and the peasantry. The closeness of the two forms of ownership of the means of production--nationalized and kolhoz-cooperative--has strengthened the alliance of the workers and peasants and has made their friendship indestructible. In the nation a new, democratic intelligentsia loyal to socialism has grown up. The opposition between city and countryside and between mental and physical labor has been eliminated and

unprecedented sociopolitical and ideological unity has been achieved in Soviet society.

Our nation has realized the basic principle of socialism: "From each according to his abilities to each according to his labor." This makes it possible to best reconcile the personal and social interests of the citizens and serves as a dependable means for further increasing the economic might of the nation and for the growth of the prosperity of the people. The activeness of the working masses in building a new life is a law of socialism and its aim is the ever fuller satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of the people by the on-going development and improvement of production.

The greatest victory of socialism is the just resolution to the nationality question. The unification and consolidation of equal peoples on voluntary bases in the unified multinational Soviet state, their close cooperation and fraternal friendship, the flourishing of their economy and culture are the most important result of the carrying out of Lenin's nationality policy by the party.

The immortal feat of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces which won an historic victory in the Great Patriotic War became a vivid manifestation of the might and vitality of socialism. This victory strengthened the authority and international standing of the USSR and opened up new favorable opportunities for the growth of the forces of socialism, national liberation, democracy and peace throughout the world. The formation and strengthening of the world socialist system were the most significant event in the history of mankind since the victory of Great October. In the postwar years, the revolutionary struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries has intensified significantly. The national liberation movement of the suppressed Asian, African and Latin American peoples has assumed gigantic scope and the colonial system of imperialism has collapsed.

It must be pointed out that the transition of mankind from capitalism to socialism has been a complex and difficult path of fierce class engagements and of struggle against a strong and dangerous enemy. Having begun it, the peoples have already achieved a great deal. The international communist movement, in being headed by the revolutionary forces of the modern world, is moving steadily forward. Each of these forces has contributed to the great cause of the revolutionary transformation of the world. Their blows against imperialism are increasing day after day. And we are firmly convinced that the final victory of the forces of peace and progress over the reaction and the victory of socialism over capitalism are inevitable.

For more than 63 years now our motherland, the USSR, has been in the vanguard of the struggle to create socialism and communism throughout the world. The greatness of what has been achieved in the Soviet nation is most vividly and completely seen in the building of a developed socialist society. The communist party and the Soviet people have successfully carried out Lenin's legacy on the necessity of firmly and consistently working toward the full development and strengthening of the new society and creating a mature socialism, a completed form of socialism (see PSS, Vol 36, pp 65-66, 139; Vol 21, p 33).

A complete description of a developed socialist society is contained in the current USSR Constitution. "In continuing their creative activities, the workers of the



USSR," states the Basic Law, "have ensured the rapid and all-round development of the nation and the improving of the socialist system. The alliance of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the people's intelligentsia has grown stronger as has the friendship between the nations and nationalities of the USSR. A socio-political and ideological unity has developed in Soviet society and here the leading force is the working class. Having carried out the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Soviet state has become one of all the people. The leading role of the Communist Party has risen as the vanguard of all the people."

It is important to describe a developed socialist society. At this stage, when socialism is developing on its own basis, the creative forces of the new system and the advantages of the socialist way of life are being evermore fully disclosed, the workers are evermore widely benefiting from the great revolutionary victories.

This is a society in which powerful productive forces and progressive science and culture have been created, in which the prosperity of the people is continuously growing and evermore favorable conditions are being created for the all-round development of the individual.

This is a society of mature socialist social relationships in which a new historical community of people, the Soviet people, has formed on the basis of the merging of all the classes and social strata, on a basis of legal and actual equality of all the nations and nationalities and their fraternal cooperation.

This is a society of high organization, ideological loyalty and consciousness of the workers who are patriots and internationalists.

This is a society in which concern of all for the good of each and concern of each for the good of all are a law of life.

This is a society of true democracy, the political system of which ensures effective control over social affairs, the evermore active involvement of the workers in state life, and the combining of the real rights and liberties of the citizens with their obligations and responsibility to society.

Marxism-Leninism teaches that the tasks of building communism are to be carried out in consecutive stages. V. I. Lenin repeatedly pointed to the necessity of distinguishing the stages, periods and steps in the development of each phase of the communist society for elaborating the party's correct line. Thus, developed socialism is a natural stage on the path to communism.

The highest goal of the Soviet state is the building of a classless communist society in which communist social self-government will be developed. The main tasks of the socialist state of all the people include: The creation of the material and technical basis of communism, the improving of socialist social relationships and their transformation into communist ones, the indoctrination of a man of a communist society, a rise in the material and cultural standard of living of the workers, ensuring the security of the nation and helping to strengthen peace and develop international cooperation.

## 2. The Successes of the Soviet People in Carrying Out the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the Plans of the Tenth Five-Year Plan

In beginning to give the material on the second question, it is essential to point out that the next 26th CPSU Congress will sum up the results of the creative activities of the Soviet people during the Tenth Five-Year Plan and determine the tasks for the future. Our nation is moving steadily forward in all areas of communist construction. Its economic potential is mighty. In just 5 days we produce a national income equal to its annual volume in 1928, that is, on the eve of the First Five-Year Plan. Over the years of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, the national income of our motherland increased by 400 billion rubles. Some four-fifths of it has been directly used for consumption by the population and for housing-service and socio-cultural construction.

The national economy received 635 billion rubles of capital investments and over 1,200 major industrial enterprises were put into operation. Many of them in terms of the unit capacity, the level of technology and the degree of mechanization and automation, represent truly unique facilities and embody the most recent achievements of scientific and technical progress. Among them are such flagships of our national economy as the Atomash (Nuclear Engineering Machinery) Plant, the Kama Truck Plant, the Zeya and Nurek GES and many others.

During the years of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, industry produced 717 million rubles more product than in the previous one. The Soviet Union now produces one-fifth of the industrial product of the entire world. The nation holds first place in the world in terms of the production of steel, oil (including gas condensate), iron and manganese ores, coke, mineral fertilizers, cement, diesel and electric locomotives and certain other types of products.

On the basis of the party's agrarian policy, great work has been done to further raise agriculture. Over the last three five-year plans, around 400 million rubles of capital investments have been channeled into the development of this sector. This has made it possible to substantially increase the material and technical base and raise agricultural productivity. Over the last three five-year plans, the annual average volume of gross agricultural product has increased by 1.5-fold.

The Soviet people have every right to be proud of the successes of social science and of the fact that they were the first to begin using atomic energy for peaceful purposes and the first to go into outer space. The peoples of the world with unflagging interest have followed the recent flights in which citizens of the fraternal socialist countries participated along with the Soviet cosmonauts. These flights have become a new embodiment of the great force of fraternity among the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

During the Tenth Five-Year Plan an extensive social program was carried out and there was a further rise in the prosperity of the people. Consumption funds increased by more than 60 billion rubles. Each year 10-11 million Soviet people receive new dwellings. The real income of the population over the last three five-year plans has almost doubled. Wages have increased constantly and these are the main source of income for the workers. Over the last 15 years, the output volume of consumer goods has increased by 2.5-fold. Their assortment has been replaced and

the quality improved. During the years of the Tenth Five-Year Plan alone, 790 billion rubles worth of consumer goods were produced and this was 170 billion more than in the Ninth Five-Year Plan. The public consumption funds are playing an even more substantial role in increasing the prosperity of the people. In this five-year plan, they reached the enormous amount of 527 billion rubles.

The five-year plan which is ending has been characterized by a further strengthening of the sociopolitical and ideological unity of Soviet society and of the unshakable fraternal community of peoples in our multinational socialist motherland. Soviet democracy has been further developed. The involvement of the workers in managing the affairs of society and the state has become broader, while the activities of the trade unions, the Komsomol and the other mass social organizations have increased. The role of the labor collectives and people's control has risen. The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination" has had a great impact upon the situation and on improving and bettering the entire question of the indoctrination of a new man.

Our successes have been achieved primarily as a result of the unstinting labor of the Soviet people. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, on behalf of the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, expressed gratitude and heartfelt thanks to all the leading collectives and to all the workers of the city and the countryside who by their labor ensured the fulfillment of the quotas of the five-year plan and have done everything for the flourishing of our motherland. In being proud of the historic accomplishments of the socialist fatherland, the Soviet people are turning their views to the Communist Party which, as is stated in the USSR Constitution, exists for the people and serves the people. Armed by Marxist-Leninist teachings, it determines the general prospects for the development of society, the line of USSR domestic and foreign policy, it guides the great creative activities of the Soviet people and gives a planned and scientifically sound nature to their struggle for the victory of communism. In the Leninist Communist Party the Soviet people rightly see their wise political leader and tested and dependable guide. Through the wholehearted serving of the cause of communism and peace and the happiness of the working people it has won the infinite confidence, authority and affection of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the people's intelligentsia of our nation.

To make maximum use of our enormous economic potential and the advantages of the socialist planned economy, to put all reserves into serving the national economy and to decisively and energetically overcome shortcomings and omissions in economic activities--this is the main political task in our times as posed by the party. Proceeding from these fundamental ideas, the draft of the CPSU Central Committee "Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990" has been worked out.

Each day the nation-wide competition under the motto "A Shock Finish for the Five-Year Plan. A Worthy Greeting for the 26th CPSU Congress!" grows broader. This clearly manifests the patriotism of the Soviet people and their desire to greet the congress of their party with new labor achievements. The Soviet people are successfully carrying out its magnificent plans and are taking ever-new goals in the struggle to build communism.



### 3. The Tasks of the Men of the Army and Navy in Properly Defending the Peaceful Creative Labor of the Soviet People

In beginning to give the material on the third question, it is essential to point out that the building of communism in our nation is being carried out under a difficult international situation. Loyal to Leninist foreign policy principles, our party has consistently and steadily carried out a course of maintaining peace and detente and checking the arms race and is struggling for disarmament. This course is opposed by the forces of militarism and aggression and by the actions of American imperialism and the aggressive NATO bloc. The tense situation in the world has been further complicated by the rapprochement of Beijing with the most aggressive circles of the United States and the other imperialist states. As was emphasized at the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the partnership of imperialism and Beijing hegemonism represents a new dangerous phenomenon in world politics.

In the international situation which has been exacerbated by the most aggressive imperialist circles, the CPSU and the Soviet government have shown truly Leninist restraint, firmness and principledness in decisively defending and carrying out a policy of preserving peace and ensuring the security of peoples. At the same time the Soviet state has been constantly concerned with the strengthening of our Armed Forces and making certain that they meet the high demands of ensuring the security of our motherland and the great victories of socialism. The all-round political cooperation between the states of the socialist commonwealth and their close collaboration in the economic, scientific-technical and cultural areas are a guarantee for the further strengthening of the might and influence of socialism and a dependable shield against any intrigues by the warmongers.

The 25th CPSU Congress posed a responsible mission for the USSR Armed Forces, that is, to guard the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and be a bulwark of universal peace. The Soviet military are proud of the fact that they are the defenders of the world's first socialist state of all the people and that they serve in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces. Our Army and Navy embody the finest traits of the multinational Soviet people. Inherent to them are social unity, moral-political solidarity and ardent patriotism and internationalism. The Soviet military are persons indoctrinated in the immortal Marxist-Leninist ideas and who are totally dedicated to their people and the socialist motherland and to the great cause of October. Citizens of a developed socialist society with full rights, they take an active part in the political and social life of the country, by their military service they make a weighty contribution to the nationwide cause of building communism and are participating actively in the socialist competition to properly celebrate the 26th CPSU Congress. Military service for them is a good school of tenacity and discipline, technical and professional knowledge and political training.

Every Soviet serviceman—from a soldier to a marshal, from a sailor to an admiral—is profoundly aware that the strength and might of the Army and Navy lie in the leadership of the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee. Due to the constant concern of the party and to the heroic labor of the Soviet people, the Soviet Army and Navy possess first-rate weapons and military equipment and highly trained military personnel. The development of our Armed Forces has occurred in the general channel of the creation of a new society. The qualitative level achieved by them has been the result of the great force of socialism, the enormous advantages of the Soviet

social and state system and of the constant activities of the CPSU to strengthen the defense capability of the nation.

The economic and scientific-technical might of our state, the sociopolitical and ideological unity of Soviet society and the unshakable friendship of the Soviet peoples--this is what comprises the stable foundation for the high combat readiness of the Army and Navy. Their material and technical basis ensures the successful carrying out of any combat missions on land, in the air and at sea. The personnel of our Armed Forces excels in its high educational level. At present virtually all the men of the Army and Navy have an education of at least eight grades, while the share of servicemen with a higher and secondary education is about 80 percent. The communists and Komsomol members are a mighty unifying force in the Army and Navy and they comprise an absolute majority of the personnel.

The might of our Armed Forces is aimed totally at carrying out the great mission of dependably defending the victories of October, the fruits of the creative labor of the Soviet people and universal peace in the world. In carrying out this noble mission, the Soviet military, along with the personnel in the fraternal armies of the socialist countries, are making a worthy contribution to ensuring the necessary external conditions for the successful construction of socialism and communism.

The men of the Army and Navy are well aware that to worthily carry out their military duty means primarily to ensure constant combat readiness. And the combat readiness of the Armed Forces is comprised of the combat readiness of the units and ships, the companies and batteries, platoons, squads, crews and depends ultimately upon the ideological tempering and skill of each man. Combat readiness is a state of the Army and Navy whereby they are capable at any moment and under the most complicated conditions to repel and thwart aggression from wherever it might originate and whatever means our opponents may employ. In remembering this, the Soviet military constantly study military affairs. They ably control complex combat vehicles, missile complexes and radioelectronic systems, they operate nuclear submarines and supersonic aircraft, and master the methods of the combat employment of various other military equipment. They realize that the service duty and moral duty of each serviceman consist in an on-going improvement in combat skills and the shaping of high moral-political and combat qualities. Tenacity and stubbornness multiplied by high political awareness aid the young men in more rapidly becoming true soldiers and sailors, able and courageous defenders of their socialist motherland.

In approaching the 26th CPSU Congress, the men of the Army and Navy have honorably completed the jubilee training year, the year of the 110th birthday of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. High socialist obligations have been successfully fulfilled by a predominant majority of the sub-units, units and ships, while the number of outstanding men in training and class specialists has risen. Precise teamwork and the ability with tactical skill to carry out the given missions under the most complicated conditions have been demonstrated by the personnel in exercises, firings, rocket launches, flights, in sea cruises, and in the course of the exercises for all types of combat training.

The combat training of the troops is rich in examples of tenacity and stubbornness in the struggle to carry out the socialist obligations. However, the successes achieved in the competition do not give us any right to be complacent. All the more

as during the last training year certain subunits did not fulfill their obligations. Individual military collectives at the end of the training year did not show proper tenacity in the struggle to fulfill the plans and programs for combat and political training and the socialist obligations.

A propagandist proceeds correctly if, using the specific examples of his subunit, unit or ship, he demonstrates how the pacesetters in the socialist competition are working conscientiously in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress and how they are achieving high indicators in training and service. A word must be said about those who are not working at full strength, those who must shape up, and the shortcomings eliminated.

In completing the statement of the material on the subject, it is important again to emphasize the enormous significance of the military service of the Soviet military for ensuring the invincible defense capability of the Soviet state and the dependable safeguarding of the peaceful creative labor of the builders of communism. Inseparably linked with the people and directed by the party of Lenin, the USSR Armed Forces have been and remain the dependable safeguard for the great victories of socialism and a powerful bastion of peace and security of peoples. They are always ready to honorably carry out their patriotic and international duty.

During the hours of independent study, the students should study the works of V. I. Lenin such as "The Great Undertaking" (PSS, Vol 39, pp 5-6, 13-26) and "Tasks of the Youth Unions" (PSS, Vol 41, pp 298-318); the Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR (Preamble, Articles 31, 32, 62, 63); the report of L. I. Brezhnev "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXV S'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], pp 22-29, 83-89); the materials of the June and October (1980) plenums of the CPSU Central Committee (PRAVDA, 24 June and 22 October 1980); the decisions of the Fourth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Tenth Sitting (PRAVDA, 23-24 October 1980); the draft of the CPSU Central Committee for the 26th Party Congress "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990" (PRAVDA, 2 December 1980); the first chapter of the textbook for political exercises "Nasha Tsel'--Kommunizm" [Our Goal--Communism] (Voenizdat, 1976).

In the evening it is wise to organize for the students the showing of the following films: "The Communist," "Kremlin Chimes," "Officers," "The Father of a Soldier," as well as the film strip "From Socialism to Communism." In the seminar exercise (in the talk), it is recommended that the following questions be discussed: 1. What is the communist socioeconomic formation? 2. What are the basic traits of a developed socialist society? 3. What successes have been achieved by the Soviet people in carrying out the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the plans of the Tenth Five-Year Plan? 4. What is the objective necessity for strengthening the defense capability of our country? 5. What does it mean for the Soviet serviceman to be in constant combat readiness and to properly greet the 26th CPSU Congress?

#### Literature for Propagandists

1. V. I. Lenin, "State and Revolution," PSS, Vol 33, pp 86-87, 91-102.
2. V. I. Lenin, "The Next Tasks of Soviet Power," PSS, Vol 36, pp 165-208.



3. V. I. Lenin, "The Great Undertaking," PSS, Vol 39, pp 1-29.
4. "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) SSSR" [USSR Constitution (Basic Law)], Preamble, Articles 31, 32, 62, 63.
5. "Programma KPSS" [The CPSU Program], pp 3-11, 62-66, 110-112.
6. L. I. Brezhnev, "The Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy," "Materialy XXV S'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], pp 3-89.
7. L. I. Brezhnev, "Report at the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee," PRAVDA, 24 June 1980.
8. L. I. Brezhnev, "Speech at Alma-Ata in the Celebration of the 60th Anniversary of Kazakhstan and the Kazakh Communist Party," PRAVDA, 30 August 1980.
9. L. I. Brezhnev, "Speech at the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee," PRAVDA, 22 October 1980.
10. "Materials of the Fourth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Tenth Sitting," PRAVDA, 23-24 October 1980.
11. "Draft of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress 'Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990'," PRAVDA, 2 December 1980.
12. N. A. Tikhonov, "According to Lenin's Legacy, Along the Path of October," PRAVDA, 7 November 1980.
13. D. F. Ustinov, "60 Let na Strazhe Zavoyevenny Velikogo Oktyabrya" [Sixty Years on Guard for the Victories of Great October], Politizdat, 1978.

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## ARMED FORCES

### CONTENTS OF MILITARY PRESS REVIEWED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 80 (signed to press 4 Dec 80) pp 83-85

[Unattributed article: "The Competition and the Press"]

[Text] The Decree of the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the materials of the Fourth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Tenth Sitting, and the speech at the plenum by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in being greeted with great enthusiasm by the men of the Armed Forces, as by all the Soviet people, evoked in them a new upsurge in political, service and labor activities. This has been expressed in the socialist competition and in the increased efforts by the men for combat improvement. With a great political upsurge and enthusiasm each armed service has welcomed the patriotic initiative approved by the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and initiated by the personnel of the leading units and atomic submarine to widely develop a socialist competition in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress under the motto "For High Combat Readiness and Firm Military Order!"

The taking up of the course of the socialist competition and the showing of its pre-congress scope and high effectiveness are one of the central themes in the military press. In carrying out the demands of the party on the mass information and propaganda media as found in the April (1979) Decree of the CPSU Central Committee on ideological questions and the recommendations of the All-Union Conference of Ideological Workers and the Meeting of the Command and Political Leadership of the Army and Navy (1980), the newspapers have thoroughly shown the struggle of the men to completely carry out the obligations assumed to commemorate the 26th CPSU Congress. The analyticalness and the acuteness of posing the problems have risen. Advanced experience is being propagandized more successfully. The shortcomings in the organization of the competition have been gone into more boldly. Criticism of laggards has been more acute. A definite system can be seen more and more clearly in the choosing of urgent questions, in the preparation of the materials and in the format of the newspaper columns. One cannot help but note that all departments of the editorial staffs are involved in the posing and working out of these problems. In all the articles, be it on the question of field skills or party political work, the organization of political studies or leisure, the individual soldier with his successes and thoughts, with his rich spiritual world, psychology and morality is being portrayed evermore fully, sharply and clearly.

On the pages of the district, group and fleet newspapers, an important place has been given to disclosing the indoctrinational significance of the socialist competition and to comprehensively depicting all its aspects, including moral aspects. This is clearly seen, for example, in the articles of the newspapers NA BOYEVOM POSTU of the Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District, FLAG RODINY of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet and ZASHCHITNIK RODINY of the Red Banner Odessa Military District. Diversely, in using various genres, in a planned and well thought-out manner they take up many aspects of this important theme. The editorials, theoretical and propaganda materials show the essence of the socialist competition and the Leninist principles of its organization, and the necessity is emphasized of a maximum realization of its indoctrinational opportunities. The articles, special-subject pages and selections of information show how these principles are actually embodied in daily life and disclose the experience of the commanders, the political workers and party and Komsomol organizations in indoctrinating high moral-combat qualities in the men. The authors of these articles, including leading commanders, political workers and the winners of the competition, knowledgeably popularize the examples of the better organization of the competition and show how it helps the men to successfully carry out the combat training missions and shape a highly moral personality in the armed defender of the socialist motherland.

For example, in the article "A Time of Difficult Truths" published in NA BOYEVOM POSTU under the heading "The Competition Indoctrinates," Capt A. Andrianov viewed the competition as a means for increasing the quality of the combat skills of the men and the effectiveness of indoctrination. The author's judgments and conclusions were reinforced by an analysis of the activities of Lt V. Ul'yanenkov in indoctrinating the men in the course of the competition. From this material one could see the growth of the young officer, his attaining the practical forms and methods of indoctrinating the men, the spiritual growth of the soldiers, their greater exactingness on themselves and higher personal responsibility for carrying out the assumed obligations. The article brought out the positive experience and was full of specific examples.

It is a positive feature that the newspapers endeavor to more deeply go into the moral motives of the competition and above all the desire of the men to greet the 26th CPSU Congress with high results in training and service and to achieve new heights in improving military skills, raising combat readiness and strengthening military discipline. The taking up of this question has occupied one of the basic areas of this subject. Each of the newspapers has its own approach to working out the materials and its own system for presenting them. For example, NA BOYEVOM POSTU publishes articles by the very participants of the competition as well as "round table talks" about the problems of indoctrination, reports on the special-subject evening meetings and informative materials devoted to important problems in the training and life of the troops, to generalizing and introducing into practice the advanced experience in the ideological and organizational work of the commanders and political workers and the party and Komsomol organizations in raising the effectiveness of troop indoctrination in the course of the competition.

On this level the article by Maj Gen Avn A. Sadovnikov is undoubtedly instructive. The author, on the basis of specific material from the practices of the units and subunits of the Moscow Air Defense District, shows how to raise the role of the competition in shaping the high moral-combat qualities of the men. The article disclosed the basic directions for carrying out this task and recommendations were

given which undoubtedly will help the commanders and political workers in working more specifically with subordinates and organizing more effectively the entire process of training and indoctrination.

We feel that the article "A Formula of Morality" would not leave the readers unmoved. This is a reflective article about the relationships between the competing men, unselfish mutual aid, honesty in the struggle for first place and pride of one's collective. It is about how important it is to indoctrinate high moral qualities in the men in the course of the competition.

The clarity and instructiveness of such articles lie in the specific demonstrating of the concrete actions of the competitors and the positive example. In propagandizing such moral values as serving the interests of the collective, a feeling of comradeship and responsibility, principledness and the unity of word and deed, the newspaper thereby shapes the reader's active position in life.

The depicting of the moral development of the men in the course of the competition is a complex thing. It cannot be approached with quantitative measurements. But the newspapers are more and more successfully carrying out these tasks. For example, ZASHCHITNIK RODINY regularly publishes materials which show the experience acquired in the troops for the effect of the competition on developing high moral and combat qualities in the men. In particular, the article in the column "The Competition Multiplies Forces" can be considered a success of the editorial collective. Its materials are written using the instructive examples from the life of an outstanding tank company and they show the experience and style of work of its commander, Sr Lt V. Dorofeyev, in indoctrinating his subordinates in the course of the competition. In summing up the results of training, he always analyzes the quantitative indicators (the result of firing, driving and so forth) in a unity with the moral ones such as: the activeness of the men in raising political and military knowledge, the attitude toward the job and toward the collective, participation in social work, concern for exemplary personal appearance, and so forth. Characteristic of the company commander, the article emphasizes, is a desire "to analyze the motives which inspire the men to unstinting training."

The other publications have also achieved numerous creative successes in the dealing with these questions. For example, in FLAG RODINY one must notice the planned and systematic approach in preparing the materials published under the heading "For the 26th, the Black Sea Sailors on the Shock Watch." Many of them emphasize that the indoctrinational role of the competition is fully manifested only when it is scientifically organized, dependably supported in material-organizational and moral-political terms, and when there is no concessions and eyewash. For example, the article by Maj L. Bleskin "A Prisoner of Formalism" shows the importance of studying the professional and moral qualities of the competitors and the importance of objectivity in determining the winners, it shows the harm of twaddle and sham and criticized those guilty of this.

The newspaper ZASHCHITNIK RODINY regularly publishes materials which analyze the experience in organizing the competition in field exercises and discloses the forms and methods of indoctrinating the men in high moral-combat qualities in the course of exercises, flights and the driving of combat vehicles. In truth, some of them are only formally related to this subject. For example, how do they choose the



comments published under the heading "In the Vanguard of the Competitors" which gives only information about the internal Komsomol work and about the role of the Komsomol meeting as a school of communist indoctrination. Certainly such articles are needed but obviously the heading should be the appropriate one.

A rise in the indoctrinational role of the competition is directly dependent upon its leadership by the commanders, political bodies, the staffs, the party organizations and upon the carrying out of the recommendations of the meeting of the command and political leadership of the Army and Navy aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of the competition. This idea runs constantly through many articles in the newspaper NA BOYEVOM POSTU. This can be seen from the appropriate headings such as: "The Commander--The Organizer of the Competition," "The Company--The Center of Political Indoctrination," "Communists and the Competition" and "The Competition: The Moral Aspect." The materials published in them are marked by instructiveness, by sound arguments and by an analysis of the shortcomings which prevent the servicemen from attaining the designated results.

Characteristic in this regard is the extensive material "The Regiments Compete" which takes up almost an entire column. In showing the situation in each of the collectives, the author of the article carefully, as they say "painstakingly" analyzes the forms and methods of leadership of the competition and shows its influence on the results of combat training and the indoctrination of the men. From instructive examples he points out that among the components of high indicators are greater attention by the organizers of the competition and the competitors themselves to its moral aspects.

The military reporters regularly turn to such a problem as the influence of the socialist competition on developing high discipline in the servicemen. For example, the newspaper NA BOYEVOM POSTU, in addition to independent articles, interviews and writings about the moral-political aspects of military discipline, regularly generalizes advanced experience and discloses shortcomings and formalism. This, in particular, can be seen from the article "Not Only a Technician..." which dealt with the experience of the best indoctrinators who, in the course of the competition, ably employ the most important principles and methods of military pedagogy and actively influence the men. Here also omissions by individual officers were disclosed in indoctrinational work and in strengthening discipline.

The competition provides great opportunities which help to shape high moral qualities and with particular clarity it realizes the most important moral criterion, the unity of word and deed. A correct, able combination of moral and material incentives is one of the effective instruments for strengthening such unity. The military press has disclosed the advanced experience in the troops in this area. In particular, in the newspaper FLAK RODINY one can find much that is instructive concerning the elaboration of this subject. Here it has become a firm practice to use such a form of treating the problems of moral incentives as letters from leading subunits and ships. As a rule, these are published under the heading "Who Now is Ahead?" and "The Right Flankers of the Competition." The same task is served by the publishing of portraits of leaders in the competition. This newspaper regularly propagandizes examples of how the military collectives create an atmosphere of respect for the winners of the competition and it describes the awarding of orders and medals, pennants and diplomas to them.

However, all that has been said here does not mean that the newspapers are fully utilizing the opportunities to thoroughly take up the course of the competition and its indoctrinational role. On their pages one at times encounters superficial, excessively rhetorical and poorly reasoned articles in which the moral aspects of the competition are merely designated by rote turns of phrase, while analysis of actual practice is replaced by the listing of measures. Such failings can be found, in particular, in the article "Combat Near the Ground" and "When Seconds Count" (the newspaper NA BOYEVOM POSTU) and the article "By Word and Personal Example" published in FLAG RODINY under the heading "Party Life: Communists and the Competition." Judging from the title, it should be a question of the role of the communists in the struggle to carry out the pre-congress obligations, in ensuring the high effectiveness of the competition and raising its indoctrinational function. But in fact a larger portion of the article was devoted to listing the measures carried out by the party organization and these did not have any direct bearing on the subject of the heading.

The reviewed newspapers often generalize the experience of the leading units and the initiators of the competition, devoting to them, as a rule, entire columns where they describe various aspects in the life and service of the men and the carrying out of their assumed obligations. And this, certainly, brings definite good. But they still rarely take up the experience of organizing the competition among the officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "midman"] and their influence on developing high moral qualities among the competitors.

The military service of the men and their desire to completely carry out the socialist obligations assumed in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress require a vivid, emotional and convincing word and militant party writing. A clear guideline in carrying out this complicated and responsible task is the requirements and instructions of the CPSU Central Committee as formulated in the Decree "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination" and in the speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the presentation of the Lenin Prize to him.

The editorial bodies of the district and fleet newspapers must in every possible way contribute to the success of the socialist competition in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress and to orienting the competing servicemen at achieving high end results in carrying out the tasks of combat training, improving the skills of the troops and naval forces, increasing efficiency and the quality of the training and service of the personnel and the successful fulfillment of the tasks posed by the minister of defense for 1981.

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## AIR FORCES

### MARSHAL KUTAKHOV ON TRAINING OBJECTIVES, RESULTS

Moscow KOMBUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 80 (signed to press 4 Dec 80) pp 23-31

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, Chief Mar Avn P. Kutakhov, commander-in-chief of the Air Forces and USSR Deputy Minister of Defense: "To Raise Masters of Air Combat"]

[Text] Our socialist motherland is on the eve of the start of 1981, the year of the 26th CPSU Congress. The Soviet people are preparing to properly greet the congress and by new labor successes are strengthening the might of the Soviet nation thereby expressing their loyalty to the cause of communism and their unshakable unity with the party of Lenin.

The military aviators, like all the personnel of the Armed Forces, with a feeling of enormous pride for their motherland have wholeheartedly accepted and fervently approved the decisions of the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the Fourth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet as well as the provisions and conclusions drawn in the speech by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, at the plenum.

Our path is a bright and straight one. We look with confidence toward the future. The Tenth Five-Year Plan has affirmed the correctness of the CPSU economic strategy as elaborated at the 24th and 25th party congresses. The economic, defense and spiritual potential of our state has risen significantly. Magnificent plans for communist construction have been outlined in the draft of the CPSU Central Committee for the 26th Party Congress "Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1981-1985 and for the Period up to 1990." This is now being widely discussed throughout the nation. In domestic and foreign policy, the party is steadily following the tested Leninist course.

Due to the efforts of the USSR and the other socialist countries, the positions of socialism have been strengthened. However, recently the forces of reaction and aggression have become noticeably more active and they have been unable to accept the irreversible historical changes and the new balance of forces existing on the international scene.

The military-political leadership of the NATO countries headed by the United States has increased its efforts to undermine international detente, it has set a gigantic arms race spiraling endeavoring to achieve military superiority over the Warsaw Pact nations. The Beijing hegemonists have sided with the imperialist reaction in calling openly for the creation of a unified anti-Soviet front. The strengthening of the military danger has become a cruel reality of our times.

In such a situation the USSR has been forced to be constantly concerned with the strengthening of its defense capability and for further increasing the combat capability and readiness of the Armed Forces. The 25th CPSU Congress emphasized that "no one should have any doubt that our party will do everything so that the glorious USSR Armed Forces in the future will possess all of the necessary means for carrying out their responsible task of guarding the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and being a bulwark of universal peace."

During the years which have passed since the 25th CPSU Congress, the Soviet Armed Forces have taken a significant step ahead in their development. Due to the constant concern of the Communist Party, its Leninist Central Committee, the Central Committee Politburo and the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and as a result of the successes of our people in economic, scientific and technical development, the combat might and the readiness of our Army and Navy to immediately repel any aggressor have risen.

Enormous qualitative changes have also occurred in the Air Force. Modern aviation has been equipped with supersonic, all-weather aircraft with powerful missile and canon weapons, diverse electronic equipment and automated control systems. Its combat might is based upon the formations and units having supersonic missile-carrying aircraft and bombers. The aviation missiles make it possible to hit enemy objectives without entering the zone of its air defenses.

The frontal [tactical] aviation is capable of successfully countering enemy aviation both on the ground and in the air, of providing dependable support for the Ground Forces and Navy, covering them from the air, conducting reconnaissance and carrying out other missions. The military air transport units possess aircraft of great cargo-carrying capacity and can move troops over great distances. Modern helicopters are a powerful weapon. The helicopter crews are capable of hitting tanks, missile units and artillery and destroying enemy personnel by precise strikes with missiles of varying types, by bombing, and by firing canons and machine guns.

Fundamental changes have also occurred in the training of the command, political, engineer and technical personnel. The transformation of the aviation pilots and navigator schools into higher military institutions of learning was a concrete manifestation of the concern of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government for the Air Force. They train officers with a higher special military education with the awarding of the qualification of "engineer-pilot" and "engineer-navigator."

Thus, at present the Air Force together with the other armed services as well as independently is capable of carrying out major operational-strategic missions. The technical equipping of the aviation fully conforms to the interests of reliably protecting the air frontiers and state interests of our motherland.

In carrying out the demands of the 25th Party Congress and the subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the instructions of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, on defense questions, the military councils, the commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations in their political and organizational work have primarily emphasized a profound mastery by the personnel of the complex aviation equipment, the working out of the most effective methods of combat employment and tactical procedures and the training of pilots, navigators and crews for bold and decisive actions in modern combat.

The course proclaimed by the 25th CPSU Congress of improving the quality and efficiency of all work have been perceived by the military aviators as a militant order by the party. They have constantly worked to improve the quality indicators for the combat readiness of the Armed Forces and for achieving the highest results in military service with the least expenditures of materiel.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War has convincingly shown that the Soviet military aviators were victorious over the enemy due to the spiritual superiority, to the perfect mastery of the aircraft and its weapons, to the use of new tactical procedures unknown to the enemy and the ability to hit the target with each bomb and each round on the first pass. These moral and combat qualities have fully maintained their importance in our times as well.

The present aviators are the worthy successors of the combat glory and military experience of the frontline veterans. In following the heroic traditions they, in their practical deeds, demonstrate their wholehearted dedication to the party and the people and their loyalty to the military oath and combat duty. In a difficult situation of training days the pilots show courage, valor and high moral, political and psychological qualities and they demonstrate their excellent flight skills and combat mastery.

The personnel of a majority of the units and formations has successfully carried out the plan quotas and socialist obligations of the previous training year. There has been a rise in the number of outstanding men in military and political training, class specialists, masters of air combat and combat employment, sharpshooter pilots and navigators and outstanding units and subunits. Among the right flankers of the competition are the aviators of the military collectives headed by the communists Officers A. Shestakov, A. Mironov, G. Kolodiy, V. Vasil'yev and many others.

For example, the Red-Banner Division imeni 60-letiya Velikogo Oktyabrya, for high indicators in military and political training and for flight skills, was declared to be a leading formation of the Air Force and received the rotating banner of the Air Force Military Council. The socialist pledges have been carried out fully and with a high quality by Red Banner Bomber Aviation Regiment which until recently was commanded by Col G. Treznyuk. Here all the commanders of the aircraft and 90 percent of the navigators are specialists 1st class, and 80 percent of the crews has achieved the title of outstanding.

The Red Banner Helicopter Regiment imeni V. I. Lenin is considered one of the best in the USSR Armed Forces. In this regiment Lenin's order to never remain on the achieved level but to constantly move forward and to continuously achieve more has

become an unswerving law. Two out of three aviators in the regiment are outstanding men in military and political training while 80 percent of the pilots and navigators are specialists 1st and 2d class.

The start of the new training year has shown that the leading aviation collectives, in using their acquired experience, are working fruitfully on carrying out the demands of the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the tasks posed by the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The already achieved results are not the limit and have not given rise to complacency among the aviators. They are aware that the interests of reliably defending the motherland and the complexity of the international situation demand from them an expert mastery of the weapons and military equipment, unflagging vigilance and high combat readiness. The increased demands upon flying and combat skills among the aviators oblige us to increase the quality level of their training in order to fully utilize the combat capabilities of the first-class equipment and gain the maximum effect from its combat employment. All of this was thoroughly and closely discussed in all the aviation units and formations in summing up the results of the last training year and in the report-election party meetings and party conferences. Specific measures were outlined and effective party decisions were taken aimed at further improving work in the area of indoctrinating true masters of air combat and combat employment who would be capable of carrying out the missions confronting them in the most difficult situation. Upon the initiative of the personnel from the Red Banner Guards Bomber Aviation Regiment under the command of Officer V. Rodionov, in the Air Force a socialist competition has developed widely to properly celebrate the 26th Party Congress and to achieve high end results in military and political training and in strengthening military discipline.

During the years which have passed since the 25th CPSU Congress there has been a noticeable rise in the training level of the personnel. The intense training of high-class air fighters, sharpshooter pilots and navigators in the leading aviation units has provided an opportunity for shifting them to a new qualitative state making it possible to successfully carry out the most complex combat missions.

A master of air combat and combat employment is above all an air fighter of high ideological tempering who is totally devoted to the motherland, the people and the Communist Party who possesses an unshakable will for victory and is ready for the sake of it to carry out any feat, even to the point of self-sacrifice. From the professional viewpoint, a master is a pilot who has perfectly mastered the aircraft and the weapons, a creatively thinking tactician who is capable to correctly employ the most recent procedures and methods for conducting air combat and hit the target on the first attack and with the first run. He is capable not only of intelligently piloting the aircraft during the day and at night, under simple and difficult weather conditions, at maximum low altitudes and in the stratosphere, but also to make full use of its combat capabilities. And, of course, a master of air combat and combat employment is a pilot who has an excellent knowledge of the equipment and tactics of the probable enemy, his strong and weak points, and who is capable of correctly utilizing this knowledge in combat for achieving victory. Inherent to him are good physical conditioning, high moral-psychological preparedness and tenacity in achieving the objective. A master pilot should show valor, courage, combat daring and an aggressive spirit and an ignorance of fear in combat.



Of course, all these qualities do not come spontaneously. Their formation begins in the schools and continues without interruption in the units in the process of daily military and political training. As experience shows, the determining condition for success in the training of masters of air combat and combat employment is its ideological focus and effectiveness. Political maturity and ideological conviction are the main thing which determines the conduct of a pilot both in daily life and in a combat situation. For this reason we endeavor to train air fighters not only in the professional, military-technical realm but primarily as conscious defenders of the interests of the Soviet state.

V. I. Lenin pointed out that a socialist army must be organized on the basis of political awareness, high ideological strength of its personnel and their profound understanding of their duty to defend the socialist fatherland.

In being guided by this advice of Lenin's, by the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the demands of the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination," the commanders, political bodies and the party organizations of the Air Force are constantly concerned with developing in the personnel a Marxist-Leninist ideology, communist conviction and dedication to the cause of socialism.

Working effectively and fruitfully in this regard are the political section of the Red Banner Division imeni 60-letiya Velikogo Oktyabrya and the unit party committee where Maj N. Kirichenko is the secretary. They are constantly concerned with introducing a comprehensive approach to indoctrination, to improving the quality of the Marxist-Leninist training of the officers, the scientific level, concreteness and offensive nature of agitation and propaganda. The political section and the party committee have already done a great deal to turn the primary party organizations and the party groups into centers of ideological indoctrination so that a profound study by the men of Lenin's ideological and theoretical heritage, the decisions of the 25th Party Congress, the subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the works and speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev become the core of this work.

The commanders and political workers, the party organizations of the units and sub-units are endeavoring to more profoundly understand the spiritual world of the aviators and to be more effectively concerned with political, military and moral indoctrination and with developing in them the qualities inherent to a politically aware and able air fighter. They constantly see to it that the political knowledge of the men is turned into their ideological convictions and on this basis the moral standards of conduct and a zealous attitude toward service are formed. It is a question that in the coming training year, the year of the 26th Party Congress, not to flag in our efforts in the area of the ideological saturation of the entire process of combat training and the improving of party political work, to achieve a rise in the indoctrinational role of each exercise, flight and drill and provide a comprehensive approach to the training of military aviators.

One of the most important aspects in the activities of the command and political leaders and the party organizations also is constant concern for a continuous improvement in the tactical skills of the crews. The constant equipping of aviation with new technology and weapons has introduced much that is new into the content and procedures of tactical training and into the moral, political and psychological



conditioning of the aviators. This has caused increased demands upon the organizing of military and political training and on the instruction and indoctrination of the personnel.

In the process of combat training, tactics are improved and new procedures of combat are sought out which most fully meet the combat properties of modern aviation weapons. The methods being worked out at present for the combat operations of the air units are based upon tested, reliable and scientifically sound conclusions obtained from an analysis of the exhaustible experience of the Great Patriotic War and the results of tactical flight and air exercises in the course of which the helicopter and airplane crews, in cooperating with the ground troops, demonstrate their high tactical and gunnery skills. Many aircraft commanders and crews in each flight demonstrate initiative, daring and decisiveness, that is, the finest qualities of combat aviators.

A further rise in the tactical training of the commanders, staffs and all the flight personnel in the air formations and units remains the primary task in the new training year as well. It is essential to search constantly for effective ways and tactical procedures for employing modern aviation weapons and for conducting air combat.

At present it is not enough to have just a theoretical solution to the constantly arising problems. It is also not enough to check out the discoveries of the innovators in research flights. Rather it is essential that all that is new and progressive be constantly introduced into the daily practices of combat training. This should be the constant concern of all the commanders and political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations. The interests of raising combat readiness dictate the necessity of deepening the search for the ways to optimize the employment of aviation during its joint operations with the ground forces under the conditions of unified command over the diverse resources involved in combat.

Modern tactics is closely linked to a whole series of other areas of aviation science. For example, without knowing aircraft aerodynamics and the particular features of its behavior in different flight modes, without studying aviation equipment and without having mastered all the "secrets" of its operation in the air, a pilot and group leader is not always able to realize even the most excellent tactical procedure and the high combat capabilities of a modern aviation complex. It cannot be considered that a pilot is thoroughly ready for a flight if he has not mastered the theoretical principles of maneuvering in air, piloting and the combat employment of the equipment or if he is unable to calculate the basic parameters of the combat flight and model the battle and strike against ground targets. Consequently, the task of improving the tactical skills of the flight personnel must be carried out in close unity with their thorough study of the modern equipment, aerodynamics and other special disciplines.

Actual combat training has convincingly shown that high professional skills of the flight crews and the expert mastery of modern aviation equipment and weapons can only be achieved in working out the appropriate training procedures for the flight personnel. Definite advances have been made in this area. The system of exercises to master the equipment, to study aerodynamics, the instructions and regulations has been improved. Methods have been developed for simulating various stages

of the flight and this is very important to achieve high efficiency of the aerial engagements and strikes against ground targets.

Particular attention has been given to training the flight leaders as instructors for difficult types of flights. This task is carried out not only in the units but also through centralized procedures. The flight leader is the first instructor of the pilot, the recognized leader of the combat collective and the indoctrinator of the young aviators, capable of organizing their instruction and their carrying out of the combat mission. The improvement in the skills of the air fighters depends largely upon his professional and pedagogical training.

The shaping up of the young flight personnel is of great significance for creating a reserve of future experts of air combat and combat employment. Purposefulness and tenacity in carrying out this task have made it possible in recent years to achieve a significant reduction in the time required for the professional training of the flight school graduates who have arrived in the units.

Careful ground preparations for each flight have always determined the success of air skills. At present the significance of these preparations have risen even more. The demands have increased immeasurably for the study of aerodynamics, the equipment, instructions and regulations and for using trainers to work out the actions of the crew in the air according to the mission and under special cases.

The units are carrying out extensive work in the creation and upgrading of the training facilities and in the more efficient use of modern multipurpose trainers. Monitoring equipment is being actively employed to analyze the quality of flight execution. Positive experience has been gained in organizing military technical propaganda. A great deal is being done to instill in the personnel a love for the military equipment and weapons and confidence in their strength and might as well as to indoctrinate a feeling of responsibility for their expert use.

Ultimately all of this contributes to the intelligent operation of the military equipment and weapons and to the maintaining of them in a proper working order ensuring high combat readiness of the air units and flight safety.

However, in this important area as well we have a number of reserves and unused opportunities which must be put into operation in the new training year. This is above all an improvement in the organization and methods for the professional training of the flight personnel, the search for new more efficient forms of work, greater exactingness in assessing the achieved level and in improving the work of introducing advanced experience and strengthening demandingness, control and a check on execution in all areas. The rapid shaping up of the young pilots and the training of instructor personnel also requires the constant attention of the commanders, political bodies, staffs and party organizations.

In the training of experts of air combat and combat employment we must make better use of the advanced experience acquired in many military collectives. We are obliged to do this by the decisions of the 25th Party Congress, the June and October (1980) plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the demands of the USSR minister of defense. The experience of the pacesetters will make it possible to more quickly reach the high goals of combat expertise and prevent the wasting of time and energy on searching for what has already been long discovered and tested out in practice.

For example, there is much that is instructive in the unit under the command of Lt Col V. Kopylov. Its efforts are based upon the individual work of the commanders, political workers and party activists with the pilots. This work is carried out continuously and all the more actively the more complex the missions which the subunits are to carry out. The leadership devotes great attention to the independent preparation of the pilots for the flights and to assisting them in mastering the theoretical knowledge and reinforcing practical skills. The commander, the staff and the political section of the unit, in relying on the party organizations, skillfully achieve a higher quality from each exercise in studying the aviation equipment and its capabilities, the aerodynamics of the aircraft and the questions of the theory of bombing, air gunnery and the launching of missiles. This is achieved by well thought-out planning of training and systematic supervision over the actual implementation of what has been outlined, due to well organized competition among the officers. Good results have also been achieved by the speeches given by experienced air fighters to the young pilots; these speeches are organized by the party bureaus. In the collective a great deal has been done to improve the training procedures for the special trainers and the aircraft cockpit. Here a clear system of organization and control has been instituted.

In order that each minute of the pilot's work in the air be employed with maximum efficiency to improve his skills, each flight starts with a training drill in the aircraft cockpit and ends with a detailed analysis using the monitoring equipment. The experience gained in each flight is employed for instructing not only the crew which has carried it out but also all the personnel of the subunit.

In the exercises all the crews of this unit have demonstrated high results. The combat training missions are carried out with particular success by the squadron of Maj L. Bondarenko. And this was the case also at the recent inspection exercise. In the course of the preparations for the flights, the squadron commander carried out a careful simulation of the forthcoming actions, he outlined the methods for seizing and maintaining initiative in the "engagement," he defined the tactical procedures of the crews and on the basis of playing out the dynamics of the forecasted development of events correctly assessed the possible responses by the "enemy." This made it possible for him to rationally allocate the squadron's forces in the tactical groups, to set specific missions for the leaders and to organize effective training for the personnel and the supervising of its preparedness for the combat training flight. The group leaders, having firmly assimilated the combat training missions and the plan of their commander, successfully controlled their wingmen in the air. This ensured the high-quality execution of the flight missions.

The definite successes achieved in the training of experts of air combat and combat employment cannot be a pretext for letting up on our efforts on this question, but on the contrary, should evoke even greater activeness by all categories of commanders and political workers and urge them to focus their efforts primarily on the overcoming of shortcomings. This is all the more essential as in the Air Force there are lagging troop collectives in which the organization and effectiveness of the training and indoctrinational process leave much to be desired.

The achieving of a high level of combat skills among the personnel with a simultaneous ensuring of flight safety is a serious problem requiring a practical resolution in the process of combat training.



It is no secret that sometime in organizing the air training of flyers elements of oversimplification, weakness and the overstating of grades are committed. Many years of work at familiar ranges, an approach to the target and attack from the same position without carrying out antiaircraft and antimissile avoidance maneuvers give rise to complacency in the flyers, this deprives them of the opportunity to show their abilities, it harms the indoctrination of the air fighters and creates conditions for potential air accidents. A particular danger of oversimplification and concessions is that the crews learn to act in a situation which is far from the real one which they would encounter under combat conditions. There must be a decisive struggle against this. We must erect a barrier to any attempts to seek out ways of a simplified approach to carrying out the complex tasks of the air and tactical skills of the flight crews and teach them what is needed in war.

The struggle for excellent combat skills and flight safety is effective when it is carried out in an integrated manner. It is important to find a rational combination of these two complementary areas and on this basis ensure high combat training of the air units and fully exclude the possibility of accidents and disasters.

The carrying out of the great and complex tasks of the new training year depends largely upon the effectiveness of party political work. In the course of the reports and elections there has been a rise in the militancy of the primary party organizations and the activities of the communists and their influence on the personnel has been strengthened. The party meetings and conferences generalized the advanced experience, the shortcomings were critically analyzed and many valuable proposals were made by the communists. Their effective implementation undoubtedly will help improve the indoctrination of the men in a spirit of the wholehearted serving of the motherland, the conscientious carrying out of official duty, in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism. It will help raise the intensity and effectiveness of the training process. In the future the determining factor in party political work should be the mobilizing of the personnel to further improve the quality of combat and political training, the improving of air skills, the profound mastery of the military equipment and weapons, the strengthening of discipline and the successful carrying out of the training plans and programs and the socialist obligations assumed in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress. By all the forms and methods of work it is essential to develop in the flyers a desire to become true experts of air combat who are up to any mission.

In the training of the masters of air combat and combat employment it is difficult to overstate the role of the socialist competition. It helps to develop creative initiative among the aviators, comradely mutual aid in training and to disseminate the most effective forms of work. It is essential to steadily carry out the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Socialist Competition to Properly Celebrate the 26th CPSU Congress" and the recommendations of the USSR minister of defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy which approved the patriotic initiative of the personnel of the units and the nuclear missile submarine who were the initiators of the competition in the armed services.

The effectiveness of the competition, as is known, to a decisive degree depends upon its organization and upon the ability of the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations to activate this powerful lever for increasing the creative activeness and initiative of the men. For this reason it is very



important to continuously improve the organization of the socialist competition between the servicemen, the subunits and units, in more specifically defining its tasks both in terms of the periods of instruction and in the process of daily training, and in every possible way develop the movement for the title of leading formation. Correct actions are followed by those commanders and chiefs of political bodies and staffs which instruct the officers in the methods of organizing the competition in exercises, in the course of the flights, and in an exacting and objective assessment of its results. The question is as follows: the competition in fact should become everywhere an inseparable part of the training and indoctrination process and the level of its leadership should be viewed as an indicator of the professional and party maturity of the commander.

By their joint efforts, the commanders, the political bodies, the staffs, the party and Komsomol organizations must direct the socialist competition in honor of the approaching 26th Party Congress into the following areas: a thorough study and actual realization of its decisions, increasing vigilance and combat readiness, a quality execution of missions under any situational conditions, a further strengthening of discipline and the maintaining of firm military order, the excellent mastery of modern weapons and aviation equipment by the personnel. It is a question of ensuring proper scope and high effectiveness for the socialist competition and mobilizing the personnel of the air units and formations to carry out in an exemplary manner the tasks confronting them during the commenced training year, the year of the 26th CPSU Congress.

Loyal sons of their people, the Soviet aviators have rallied closely around the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee. They see their patriotic and international duty in vigilantly defending the victories of October and always being constantly ready to come to the defense of the motherland and the entire socialist commonwealth.

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## GROUND FORCES

### MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION PARTY CONFERENCE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 80 (signed to press 4 Dec 80) pp 53-58

[Article by Maj A. Golda: "The Guidelines--Creativity and Professionalism in Work"]

[Text] The party conferences of the formations have become an important stage in the pregress report and election campaign underway in the party bodies of the Soviet Armed Forces. They have demonstrated the unanimity and solidarity of the men and their full approval and fervent support for the domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party.

The communists in a professional and principled manner have analyzed the carrying out of the decisions of the 25th Congress of our party and the ideological and organizational work done by the political bodies and party organizations. The delegates discussed the questions related to carrying out the tasks of further raising the vigilance and combat readiness of the troops in light of the demands posed by the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Below we publish comments from the party conference in formation X.

When Lt Col V. Kraynov spoke at the conference, a person unfamiliar with the state of affairs in the units of the division, might gain the opinion that it was a question of a lagging military collective, so acute and self-critical was the speech by this delegate. He described thoroughly the shortcomings in the work of the regimental party bureau, he brought out their causes, he criticized the persons guilty of one or another oversight and made effective proposals....

We should immediately stipulate that the party organization which V. Kraynov represented at the conference had done good work in the last training year. In fact it had become the commander's support in the struggle for the effectiveness and quality of the training process. Together with him it ably organized the competition to surpass the combat standards for the mastery of the equipment and weapons by the men and fought steadily for a further improvement in military discipline. What above all distinguishes this party organization? A professional-like posing of questions, their thorough discussion and the search for optimum solutions.

At the start of the previous training year, the indicators for gunnery practice had declined in the subunits of the regiment. What were the reasons for this? The party activists ascertained that not all the communist company commanders had good pedagogical training while the gunnery skills of individual comrades left much to be desired. Understandably such an officer could not properly organize the exercises and did not set an example for his subordinates. The subunit party organizations were aware of these shortcomings but did not always properly assess them. For example, at a party meeting of the battalion under the command of Maj Yu. Robov, for a long time they had not discussed the questions of the personal example set by the party members and candidate members for their greater responsibility for carrying out service and party duties, although there was a need for this. It was also discovered that a meeting had approved, let us say, a decision to organize the exchange of experience among training leaders or to hold a gunnery contest, but all of this remained on paper.

The party bureau recommended that the situation which had developed in gunnery training and the attitude of the communists to it should be discussed at meetings in all the battalion party organizations. The bureau members helped the secretaries in preparing these meetings and participated in discussing the questions raised. As a result of the thorough party discussion the subunit communists clearly saw their omissions in work and outlined a specific program of actions. They began to have a more demanding approach to assessing their labor, to more carefully prepare for the gunnery exercises and to actively propagandize the experience of the best subunit gunners.

The unit party bureau also drew conclusions for itself. It turns out, the activists reasoned, that we have not been sufficiently concerned with indoctrinating the communists in a spirit of responsibility for carrying out service and party duties, exactingness for oneself and self-criticalness. The bureau members had not gone deeply into the training process, they were rarely in the subunits and were unable to nip in the bud the shortcomings in the gunnery training of the men. The bureau had also ineffectively trained the subunit party organization secretaries in organizing the execution of the meeting decisions.

Specific steps followed these conclusions. A party meeting was held for the communists of the regiment and here they sharply raised the question of ensuring the vanguard role of the party members and candidate members in combat training. A procedural conference was organized in the unit. In the course of it the best trained company and platoon commanders exchanged experience on organizing gunnery exercises and tank firing drills. These and other measures produced tangible results. The responsibility of the party members for the assigned job was increased and their influence on the men was strengthened. This ultimately told on the combat training indicators. During the year the men of the regiment unfailingly demonstrated high gunnery skills.

Professionalism is characteristic for the unit's party organization. The report by the chief of the political section pointed to the ability of the party activists in the regiment to organize vital organizational and political work. They are always where the success of combat training is determined: in the gunnery compound, on the tank driving range and the training fields. With the slightest failing the bureau members thoroughly study the situation, disclose the shortcomings and achieve

their elimination. It seems as there is no question or no task to which the party organization is indifferent. Effective organizational and political work by the communists contributes to the successful carrying out of the socialist obligations by the men.

The delegates who spoke at the conference emphasized that the establishing of professionalism in the work of the party organizations, a profound and critical analysis of each step in their activities and constant concern for improving the forms and methods of the approach to carrying out the tasks of combat and political training have contributed to their more effective support. This can be seen from the example of the party organization where Capt A. Lavrent'yev is the party bureau secretary. Take, for example, ideological indoctrination activities by the unit communists. The party bureau is effectively concerned with ideological indoctrination and the political tempering of the men and endeavors that each of them studies the recommended works by the founders of Marxism-Leninism and the party documents. It seems to it that each man acts, as is demanded by the decree of the CPSU Central Committee on further improving ideological and political indoctrination, as a propagandist and proponent of the ideas of the Leninist party and devotes all his knowledge and all his heart to this exceptionally important matter. At meetings and sessions the bureau regularly discusses how the party members and candidate members are improving their ideological level, participating in the organization and execution of mass political measures and conducting individual indoctrination. It also examines how closely ideological activities by the party organization are tied to the carrying out of practical tasks.

The party bureau is constantly interested in whether or not all the members of the organization take an active part in agitation and propaganda work and the indoctrination of the men. Thus, at one time it was noticed that individual communists were not involved in propaganda and agitation. This concerned, in particular, the chiefs of the services. They, in referring to their heavy workload, were not involved in the indoctrination of the men.

The party bureau decided to increase the demands placed on such communists. For example, at one of the sessions, a statement was heard by the party member Officer I. Solov'yev, the regimental motor vehicle service chief. He had to listen to many valid complaints. But there were also a good number of effective recommendations. For example, Solov'yev was advised to establish greater contacts with the men, to conduct talks with them, participate in special-subject evening meetings and take an interest in the life of the men. He was also advised to organize and conduct a technical competition for the drivers.

Then the bureau members supervised how the communist carried out the decision of the party bureau. He was helped in preparing for the technical competition. And since then the man has fundamentally changed his attitude toward ideological indoctrination.

However, the conference gave examples of another sort. Comrades V. Lobov and V. Novoshilov who spoke criticized the party bureau of one of the regiments, where until recently Maj I. Kolenichenko had been the secretary. According to them it had not seem to it that all the party members set an example in training and service and that their word did not differ from their deeds. The party bureau was not sufficiently concerned for indoctrinating in the communists a sense of responsibility



for the assigned job. And this had a negative effect in specific deeds. The subunit under the command of Maj V. Zakharkin did not fulfill its socialist obligations. Among certain communists in the subunit their sense of responsibility was blunted and some of them were guilty of oversimplifying in combat training.

It cannot be said that the bureau did not undertake any measures to straighten things out. There were sessions to which the secretary of the party organization and other communists of the subunit were invited. There were also party meetings in the subunit where the members of the unit party bureau spoke on the shortcomings and unresolved problems. But, as is known, words should be reinforced by organizational and indoctrinational work. And here the bureau was not up to things. It lacked professionalism and organization. As the speakers at the conference said, one conclusion could be drawn from this: success could be counted on only when a situation of professionalism had been created in the party organization.

At the conference the delegates linked the discussion of professionalism with party principledness. And there was reason for this. This can be seen from the fact given at the conference.

In one of the subunits there had been an increase in the number of infractions of military discipline. What should the communists do in such instances? To analyze, to disclose the sources of the infractions and do everything to eliminate the flaws in the indoctrination of the men. However, the party member, Officer Yu. Lyakhovchenko followed a different path. He endeavored to conceal the infractions of military discipline. The subunit under his command thus fell in among the leaders...

The unit party bureau, of course, did not properly assess this instance. But the case, as is said, was obvious. How could this happen? It turned out that the party activists before had seen that the instances of violations of military discipline had grown more frequent in certain platoons and that not all the communists who were subunit commanders were conducting a decisive struggle against such an abnormal situation. However here the alarm was not sounded and they did not hold responsible those comrades who had committed such concessions. In a word, principledness was not shown.

But certainly principledness means primarily an objective approach to the phenomena of life, an acute political assessment of facts and the combating of indifference. And here we should remember the words of V. I. Lenin who said that one must not deceive oneself with untruth, this is harmful and is the main source of bureaucracy. The very recognition of mistakes is halfway to rectifying the situation.

The conference showed that not all the party organizations are able to delve with sufficient profundity into the training process, to assess objectively and exactly the state of military discipline and draw definite conclusions and generalizations from all this. The political worker, Maj A. Nel'nichenko, spoke to the delegates. For a long time he told what important work was being done by the party bureau to mobilize the communists of the regiment to effectively carry out the tasks of military and political training. But for the delegates it remained unclear as to just why certain subunits in the regiment had not fulfilled the socialist obligations, why the unit had infractions of military discipline among the officers who were party members and candidate members, and why the regiment was actually marking time and the communists tolerated this?

"The party bureau sees its shortcomings in work," said A. Mel'nichenko. It goes without saying that self-critical admission is praiseworthy. But does the party bureau know what are the reasons for these shortcomings? Did it endeavor to analyze them thoroughly? For example, did it analyze why party influence on the state of affairs had weakened in the battalion under the command of Maj V. Rybyantsev? At the last final inspection the men of the battalion had shown poor results. Was this not reason for a thorough study of the existing situation? But obviously, the party activists here had not developed a need to analyze the facts and disclose the links between them. And as they say, reflection is the start of things. Here also the political section was to blame. Its workers had frequently visited the regiment. But the essence of these visits largely came down to finding out whether one or another question had been raised at a party meeting or bureau session. And they were happy to report that yes, the question had been discussed and a decision approved. Had they heard the report by the secretary? Yes, they had and had taken note of the information. Understandably little changed from such "intervention" into party life.

The speeches by the delegates pointed out that professionalism is closely linked to the development of criticism and self-criticism. In a majority of the party organizations the work of the communists and their contribution to raising the combat readiness of the units and subunits are assessed from positions of healthy dissatisfaction. In the meetings and bureau sessions there has begun to be more sharpness in the posing questions, critical comments and professional-like proposals. This has helped to improve things. However, as was emphasized by the speakers, a number of party organizations do not make able use of criticism and self-criticism for activating internal party life. This, in particular, is true of the party organization which is headed by Capt V. Ruzhevich. Here the communists do not overlook failures and they boldly criticize persons guilty of shortcomings. But many flaws still remain in the work at present. What are the reasons? To put it briefly, in the low effectiveness of the criticism. The political section could and should provide a sounder answer, but its workers have not studied this question in detail. And if they did this they would see that there are communists who are deaf to criticism, who are oversensitive to it, who resist any remark made against them or who do not respond to the comments. Certain comrades listen to the criticism, agree with them, self-critically recognize their errors and moreover assert that they will eliminate them, but do nothing more than talk about it.

We feel that the political section would be acting correctly if it made a special study of this question. The political body, it was the opinion of the delegates, should be oriented to a systematic analysis of criticism and self-criticism. Certainly criticism and self-criticism are not an episodic phenomenon or a single act. This is an on-going process of the constant analytical generalization of the results of the work, the actions and conduct of the men. Where this is the situation, the men promptly draw the correct conclusions, they find the right solutions and plan ways for further advancement.

The professionalism of the party body has also manifested in whether or not it is able to spot the main goal and choose the basic element in work. And it happens that certain activists set to work on several things simultaneously and endeavor to encompass the unencompassable. As a rule, such workers do not have enough time, they are split into parts, they want to do everything simultaneously and, of course,

are not able to have an effective influence on the training and service of the personnel. The appearance is one of stormy activity but in fact the result is meager.

Such apparent professionalism until recently was inherent to the party bureau of one of the units in the division. The party activists of the regiment spent a great deal of time and energy on discussing, as it seemed to them, primary questions. Flaws in technical training were discovered and there immediately followed the reaction of "discuss!" "decree!" and "listen!" It was suddenly apparent that the indicators in the gunnery training of the men had dropped. Now all attention was devoted to "patching up the holes" in this area. And it turned out as in the fable: They pulled on the head but the tail was stuck.... The bureau did not pick up on the main thing, that is, the planned and prompt interference into one or another developing situation and the ability to rectify it.

Probably, in solving current questions, the party bureau should have focused attention on such an aspect as why such omissions were possible. And then it, we feel, would have seen the main problem which should have been solved immediately, the problem of indoctrinating in the communists a personal responsibility for the assigned job. The secretary of the subunit party organization should have been invited to the bureau but not for a dressing down but rather to help him see the errors in the work of the party organization and give professional recommendations. And at the same time to deal severely with those communists who were working half-heartedly.

The persons who spoke at the conference stated that it was essential to put a decisive end to letting things go and organize work in such a manner so as to be the organizer of events and not their prisoner. Only in this instance can one thoroughly analyze phenomena, objectively assess them, disclose the reasons for shortcomings and focus attention on the main thing.

In the course of the preparations for the conference, the political section recalled an instructive instance. At the beginning of the summer training period the men of the battalion where Maj N. Glazov was the chief of staff actively supported the initiative of the company of Capt V. Mazalov which had been the initiator of a socialist competition to properly celebrate the 26th Party Congress. The subunit party organization at that time did some good work. The communists talked with the men and helped each man weigh the possibilities and determine the limits. At the party meeting it was decided to organize and carry out a number of necessary and useful measures.

A month passed. Members of the unit party bureau visited the subunit and were interested in how the plans were being carried out. They saw that much that the communists had planned to do had remained merely good intentions. For example, the subunit had forgotten about the competitions for the title of the best in the combat specialty. Elements of formalism had been permitted in organizing the socialist competition. The results of carrying out the socialist obligations were summed up hurriedly and the experience of the best specialists was described only generally.

When the members of the bureau voiced their concern, the secretary of the battalion party organization assured them that there was enough time and at the finish would show what they were capable of. The party bureau members accepted this.



And time flew by. In being taken up with routine matters, the party organization did not set up organized work aimed at carrying out its decisions. This could not help but tell on the results of the socialist competition. The battalion did not fulfill its obligations for gunnery practice.

This instance was later discussed in the political section. The right conclusion was drawn. The party aktiv had to more closely study the art of organizing control and the check on execution. Understandably this is a complicated matter and not something to be mastered quickly. As practice shows, at present the problem of organizing control and the check on the execution of decisions is the number-one problem for the members of the political section.

We pass many resolutions, said the speaker, but we are not always concerned whether they are fully carried out. Of course, this situation cannot be tolerated.

The party organizations, the conference delegates pointed out, must be more concerned with increasing the communists' feeling of responsibility for carrying out the requirements of the party, the instructions of the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and the decisions of the meetings of the party aktiv, the assemblies of communists and sessions of party bureaus. Certainly control and a check on the execution of approved decisions, as was pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress, is a most important part of organizational work. If this is well organized then the unity of our words and deeds is strengthened. Where such work is carried out formally, one can scarcely count on success. Here is proof of this.

The party bureau of one of the motorized rifle regiments in the division during the past training year several times discussed in what manner the influence of the communists on the level and quality of commander training could be strengthened. This problem was taken up repeatedly at the meetings. More than enough decisions were approved. But the result? The final inspection showed that individual officers still had poor professional training. And there were communists among those who could be rebuked for this.

Execution should follow a decision. But as yet this party bureau cannot be praised for this. Before the start of the conference I happened to talk with certain party activists from this unit. Their intentions were good, to do everything to bring the regiment up among the leaders. But, in the opinion of those who spoke, far from everything was being done to realize these intentions. And one cannot help but wonder whether the picture of last year will not be repeated and will the training of the officers who are the organizers of the training process again be weak? Obviously some thought must be given to this at the party bureau and in the political section.

Control and the check on the execution of decisions should be constant and based on the activeness of the masses. Such a notion could be heard in the comments of many delegates. And in confirmation of this Lt Col A. Nizhegorodov gave the following specific case.

The party organization where Maj A. Bondarev is the secretary regularly discussed how to strengthen the party's influence on improving field skills and approved the



appropriate decisions. Technical conferences, the exchange of experience and various contests were planned. However there was no proper control over the execution of the decisions. Individual party members forgot about their assignments and were inactive. And the party organization did not deal properly with them and did not supervise how the decrees were being implemented. And it is no surprise that little was done to improve the special tactical training of the men. As a result in the inspection certain soldiers and officers demonstrated very mediocre results.

The conference pointed out that the party activists learn the ability to organize their work efficiently and creatively and to achieve a unity of word and deed, decision and execution from more experienced comrades and from the officers of the political section. In actuality the political section endeavors to interject a spirit of creativity and professionalism in all that it undertakes. The communists know that the workers of the political section visit them not as inspectors but rather as organizers and they help and teach. But, as the speakers pointed out, the political section has still not succeeded in keeping the lagging subunits in its view. For example, it was known that certain party organizations in the unit where Maj A. Mel'nichenko was the political worker were not sufficiently effectively influencing all aspects of the life and training of the men. And the reason was that certain communists had a lessened feeling of responsibility. The party bureau had also reduced its exactingness. And thus the workers from the political section had to have their say. However obviously here they reasoned as follows: they will be content that we have taken up exactingness and demandingness at the seminars for the secretaries. Of course, in formal terms this is the case. But in essence? The activists did not realize that the demands placed upon the communists must be continuously improved and on the spot they must demonstrate in what manner an atmosphere of exactingness can be created in the party collective.

At the conference there was rather sharp criticism of the communists on the unit staffs. It was pointed out that not all of them effectively influence the state of affairs in the subunits and do not actively and concretely help the company and battalion commanders in carrying out the tasks of improving the quality and effectiveness of the training process, the organizing of the socialist competition and the strengthening of military discipline. At times the comrades from the staff follow the principle: I am here, I have recorded the shortcomings and that is it. No, a staff officer is not a recorder of facts. Did he study the situation and disclose the overights? Were measures taken to eliminate them, did he help the men on the spot and give advice on how to better organize the work? The political section should direct the staff party organizations precisely to such a style.

The opinion was also voiced that more concern must be shown for the small party organizations. The combat support subunits are an unique rear service of a division. And they, like the frontline, should be strong.

People determine the fate of a question. For this reason the conference spoke with particular exigency about how the decree of the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was being carried out in emphasizing that an attentive, considerate attitude toward man should permeate the entire style of work of the party organizations. Concern for the men and attention to their needs and requests are an indispensable condition for strengthening the party's influence in the masses. The men must be confident, it was stated in the report and in the speeches of the delegates, Lt Col E. Zhikh and V. Sryvkin, that the political section and the party bureaus will understand them, help resolve doubts and give the required advice.

At the conference the delegates set high demands. And behind each speech one could feel concern. What must be done so that each communist is acutely aware of his responsibility for the state of affairs in the party organization? What measures must be undertaken so that organizational and political work becomes more effective? The decision approved at the conference was aimed at raising the effectiveness and quality of all party organizational work during the year of the 26th CPSU Congress and increase the combat readiness of the units and subunits to a new, higher level.

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## GROUND FORCES

### TRANSBAYKAL MILITARY DISTRICT PARTY CONFERENCE

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jan 81 p 2

[Article by PRAVDA special correspondents T. Gaydar and V. Orlov: "They Are Personally Accountable"]

[Text] Military districts, fleets, and groups of forces are participating in party conferences currently being conducted within the armed services.

The intent of the conferences is to initiate a fundamental and exhaustive analysis of the operations of policy-making bodies and party organizations, as well as to identify means for additional strengthening of the party's influence on all processes which are taking place within the army and within the fleet. The party members of the armed forces, as proud standard bearers of their nation's trust, uphold the faith of the Central Committee, as well as the entire nation, that they will honorably discharge their patriotic responsibilities for unwavering defense of our nation's borders and preservation of our national interests.

Delegates arrived at the party conference from combat training areas, from proving grounds, firing ranges, and airfields, hardened to the sting of frigid winds. The one, all-encompassing, designation is: Transbaykal district. But, in fact, this includes territory in Irkutskaya and Chitinskaya oblast's and other regions, as well as vast stretches from the southern borders of the country to the Arctic Ocean.

The new training year got under way in the district with precise coordination and is currently proceeding at an intensive pace. Military leaders are striving to imbue the national party congress with genuine successes, to cross into new frontiers of military and political preparedness.

A report on the status of party political operations and measures for their improvement, as well as for increasing troop combat readiness and the training and education of military staffs was presented by a member of the military council--Lieutenant-General V. Lomov, head of political-control for the

Commander of forces for the district, General of the Army G. Salmanov, delivered a report on the structure of the 26th CC CPSU Congress and the missions assigned to party organizations.

The modern army is a highly complex organism--especially with regard to jobs and specialties! The skills required of an infantryman are not the same as those of a tank crew member; a division commander's view of the battlefield is not the same as that of a sergeant... Yet, there exists an undeniable conjunction of soldier with general--of all who have taken the oath of allegiance and have stood tall under the battle standards of our armed forces. It is a sense of personal responsibility for the security of the homeland. The conference also took under consideration pre-established issues from a similar position of high responsibility.

As recognized at the conference, commanders, policy-making bodies, and party organizations, in fulfilling the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress, have acquired considerable experience in party political operations. Much has been done to implement the requirements of the CPSU CC resolution, "On the Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Cultural Efforts." The extent of ideological influence on personnel has been markedly increased, the relationship of ideological work to the lives of military personnel has become more perceptible, and measures have been taken to ensure that political agitation and propaganda take on an aggressive nature. Both the quality and the effectiveness of political indoctrination have been increased, and the growing spiritual needs of troops are being more fully satisfied.

For example, the political-ideological indoctrination of party members and all soldiers of the partkom in the regiment in which Lt Col V. Prokopenko serves as partkom secretary is being carried out very effectively. Here, in fact, each party member establishes his own leading role in training, service, and conduct. By increasing the accountability of party members for personal participation in educational work, the party committee assigns special importance to the quality of the measures which are being carried out in subsections and affords officer-party-members practical experience through individual work with their people.

The level of military preparedness, the condition of armaments and support equipment, the quality of the officer corps--all represent a response to currently existing requirements. These requirements, however, are constantly increasing, according to Arm Gen Salmanov. The worsening of the international situation in general and the situation in the Far East in particular increases the responsibility of forces of the Transbaykal district for the defense of socialist gains and obliges them to maintain a constant state of combat readiness.

The delegates took note of the fact that the combat readiness of military units is based on advanced troop training which incorporates tactical preparation under conditions which closely approximate actual combat. Training



for operations in mountainous terrain and night-fighting skills are taking on particular importance.

While sharing work experiences, delegates A. Vertyakov, A. Vol'khin, and A. Iomakin pointed out, using concrete examples, that if party political work is carried out tirelessly and purposefully, and if it is concentrated at the company and battery level, while the party organization in actuality becomes the center for day-to-day cultural activity, then difficult conditions will not be able to impede military personnel in the successful accomplishment of their assigned duties, but, on the contrary, they will promote esprit de corps and impart a special glow to the meaning of socialist competition. Officers M. Burlakov and A. Zhivakin observed that not all party organizations make use of the mobilization potential of competition. It is essential that competitive elements be regularly introduced into the training process, and that efforts be made to exceed the requirements of military standards, to recognize outstanding specialists, and to achieve interchangeability within military crews.

The main topic for discussion concerned the responsibility of party organizations for improving the selection, placement, and education of military personnel. The primary means to that end, as pointed out in all reports and presentations, is to concentrate on increasing the personal accountability of party supervisory personnel and to create within the party collectives a state of heightened mutual exactingness. Lasting concern must be shown for young officers; they must be instructed in advanced techniques; consideration must be given to improving their living conditions.

"There must be improvements in the established procedure for selecting candidates for military academies," stated the head of the Chitinskiy oblvoynkomat[oblast' military commissariat], Maj Gen I. Tatarov. "We must always remember that the quality of the candidate determines the quality of the future officer."

The conference devoted a good deal of attention to the matter of increasing military discipline. Delegate V. Krayev discussed how the concerted, determined efforts of commanders, political operatives, and party and komsomol organizations help to achieve the most rigorous legal procedure. He, along with other delegates, stressed that uncompromising exaction must go hand in hand with concern for the soldier, as well as his material and spiritual needs.

While noting the successes of military builders, who have done a great deal to ensure that the troops are comfortably quartered and that they have the necessary facilities for organizing their leisure time and for domestic security, the delegates at the same time also delivered some justifiable critical comments in the address concerning the builders.

The conference participants paid tribute to those who had formerly served in the Transbaykal district at a time when service here was not easy:

soldiers, officers, generals--each of them has left his mark on his unit, whether it was great or small, it contributed to the larger fund which is known as tradition. The reports and presentations of the delegates warmly recalled that it was here in Transbaykal in 1935 that the military career of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev began.

Major N. Zaytsev spoke of the need to give constant attention to komсомol organizations--the reserves and support of the party, and he pointed out that, although veterans continually leave the service, the military traditions of our armed services remain.

For the soldiers of the district, there is much to be proud of, there are many fine examples to emulate. The history of the district dates from the time when Transbaykal soldiers were concluding the civil war, routing the bands led by Ungern, Kappel', and Semenov, and driving the Japanese occupiers from our far eastern regions. As the Special Far Eastern Army, they taught a serious lesson to Manchurian-Chinese militarists during the conflict on the KVZhD [Eastern Chinese Railway]. Men of the Transbaykal district fought courageously at Khalkhin-Gol'. During the Great Patriotic War, units from this district, which had been transferred to the western front, battled the fascists at the approaches to Moscow, at Stalingrad, and the Kursk Bulge; they came as liberators into the countries of Eastern Europe... And, those units of the district which were not called upon to fight in the West were rushed in August 1945 to the eastern foothills of the Great Xingan Range, there to crush units of the Japanese Guangdong Army... Nevertheless, the historical origin of the district should perhaps be dated from even earlier periods of the 18th century when the Transbaykal Cossacks established outposts here to protect the Russian border from a restless neighbor to the south. And, perhaps, one may also consider the Decembrist officers to have been the first military political operatives to arrive in these regions...

One of the youngest of the conference delegates, O. Novosel'tsev, having assured party members of the district that young Transbaykal military men are making rapid progress in their total effort to become highly skilled and courageous soldiers--defenders of the fatherland, delivered a speech which resounded through the conference like an oath of allegiance to the glorious military traditions of our fathers and grandfathers.

In his address to the conference, Arm Gen L. Govorov, taking note of the distinctive features of the area in which Transbaykal personnel serve, indicated the need for organizing combat training to exclude weakened and indulgent curricula and for guiding soldiers toward skillful mastery of the techniques needed for operating under the conditions of severe frost and complex terrain found in the region.

The delegates warmly greeted the address by the first secretary of the Buryatskiy CPSU obkom, A. Modogoyev. He transmitted to the assembled military men the warm regards of the workers of his autonomous republic and talked

of how plans of the party for utilizing the natural storage facilities of the Transbaykal area are already being put into practice.

An address was delivered to the conference by the Chief, Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Arm Gen Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishhev. He stressed that the results of military operations are most gratifying where there is an inherent concreteness and purposiveness in party political work, and where those operations are closely coordinated with the objectives of military training. The struggle to attain a high level of quality in military training remains the central element in party political activity. In this regard, the efforts of military panels, commanders, political operatives, and party organizations must be concentrated in the following areas: achieving an increase in the levels of combat and airborne training, tactical combat training, and nighttime operations training; providing for in-depth study and practical use of combat techniques and weapons; continuing improvement in the quality of professional training for the officer corps.

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## NAVAL FORCES

### COMPARATIVE RESULTS OF PARTY WORK ON TWO SHIPS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 80 (signed to press 4 Dec 80) pp 46-52

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Tkachev: "In Order That the Successes are Stable"]

[Text] In the final exercise the escort ship "Deyatel'nyy" and the destroyer "Blagorodnyy" were assigned to the same tactical group the combat skills of which were inspected by the commander-in-chief of the USSR Navy. The training combat was complicated and marked by frequent changes in the situation. However both the commanders and the sailors of both ships passed the difficult examination with honor. In making an accurate missile strike against the "enemy," the crew of the "Deyatel'nyy" affirmed its ability to effectively employ the weapons under any situation. Then the crew of the "Blagorodnyy" skillfully carried out artillery firing. While for the first collective the success in the responsible exercise was a final sonorous chord in the struggle for the high combat readiness of the ship, for the latter the impressive victory was merely a rectification of previously made mistakes.

During the year of the active preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress, the personnel of the escort vessel "Deyatel'nyy" for a majority of the indicators of combat and political training had gained weighty achievements. Its combat and sea skills had risen significantly. All the navigation problems were carried out with a high quality as were the combat exercises. The sailors demonstrated ideological maturity, unfailing skill and strong moral, political and psychological conditioning in an ocean voyage, having received from the flagship an overall excellent evaluation for carrying out the missions confronting them. The collective excels in solidarity and naval friendship. As a result the ship has emerged among the leaders in the formation.

The crew of the destroyer "Blagorodnyy" in the previous training year also worked hard. For example, it was recognized as the best in the unit for ASW training. The engineering [BCh-5], the navigation [BCh-1] and the underwater ordnance department [BCh-3] achieved good results in training and the competition. But the men of the gunnery department [BCh-2] and the radio engineering service let the collective down. Due to the poor skills of individual specialists and an irresponsible attitude toward the upkeep of the equipment, serious difficulties arose in carrying out one of the firings. The artillery troops carried out another fire task only with a grade of three. The crew received only a satisfactory overall evaluation for



carrying out the missions on an extended cruise. In the collective there still were instances of violations of established order. All these omissions and shortcomings taken together did not make it possible for the men of the "Blagorodnyy" to realize their main pregress obligation to bring the ship up among the leaders.

Clearly, in one instance the success and in another the failure were caused by many circumstances and reasons not all of which are so simple to spot. However certain comparisons would make it possible to draw definite conclusions.

When one becomes acquainted with the work of the party organizations on the escort vessel "Deyatel'nyy" and the destroyer "Blagorodnyy," at first glance it seems that this has been carried out in the same manner. At the center of the communist's attention were the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the demand of the USSR minister of defense to further raise combat readiness and strengthen military discipline. In both party organizations at meetings and sessions of the bureaus they discussed urgent questions and heard reports by the party members and candidate members about their organizational and indoctrinational work. On both ships, the communists spoke regularly to the sailors giving lectures, reports and talks, and they conducted Lenin readings and lessons and special-subject evenings.

But still there is a difference in the activities of the party organizations. This can be seen in the style of work and in the moral atmosphere which prevails in both party collectives. The same forms have been used but the contents and results of them have been different.

In carrying out the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the party bureau of the "Deyatel'nyy" was constantly concerned for having the party members and candidate members set a personal example in training, service and discipline and it saw to it that the communists were profoundly aware of their party duty and the general party requirements and conscientiously fulfilled them.

What was characteristic in this work? In the first place, it was carried out continuously. Just take the colloquiums with the communists on the decisions of the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the decrees of the party Central Committee as well as the exercises on the CPSU by-laws with the young communists. Obviously they came into force and became part of the system. Of course, not all at once. The activists had to make a great effort and show much will power in order to establish such a form of work. Undoubtedly this was aided by the example of a responsible attitude toward the assigned job and toward carrying out the party decisions on the part of the very members of the party bureau and the communist leaders such as the ship's commander Capt-Lt V. Baranov (he is now a student at the Naval Academy), his deputy for political affairs Capt-Lt S. Velikodvorskiy (he was recently promoted), the first mate Capt Lt V. Mel'nikov, the commanders of the departments, battalions, batteries and groups.

Precisely they showed how scrupulous one must be if it is a question of carrying out a party decision or assignment or if it is an issue of implementing a useful idea. This was the case, for example, in carrying out a decision of the party meeting to achieve high intensity and effectiveness in combat training and to

successfully carry out the missions on the long cruise. They gave reports at the party and Komsomol meetings in the subunits, they conducted talks and gave lectures on the complexity of the military-political situation in the region of the ship's cruise in mobilizing the men for intense and conscientious labor. But the main thing was that the communist leaders, on a basis of optimum planning of the training measures, strict check of execution and great exactingness on themselves and their subordinates, in fact ensured intense and fruitful training.

Although the ocean cruise was carried out under severe climatic conditions (the thermometer in the shade registered up to 40°), from the very first to the last day of the cruise the load factor for the daily plans was intense and even. Due to the creative attitude on the part of the commander and the executive officer, the questions of tactical, special, ASW, missile, gunnery and torpedo training, damage control and all types of defense of the ship and the improving of the organization of service were worked out as an integrated unit.

No matter how busy the commander was on the cruise, he conducted the tactical quizzes and group exercises with the officers strictly according to plan. And he prepared thoroughly for them. Capt-Lt Baranov found time also for individual work with the young officers and for daily contact with the personnel and the party and Komsomol aktiv. There was not a single instance where in the subunits under the command of CPSU members, Sr Lts A. Bol'shikh, A. Zaytsev or V. Garmanov or the the candidate members Pds 1st Class A. Fomin and A. Galushko, did not conduct the exercises or drills well and wasted training time. The party bureau secretary does not remember an instance where they did not carry out a party assignment in the most conscientious manner whether this was a talk about the plundering "service record" of the American aircraft carrier passing nearby, a speech in the radio news or at a special-subject evening and the transmitting of their experience to fellow servicemen.

Here one could see first of all the high feeling of responsibility of these communists. But it is well known that no matter how conscientious a person is, he requires support and sometimes a reminder. And this is disregarding the importance of the organizational aspect of the matter. But the communists constantly felt all of this coming from the bureau. Those who made mistakes in service or at times did not show the proper effort in carrying out party decisions were promptly straightened out by the bureau members and a feeling of responsibility was patiently and steadily developed in the communists. And we feel that the style of work of the party organization was particularly apparent precisely when they had to be concerned with a specific person.

In particular the bureau members had to devote a good deal of attention to the young communist, Sr Lt A. Khlobystov. Because of a lack of organization in work, the inability to isolate the main thing and to carry out training and indoctrination of the men in a single process, for a time he was unable to establish firm order in the subunit and organize effective training. More than once the commander and the party bureau secretary spoke with the communist, they reminded him of the decision of the party meeting and suggested how to better organize his work so that there were no mistakes in it and acquainted him with the experience of the leading officers. Later a report by Khlobystov was heard at a bureau session and they demanded that he eliminate his shortcomings. Two months later he reported to the bureau how he had carried out this demand and the recommendations made to him.

What is noteworthy here? The constant attention to a person, kindness and patience. In a word, in this party collective they are not fond of abandoning something half-done.

The party organization of the destroyer "Blagorodnyy" also endeavored to have an influence on ensuring high quality of the training process and the maintaining of proper order through the personal example of the communists. Many agendas of the party meetings started with the words "on the responsibility and personal example of the communists...." What was meant was responsibility for the high quality execution of the missions of the long voyage, for raising the level of tactical and special training, for strengthening discipline and so forth.

It must be pointed out that a majority of the communists conscientiously carried out their party and service duty. They made their contribution to achieving those positive results which were spoken of at the start of the article. A majority, but not all. Moreover, certain communist leaders did not set an example of professionalism and responsibility for the assigned area of work. The deputy secretary of the party bureau, Capt-Lt A. Shemetyuk, did not provide a proper level of special training in his subunit. The chief of the radio service, the party bureau member, Sr Lt E. Khaykin, did not maintain the equipment and proper firm discipline. The communists, Officers N. Vasyanovich, A. Pushkin and V. Starukhin were primarily to blame for the decline in the quality of two gunnery practices. It cannot be said that the party bureau connived with those who forgot their party duty and did not show responsibility for the assigned job. But in the style of its work there was clearly a lack of profound analysis and the ability to get down to the true reasons for the shortcomings and promptly eliminate them. Consistency was insufficient. Often the bureau members did not anticipate events but merely recorded them. The measures undertaken by them at times were half-way and formal while principledness and exactingness were often belated. Here is confirmation of this.

The candidate party member Sn Grechushkin committed a severe disciplinary infraction. And the young communist Sr Sn Vasyagin helped him in this. Their unworthy conduct was discussed at the bureau and at a meeting and party reprimands were declared for both. Three months later these reprimands were lifted and a month later Grechushkin and Vasyagin were admitted as party members. Undoubtedly the party organization has the right to determine whether the punishment measure had its effect. But it is also obvious that such hurry would scarcely help to inculcate responsibility in the young communists who comprise more than one-half of the party organization.

Here we should mention something else. On the ship one out of every nine men is a party member or candidate member. Many of them have been admitted to the party this year. And a completely unjustified hurry has been apparent in this important question. Suffice it to say that the ship party bureau during a month reviewed ten applications for the admission of candidate members and three for party members. Six bureau sessions were held. At some of them, along with admission questions, others were also settled. But where would there be any time to thoroughly study the political and professional qualities of the persons being admitted to the CPSU and ascertain whether or not they realize the great responsibility which they are voluntarily assuming. No, it was no accident that individual young communists are not an example in service and discipline and make mistakes. Incidentally, this



was the month preceding the first unsuccessful artillery firing. Had the bureau members concentrated their work on the BCh-2 and the radio service they would not have allowed the appearing shoots of carelessness take root. But this did not happen. The activists limited themselves to holding a joint meeting for the communists of the two subunits.

The party bureau did individually examine how one or another communist was carrying out his party and service duty. However, often this analysis was of a formal nature. This happened, in particular, in hearing a report by the party member, WO ["nichman"] V. Bagdych. The petty officer in charge of the crew of the battery of small-caliber antiaircraft artillery (MZA), as they say, tried to put the blame elsewhere. Having stated that the battery did have instances of improper relationships, he then went on to say that the party organization of the BCh-2 was doing virtually nothing and little political indoctrination was being carried out. But not a word about himself. His commander spoke, commenting that the MZA battery have long attracted attention in its violations of discipline, while the BCh-2 had loosened up on the control by the officers and warrant officers over the service of the personnel. And then came the decision: "To point to shortcomings in the work of the MZA and BCh-2 (no mention was made of whom). To help the BCh-2 party organization in establishing proper order and relationships" (?!). It did state that communist Bagdych was to report on the carrying out of party and service duty. Of course with such an approach it would be hard to expect the communists to set an example in service and have their active involvement in indoctrination.

The two ships had a different approach in the party organizations to solving urgent problems and for this reason there were different results. Let us again return to the facts.

At the outset of the extended cruise, for different reasons a similar situation was created in the communications subunits of the "Deyatel'nyy" and "Blagorodnyy." Violations of radio discipline appeared and instances were detected of the negligent standing of watches. This alarmed the party organizations of both ships.

Considering that the communications division on the "Deyatel'nyy" was headed by the young Lt Ya. Burnos who was making his first long cruise and did not have sufficient practical experience, the party bureau decided to concentrate its efforts on providing him with aid. This was freely assumed by the bureau member and ship commander as well as the party members Capt-Lts V. Mel'nikov and S. Velikodvorskiy. There was not a single day when they were not in this subunit. Communists Baranov and Mel'nikov taught Burnos to correctly allocate specialists to the watches so that an experienced radio operator was near a young sailor and they instructed him in the procedures for organizing the training of subordinates and the practices of providing constant control over their activities. Velikodvorskiy helped the young commander organize a competition among the communications personnel for exemplary standing of watches and to solve the questions of indoctrination together with the communists and with the Komsomol organization. He himself conducted several talks with the radio telegraph operators on their responsible role on the ship, on the active intrigues of the imperialist signals intelligence services and what the fatal consequences of lessened vigilance could be. And when sometime later the representative of the flagship was on board the "Deyatel'nyy," he commented on the exceptionally precise operation of the signalmen and, in his words, during all his service had never encountered such a trained signal department.



The party bureau of the "Blagorodnyy" after the first violations of the communications rules listened to a report by the commander of the BCh-4 [communications department], the communist, Capt-Lt A. Shemetyuk, on his work in the area of strengthening discipline and, in following the established style, pointed out his shortcomings in the organization of the competition and in indoctrinating the personnel and resolved to strengthen control over the course of the competition in the department.

But the commander of the BCh-4 needed not so much control as help and attention, and much earlier, in the period of the shore preparations for the cruise. In the subunit only he and WO V. Per'kov had been on long cruises and this was a first for the others. Some 75 percent of them had a 3d class rating and 25 a 2d class. They should have been given thorough training at the shore training labs and meetings should have been organized with the communications specialists from ships which had returned from long cruises. But this was not done and certain important organizational and personnel questions which depend upon the unit staff were also not settled. Because of the developing circumstances, Officer Shemetyuk at sea each day alternated with WO Per'kov every 4 hours in standing signals duty and himself with his sleeves rolled up had to repair equipment which had failed due to the fault of the inexperienced specialist. There was not enough time for him to be concerned with any other questions.

Had the party bureau promptly become involved in all these problems and helped the communist resolve them probably the communications troops would not have had the problems at sea. But instructions and control alone (and incidentally the bureau members did not carry this out properly, were not sufficient for surmounting the difficulties in the subunit. And several months later the commander of the department was reprimanded by the party.

Similar contrasts were disclosed in the work of the two party organizations in the area of the influence had by the communists on the quality of special training and on the state of affairs in the individual subunits. The party members of the "Deyatel'nyy" had this influence primarily due to the fact that they had a responsible attitude toward the mastery of the equipment and the organizing of exercises and training drills in the specialty. They ably mobilized the men for conscientious training, they informed them of advanced experience, they promptly spotted bottlenecks, they corrected mistakes and came to the help of those who required it.

The communists at the designated times successfully passed the exams for a higher class rating and emerged the winners in the competition for the title of best specialist. They did a great deal to improve the training facilities and to manufacture visual aids. Upon an assignment of the party bureau, the party member Sr Lt A. Zaytsev whose subordinates had achieved high results in the mastery of the weapons and in surpassing the standards, with the officers shared his experience in organizing training and the competition.

When, after successfully carrying out the missions in the Mediterranean, the sonar operators became complacent when the ship reached the open ocean, the communists immediately sounded the alarm. The commander of the group, the candidate party member, Sr Lt V. Sarychev, was invited to a session of the party bureau and asked to explain why the exercises and drills had begun to be carried out with

concessions. With the communist the activists had a strict and principled conversation over the question of the reduced demands upon the subordinates and the letting up of control and indoctrination. At the same time the bureau members ascertained what help Sarychev required. Upon their recommendation, the ship Komsomol committee reprimanded the Komsomol member, WO L. Serebryakov, for the negligent performance of service duties. The question of the personal example set by Komsomol members in special training was discussed at a Komsomol meeting in the radio division. The commander and political worker of the ship spoke with the sonar operators. The spotted decline in training was eliminated. Subsequently they successfully located underwater targets and provided the ASW crew with precise data for attacks.

In the party organization of the destroyer "Boagorodnyy" at sessions and meetings of the bureau the communists repeatedly spoke of the need to pay more attention to improving the quality of special training. But many of them did little for this. On the ship there was not a single master of military skills. At the same time Officers N. Vasyanovich and A. Shemetyuk, WOs V. Per'kov and G. Kalinin and other communists could have had this title. However, even in the pre-congress obligations they had not set such a goal for themselves, being satisfied with a 1st or 2d class for several years. And the party bureau overlooked this alarming fact.

The bureau members, including the ship's commander, Capt 3d Rank G. Shevchenko, also overlooked the fact that having successfully carried out a number of gunnery exercises, the gunners had become complacent and conceited. As a consequence of a lessening of exactingness and control from the commander of the BCh-2, communist, Capt 3d Rank N. Vasyanovich, special training had been farmed out to the petty officers. And certain junior commanders conducted it far from in the best manner and they gave excellent and good grades even to sailors who had been absent in the exercises. The party group of the department and its party group organizer Lt V. Starukhin also did not go any farther than stating the shortcomings and talking about the need to improve the special training. Only after, as they say, the thunder had roared, that is, when the quality of the gunnery tasks had dropped from excellent to satisfactory and when the political section of the formation and the unit staff became interested in this decline did changes occur. The ship's commander who in the past had been a gunner set to bringing order into gunnery training and the party bureau dealt severely with the commander of the BCh-2 for oversights unforgivable in an experienced gunnery officer with almost 20 years experience.

The influence of the party organization on the quality of the training process depends largely upon the vital position of each communist, including upon his attitude toward the arising difficulties and the mistakes made. In talks about the reasons for the failings of the gunners, the commander of the ship, the members of the party bureau and the officers from the BCh-2 put the main emphasis on an unfortunate combination of circumstances. After extended operation the equipment supposedly required adjustment and repairs and there had not been sufficient time for this. Before the gunnery exercise itself, experienced specialists had been released into the reserves and new recruits had arrived. These and other objective factors, undoubtedly, did have an effect.

But there had been similar difficulties on the "Deyatel'nyy." However there they promptly considered them and took the appropriate measures. The commander of the

ship increased the time in the daily regimen for maintenance on the materiel. Upon the initiative of the communists, the commanders of the missile batteries and the turbine group, a competition was started up in the crew for the best maintenance of the equipment. A competition conducted in three stages for the combat readiness of the weapons and equipment helped to develop true competitiveness among the men and their creative initiative. The commission which was to judge it included the executive officer, the political worker, all the commanders of the departments and divisions and the secretaries of the party bureau and Komsomol committee. The results of each stage were widely publicized and the winners were commended. The sailors submitted and introduced many valuable proposals to ensure the dependable operation of the equipment and utilized any opportunity for preventive maintenance. With the aid of the competition among the sailors and petty officers who had completed service, another problem was solved, that is, the training of good replacements. On any occasion, when on the first day after the return of the ship from a long cruise the staff officers of the unit inspected the state of the weapons and equipment and the knowledge of the personnel, including the young sailors, their opinion was unanimous. The equipment was in an exemplary state and the specialists were ready to carry out the most complex missions. This was also confirmed, as they say, incidentally by the missile and gunnery practice carried out by the crew with an evaluation of excellent. To put it briefly, with a responsible attitude and a creative approach to things the objective difficulties could be overcome.

From all that has been stated here, the conclusion arises that the style of work of a party organization largely determines the degree of its impact on the state of affairs in a military collective. As they say, you reap what you sow. The successes of the crew of one ship are quite natural and the failures of the sailors on the other are not accidental.

V. I. Lenin taught that previous experience and previous shortcomings should be viewed as a stage, as a lesson, to move forward more confidently and to more decisively get rid of previous mistakes. The decisions of the June and October (1980) plenums of the CPSU Central Committee demand such an approach also from the communists. Obviously, the communists of both party organizations in the report and election meetings assessed the work of the party bureaus and their own activities from these positions. In any event the experience of the party organization of the "Deyatel'nyy" to ensure constant successes in combat training and the bitter lessons of the communists on the "Blagorodnyy" merit profound analysis. And certainly not just on the two ships but also in the formation. We feel the commanders, the political workers and the party aktiv of the escort vessel and the destroyer and the formation's political section should be concerned with this.

The responsible and complicated missions of the new training year and the increased demands on the quality and effectiveness of combat and political training and on the state of military discipline dictate an urgent need to improve the work style of the party organizations, the party aktiv and all the communists and to strengthen their influence on all aspects of the life of the personnel in order to celebrate the year of the 26th CPSU Congress with stable successes in training and in further raising the combat readiness of the ships.

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## LOGISTICAL SERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS

### PARTY CONTROL IN ENTERPRISES AND CONSTRUCTION ORGANIZATIONS

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[Article by Maj Gen A. Stolyarov, senior inspector of the Directorate of Party Organizational Work under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "Exercising the Right of Control over Administrative Activities"]

[Text] The years which have passed since the 25th Party Congress have shown that many party organizations at enterprises and construction sites have gained significant experience in political indoctrination in the labor and troop collectives as well as skills in organizing the socialist competition. The militancy of the party organizations has risen, their influence on the results of labor has increased and they are more fully utilizing the right to supervise the activities of the administration. All of this has told favorably in the operation of the enterprises, organizations and institutions. A majority of the labor collectives of the USSR Ministry of Defense has successfully fulfilled the production plans. The initiators of the army-wide socialist competition this year, the military construction workers of the Pacific Fleet, are keeping their word. The party organizations of the construction administration of the Belorussian Military District and the administration where Officer R. Yenyutin is the chief of the political section are actively introducing the brigade forms for organizing labor. Valuable experience has also been gained by the enterprises and organizations of the Kiev, Central Asian and Moscow military districts.

For a number of years stable results in construction work have been achieved by the collective of the administration where Col I. Shevchuk until recently was the chief of the political section. Here the questions of the responsibility of the CPSU members for the assigned jobs were constantly examined in the political section and discussed at sessions of the party committees. Here they made it a practice in the party collectives to hear statements by the communist leaders on the fulfillment of their service and party duties. In terms of the results of the competition for the five years the administration eight times has won the challenge Red Banner of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the trade union central committee and has been awarded a Lenin diploma.

The experience of the leading collectives indicates that an important means in achieving high production indicators is the able realization by the party organizations of their right to control the activities of the administration. As is known,



the Instructions to the CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy include a provision on the right of party control over administrative activities. This extends to the primary party organizations on the self-financing production enterprises and construction organizations, the cultural-educational institutions as well as the trade enterprises of the Ministry of Defense.

The party organizations widely use the most diverse forms of control, including: the discussion of the questions of production and labor at party meetings and sessions of the party committees and party bureaus, the hearing of reports by economic leaders and so forth. The use of these forms creates an opportunity to put each management element and each official under the daily control of the party organization, to objectively assess the effectiveness of organizational work by the economic leaders and the state of affairs on the spot as well as constantly focus the efforts of the labor collectives on carrying out the production plans and the socialist obligations.

One of the organizational forms for carrying out the right of control is the commissions set up under the primary party organizations in accord with the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 June 1959 and the Regulation Governing Commissions approved by this decree. The commissions are elected by open voting at the party meetings, and during a period between meetings can be formed by a decision of the party committee or party bureau. The membership of the commissions includes the best trained, competent comrades capable of an intelligent understanding of production and economics. The commissions are not control organizations which are independent and autonomous of the party organization. They work under the immediate leadership of the party committee or bureau. Their purpose is to make a detailed study of the state of affairs in the areas assigned to them, to report to the party organization on the trends which have appeared, to struggle against shortcomings together with the economic leaders, to prevent mistakes and abuses, to disseminate advanced experience, and to achieve the constant fulfillment of the established plans, the strengthening of discipline, the improving of methods of production management and the carrying out of political indoctrination on a higher level. The activities of the commissions give a systematic nature to control and make it possible to involve in this many communists as well as nonparty persons.

The party organization itself decides what commissions are to be set up. Experience shows that much more effective work is done by those which have a definite focus, for example, control product quality, the introduction of new equipment into production, the use of fixed capital, the improvement of the working and living conditions of the employees, and so forth.

The commissions state their views on the problems of the development of production and the competition and they make the appropriate proposals and recommendations. Many party committees ably direct the activities of the commissions and endeavor that control be specific, aimed at eliminating specific shortcomings and increasing the responsibility of certain persons as well as contribute to the search for and activating of internal reserves. Recently, for example, affairs have improved in the collective of the construction organization where Maj F. Medved' was the party committee secretary. Here, under the leadership of the party committee there are three commissions at work monitoring the activities of the administration. They are constantly interested in how labor productivity is growing, whether the quality

of construction and installation work is rising, whether the projects are completed on time and what are the working and living conditions of the men. The commissions thoroughly study the situation at the construction sites, they discuss this at their meetings and bring up the most important questions at sessions of the party committee and at party meetings. Thus, the party committee received warnings about more frequent instances of equipment failures at one of the sections and which had a negative influence on plan fulfillment. The party committee instructed the commission headed by Engr-Maj A. Levkov to investigate these facts. On the spot it discovered serious shortcomings in equipment utilization, it established the guilty parties and dealt severely with the chief mechanical engineer. As a result of the measures taken by the party committee, the situation at the site improved.

Or one other example. A difficult situation had developed in fulfilling the quotas in the section led by communist A. Shcheglinskikh. Here there had been rejected work, significant redoing of what had already been done, a significant portion of the military construction workers did not fulfill the production standards and there had been instances of flagrant violations of the industrial safety rules. The commission investigated the situation at the site and upon instructions of the party committee prepared this question for discussion at a meeting. The party committee members V. Bochkarev, I. Pri시킨 and V. Anisimov provided help to the chief of the section in organizing labor and in strengthening indoctrination work with the military construction workers. As a result the section fulfilled the annual quota ahead of time.

The successful activities of the commission depend largely upon the attention paid to them by the party committee. Characteristic of this is the following example. The party committee where Lt Col A. Bozhevaley is the secretary, along with the commission members, examined and approved a plan for their work at a session, they concretized it and gave it a more effective nature. In accord with the plan, the commission headed by V. Karpenkov, for example, checked the course of preparations for completing the projects at the section of S. Sochnikov. It turned out that certain work superintendents, four men and other specialists had a poor knowledge of the technical specifications, they had not introduced advanced methods and engineer decisions into construction and were not concerned with the organization of the competition or the technical training of the men. The materials of the check were discussed at a party committee session with the participation of the head of the construction organization A. Zheldin. The party committee dealt strictly with communist Sukhanov and the chief engineer V. Lysakov and demanded that they improve the instruction and indoctrination of the engineers and other specialists. From the results of the check an order was issued which defined measures aimed at improving the organization of labor of the military construction workers and raising the effectiveness of the construction process. The persons guilty of the committed shortcomings were punished. All of this made it possible to fulfill the quotas at the projects and increase the effectiveness of the competition.

As a result of unflagging party leadership, good work has been done by the commission for quality control of the produced product as set up under the party committee of the machinery plant (secretary A. Konovalov). The party committee was careful in selecting the communists for the commission and reviewed the membership at a session. It included well trained specialists as well as highly regarded and

principled communists. The commission members are closely tied to the workers, engineers and technicians and in their activities they rely on the production pacesetters and the shockworkers of communist labor. The commission is constantly concerned with preventing defective products. Thus, it was established that certain engineers, technicians and foremen had shown negligence in observing proper methods in manufacturing certain products. From the materials of the commission headed by A. Soshnikov, a party committee session was held. Together with the plant leadership, recommendations and proposals were worked out aimed at improving product quality. Worker meetings were held and the plant and shop leaders gave reports at them. A competition was developed to have the products pass inspection on the first submission and for the right to work with a personal stamp. Quality days began to be held regularly and ultrasound inspection of welding seams was introduced. Party measures were taken against direct guilty parties. All of this made it possible to sharply improve the quality of the products manufactured by the plant.

Along with permanent commissions, the practice of forming temporary ones has also proven effective. When the party committee where V. Yakovlev is the secretary began to receive warnings about the padded volume of work carried out by the truck crane operators, a commission was formed for a check. The facts of padding were affirmed. In generalizing the data of the check, the commission drew up proposals aimed at strengthening control over the labor process. These proposals lay at the basis of a decision approved by the party committee. The implementing of the measures worked out by the administration together with the party committee made it possible to rapidly eliminate the shortcomings.

The attention of the commissions is not only focused on the lagging sections. Many party organizations with the help of the commissions outline plans of measures aimed at improving the economic mechanism. For example, the party committee where Capt 2d Rank A. Moskalev is the secretary, in drawing up the regular plan, considered the comments of the commission members, engineers, technicians and employees. All the received proposals and the draft plan were discussed in detail in the collectives of construction workers, the trade union and Komsomol organizations. At present the commissions exercise permanent control over the implementation of all that was planned.

As was pointed out, in the course of the report and election meetings there have been frequent instances when the party organizations have made far from complete use of the right granted them to control the activities of the administration, they have overlooked existing reserves and opportunities, they have not mobilized them to achieve higher production and economic indicators and poorly direct the work of the commissions set up for this purpose. Instances have been encountered of a formal approach to their setting up. At times the commissions include insufficiently experienced people and they are headed by the communist leaders whose activities should be checked by the same commissions. Individual party organizations poorly supervise the carrying out of the production plans and socialist obligations. For example, the party committee of the construction organization headed by Officer V. Moskalenko regularly brings up the questions of production and the competition for discussion by the communists but many of its decisions are not reinforced by proper organization. For precisely this reason the party committee and the control commissions have not been able to have a substantial impact upon carrying out the



plan quotas. The political body also did not correct the communists. As a result here the production plan is far from carried out for all indicators.

A proven form of party control is the discussion of the major questions of the life and activities of the enterprises, organizations and institutions at the party meetings and sessions of the party committees and bureaus. For example, at many construction organizations and enterprises, the party meetings bring up such questions as the ways for raising labor productivity, the example set by the communists in the competition and the introduction of advanced methods for the organization of labor. Precisely organized control over the carrying out of the planned measures tells favorably on raising the responsibility of the communists and all the workers for carrying out the production quotas and stimulates the creative activities of the people. As a rule, prior to the discussion of one or another question the party collective thoroughly studies the state of affairs in the given area. This makes it possible to better study the opinion and proposals not only of the communists but also the nonparty persons and to consider them in working out the decisions. An effective means of party control is the hearing of reports at party committee and bureau sessions by communists from the leadership and engineer-technical personnel of the construction organizations and enterprises on various questions of their activities. Of course, the work of these comrades is studied first. In the course of the reports an opportunity is gained to objectively assess the personal activities of the leaders and their ability to organize people, to better see the existing shortcomings and outline the ways to eliminate them. The designated form of control over the activities of the administration is used effectively by the party organizations where V. Smirnov, A. Nechayev, L. Perminov and others are the secretaries. Here the sessions of the party committees and the party meetings discuss the reports of the chiefs, the chief engineers, the section chiefs of the construction and installation organizations, the party organization secretaries and the party group organizers, and specific measures are set aimed at improving production and the indoctrination of employees.

The practice of holding colloquiums with the economic and engineer-technical employees has proven effective in many party organizations. In the construction organization the members of the party committee headed by A. Zagotskin carefully study the political and professional qualities of the economic personnel and the style and methods of work with other people. The colloquiums are held in a comradely, creative situation. An individual approach to the communist leaders and concern with instilling professional and political qualities in them have a beneficial influence on the carrying out of the assigned obligations by these comrades.

Here it is essential to point out that the discussion of questions related to the improving of production in individual party organizations still occurs without proper preliminary preparation and extensive criticism and self-criticism. This leads to a situation where proper exactingness is not shown for the workers who have committed various failures and oversights and they are not given professional advice and recommendations. It also happens that the commissions monitoring the activities of the administration show unjustified timidity when it is a question of the leaders of the enterprise or organization and they restrict the sphere of their influence to the level of the leaders of a section or brigade. For example, the party committee of the UNR [work superintendent administration] the secretary of which is Maj Kh. Kil'diyev, for a long period of time did not hear reports by



the leaders, although for several years the administration had been a lagging one. Here certain leaders had an incorrect understanding of the right of the party committee to exercise control over the activities of the administration. Individual enterprise leaders viewed this as almost the undermining of their authority and responsibility. It took intervention by the political body to correct these comrades and help the party organization make full use of the right granted it.

Reports by leaders are an important but not the sole form of party control. Where control is reduced solely to the hearing of reports by economic leaders, many important questions of the work of this collective remain outside the perusal of the party organization.

The CPSU Central Committee has drawn the attention of the party organizations to improving the style and methods of work by the leading personnel and to improving their personal responsibility for the assigned job and for their own political growth and professional preparation. And those party organizations act correctly when they are constantly concerned with the indoctrination of the personnel, when they go deeply into their selection and placement, when they bring up these important questions for the review by the communists and when they involve the leadership in conducting propaganda and agitation. And where such work is carried out constantly, the tasks confronting the collectives are better carried out.

At the same time it must be recognized that not all the party organizations as yet are constantly and daily concerned with the questions of personnel policy. There have been instances when the opinion of the party organization was not always considered in promoting individuals, in increasing their ranks or presenting awards. It has also happened that the party committees and bureaus were not concerned with the training and indoctrination of the communist leaders and did not place constant demands on them for carrying out party and service duties. As a result individual leaders cease working on themselves, they commit service oversights and abuse their position. Harm is also caused by the instances still encountered at a number of enterprises and construction projects of rush work, irresponsibility, padding and eyewash and a lack of attention to the working and living conditions of the men. Particularly intolerable are the instances of personal lack of discipline by the leaders, pretentiousness, impoliteness with subordinates and drunkenness. And such instances do occur. Officer Yu. Popov was released from the position held precisely for unworthy personal conduct. In the instances under discussion the party organizations and political bodies should have a word to say. In this regard high demands are placed upon the activities of the party committees in the management of the administrations. They must strengthen control over the carrying out of party and government directives by all the communists as well as over the observance of Soviet laws. We must have a further improvement in the practice of discussing reports by CPSU members on their fulfillment of the party by-laws and service duties at sessions of the party committees and at party meetings.

For improving effectiveness of control over the activities of the administration, the party committees and bureaus make extensive use of the opportunities which the trade union organizations and people's controllers possess. There are particles of valuable experience by these groups at many enterprises and organizations. The party organizations see their task in coordinating the efforts of all means of control from below and excluding parallelism and duplication in carrying it out. Life

shows that such unity is achieved under the condition that the party committee or bureau draws up unified plans for organizing control and each element is assigned a range of questions and the times for making the checks and the persons responsible for them are set.

It is important that the party organizations further improve the work of the entire system of social control over the activities of the administration, that they play the role of organizers and leaders of control from below, that they systematically generalize the materials of the checks, discuss the critical comments and proposals voiced at the sessions of the party committees and bureaus and work for their implementation.

In improving the management methods and increasing production efficiency, the party organizations must make full use of the force of the socialist competition and the movement for a communist attitude toward labor. The experience of many labor collectives teaches that it is important to show daily concern for systematic control over the course of carrying out the assumed obligations and provide constant aid to the laggards in bringing them up to the level of the pacesetters.

An improvement in leadership of the socialist competition is inseparably linked with introducing patriotic initiatives and undertakings and advanced experience into practice. This is one of the effective means for increasing production efficiency and work quality. Certainly each collective, in setting new goals, always critically assesses what has already been achieved, it analyzes the reasons for shortcomings and discloses still unutilized production reserves. With the correct organization of the competition, the setting of individual and collective obligations presupposes their realistic technical and economic soundness, precise and rhythmically organized labor and material support for the work. As can be seen, the very course of the competition in a way subjects the correctness of the organization of work to control. And these functions are most tangibly manifested in periods of checks on the fulfillment of the socialist obligations, particularly if the checks are closely linked with the tasks of the production cycles and in summing up the results extensive use is made of reciprocal checks by the competitors, reviews, raids and other forms of exercising control.

The primary party organizations play the role of organizers and leaders in the entire system of mass control over the activities of the administration. Here, of course, they do not permit any infringement of the principle of one-man leadership. On the contrary, in the course of control the party organization in every possible way supports the authority of the leader and helps him to develop initiative, enterprise and eliminate shortcomings.

The October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized that an indispensable condition for production success remains a rise in the level of economic work and the indoctrination of professionalism, responsibility and initiative in the cadres. Understandably, the use of the entire means of exercising control over the activities of the administration by the party organizations will make it possible to strengthen party influence on the carrying out of these tasks.

A further improvement in the effectiveness of party control over the activities of the administration and an improvement in the forms and methods of carrying this out

depend largely upon the leadership over the party organizations by the political bodies. In this regard we should note the work of the political section of the construction administration in the Moscow Military District. During the current year, the officers of the political section studied the work of the commissions to control the activities of the administration in a number of party organizations and generalized the experience of one of the party committees. The ways for further improving control over the activities of the administration were discussed at a seminar of the party organization secretaries. In many political bodies and party committees, exercises were conducted with the chairmen of the control commissions for the activities of the administration.

The political bodies and party committees have done a good deal on the designated question. However even more remains to be done. In order that control over the activities of the administration meet the present demands of the party, it is important to raise the competence of the workers of the political bodies and with them provide more skilled leadership by the party organizations which have the right to control the activities of the administration. There is an urgent need for the political bodies to delve more deeply into the mechanism of control and work out specific recommendations for the party committee and bureau secretaries concerning the tasks, forms and methods of exercising party control and the instruction of the aktiv in the actual practice of this work. They must take measures to constantly carry out the critical comments and proposals voiced in line with this by the communists in the course of the pre-congress report and election campaign.

The recently published draft of the CPSU Central Committee for the 26th Party Congress "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period up to 1990" emphasized that we must strengthen control over the results of management in various units of the economy. In this regard the exercising of the right to control the activities of the administration by the party organizations assumes an even greater role. During the year of the 26th CPSU Congress, the political bodies and party organizations must even more constantly improve the activities of the administration and the style and methods of its work.

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## DORAAF AND MILITARY COORDINATE

### SHORTCOMINGS IN DORAAF ORGANIZATIONS DISCUSSED

DORAAF Central Committee Deputy Chairman on Achievements and Problems

MOSEV KRYL'YA NOVOY in Russian No 9, Sep 80 (signed to press 14 Aug 80) pp 1-4

[Article by Lt Gen V. Mosaykin, deputy chairman of DORAAF (USSR) Central Committee:  
"You Assumed an Obligation--Accomplish It!"]

[Text]. We are now living through a truly exciting time. With each passing day the Country of Soviets is approaching a portentous historic event--the day for the opening of the 26th Congress of our own Communist Party. In Moscow on 11 February 1981, in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses envoys of the 17 million-man army of the vanguard of the multinational Soviet people--the party of Lenin--will assemble. The delegates to the congress will sum up the results of everything accomplished during the years which have passed since the 25th CPSU Congress, will discuss problems which are still to be solved, and will outline new, even more majestic plans for further communist creation.

It has become a previous tradition of Soviet society to prepare for each highest forum of the party as the greatest and most joyous holiday and to greet this event with labor reports and a high creative glow. And this is completely proper. For each CPSU Congress is a unique landmark in our revolutionary-transforming movement forward and the most heights taken in the struggle for the triumph of the great Marxist-Leninist ideals. "Each congress," said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Leonidovich Brezhnev, in his report at the June plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "opened up new horizons before our party and our country. I am confident that the forthcoming congress which is called upon to define the strategy and tactics of the struggle for the coming stage of communist construction will also be like this."

The economic and defense potential of the Motherland is being multiplied steadily and confidently day after day by the heroic selfless labor of the people and the party and, as was stressed at the June plenum of the party Central Committee, its international authority and influence on the course of world events are growing and becoming stronger. Our socialist Motherland is now marching at the head of everything progressive and of everything the brightest on Earth.

During a little more than 60 years, we have travelled a distance which is equal to centuries. We did not travel a smooth, well-rolled road but, overcoming numerous difficulties and obstacles and solving the most difficult problems, we travelled



through the fiery cyclones of destructive wars imposed upon us by our enemies. And the most important result of the Soviet people's exploit is the building of a developed socialist society.

Glancing over the path which has been covered and everything which has been accomplished by a view from the heights, the Soviet people are properly proud of the fruits of their labor. And really, how can they not be proud? During the Tenth Five-Year Plan alone which is now approaching the finish line and which is called the five-year plan of quality and efficiency, more than 1,000 new big industrial enterprises have been created and put into operation, among them those such as Atomash and the giant of the socialist automobile industry, KamAZ [Kama Automobile Plant]. The tracks of the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline Railway] are getting closer and closer to the shores of the Pacific Ocean and the face of the non-Chernozem zone of the Russian Federation is being transformed literally before the eyes. Manifested in all the majestic achievements of our immense motherland, in the inspired labor of the people, and in the deeds which are being accomplished and which are tremendous in their scope with all completeness is the directing and guiding role and most strenuous activity of the party and its battle staff--the Central Committee and the Politburo headed by the loyal Leninist and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.

The multi-million-man army of members of our defense society is also making its contribution to the patriotic movement and a worthy greeting for the 26th CPSU Congress. Each of them is persistently struggling in his labor collective for the accomplishment of the assignments of the Tenth Five-Year Plan's concluding year early and with high quality. Tens of thousands of DOSAAF members are leaders of production, shock workers of communist labor, participate actively in military-patriotic and mass-defense work, and are successfully mastering technical types of sport.

A high level of political and labor enthusiasm reigns in the primary and training organizations and in the production and sports collectives of DOSAAF. Unanimously approving the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and the decree of the Central Committee, "On socialist competition for a worthy greeting for the 26th CPSU Congress," the DOSAAFites, just as the entire Soviet people, are filled with the burn- ing striving to mark the opening of the party's highest forum with worthy labor gifts.

A number of DOSAAF's primary and rayon organizations, schools and aeroclubs, and enterprises stopped forth as initiators of the all-union socialist competition devoted to the 26th CPSU Congress. Among those who were the first to take over the pre-congress watch were the defense organization of Leninskiy rayon of the city of M'yussk--the home of Vladimir Il'ich, the DOSAAFites of the Tbilis electric locomotive-building works named V. I. Lenin and the Order of Lenin "Rossiya" kolkhoz of Alaguzskiy kray, the collective of the Slutsk automobile school of DOSAAF Belorussia, the Dnypr armship of the Ukraine, the defense organizations to include aviation organizations of Moscow, Leningrad, and the oblast, the "Sputnik" association, and many others.

The initiative of the society's best production, training, and sports collectives is simultaneously and actively seized upon in all the defense organizations of the union and autonomous republics, krays, and oblasts. Specific socialist obligations have

been assumed in each large and small collective and goals have been planned which must be attained for the 26th CPSU Congress.

The main thing on which everyone must now concentrate his attention is ensuring the clear and complete realization of everything which has been conceived. Seeing that lofty words do not diverge from deeds and that the socialist obligations which have been assumed are actually accomplished. In the months remaining to 23 February, an even broader scale should be received by purposeful mass-political, agitation-propaganda, and military-patriotic work which is directed toward the accomplishment of the missions facing each defense collective.

As stressed in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, in the course of the pre-congress competition the struggle should be waged with all persistence to raise the effectiveness and quality of work and to strengthen in every possible way labor and state discipline.

We have many primary, rayon, city, oblast, and republic organizations, schools, and aeroclubs which show up as examples of exemplary work and conduct various patriotic undertakings and political-indoctrinational measures on a high organizational level and with good effectiveness. In addition, valuable experience in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the workers, and especially of the youth, has been accumulated by the defense organizations of Belorussia, Georgia, and the Ukraine and in a number of krays and oblasts of the Russian Federation.

Let us take the Rostovites as an example. At one time, the DOSAAFites of the Don stepped forth with the call: "To work without laggards!" The DOSAAF USSR Central Committee supported the initiative. Its essence was to achieve a situation in the course of the socialist competition where the achievements of the leaders and their experience in work, training students, and training sportsmen becomes the property of all those who work side by side with them in production, raise a young generation of sportsmen, or train the youths for service in the Armed Forces. In short, if you learn the fine points of a profession, then share your experience with your comrades and do not make a secret of the knowledge or work procedures which have been acquired. This is one of the most important conditions for success of socialist competition. "We do not need noise and jabbering as regards competition," says Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "We need the interest of each worker and each labor collective in improving its work."

Successes in labor or training do not and will not come by themselves. The persistent and purposeful painstaking organizational activity by leaders of primary and training organizations and committees is necessary here. It is necessary to pose matters in such a way that everything most valuable in the work of the leaders is generalized and analyzed skillfully, rapidly, and becomes the property of each one.

This is exactly how they proceed in Rostov-na-Donu. Stepping forth with the call, "Work without laggards!" the DOSAAF obkom conducted a number of organizational and political-indoctrinational measures so that the words do not remain an empty sound and so that the kindled fire of initiative is not extinguished but provides a real final result and conducted a number of organizational and political-indoctrinational measures. Here were assemblies of the supervisory personnel of rayon and city committees, heart-to-heart talks with teachers and instructors of training organizations, and lectures and reports by the winners of the competition with the specific telling about their skill.

In the aeroclub, prior to the start of training-drill flights and parachute jumps demonstration lessons took place in the classrooms and on simulators. There were flights and jumps by the most experienced instructors as well as sportsmen who were the winners of republic, union, and international competitions. After each such demonstration flight or parachute jump, a most detailed critique took place at the end of the day, on the spot, at the airfield. The pilot or sportsman-parachutist told the young instructors and students in detail about their actions in the air, how they prepared for the accomplishment of the assignment, what difficulties were encountered, and how they were overcome. All this helped the aviators of the Rostov DOSAAF aeroclub to now join the leaders in the high-quality accomplishment of tasks in the training and ideological-political indoctrination of helicopter-sportsmen and parachutists. The ranks of rated participants, masters, and candidate masters of sport are steadily growing here. The Rostovites are representing their oblast confidently and with merit at various sports battles within the country and abroad. Going on the pre-congress watch, the members of the aeroclubs assumed new socialist obligations and now are struggling successfully for their transformation into practical matters.

Nor does word deviate from deed among the DOSAAFites of the Kemerovskaya, Volgogradskaya, Tul'skaya, Omskaya, and other oblasts of the RSFSR and in the collectives of many defense organizations of the Baltic region. The decisions of the June plenum of the CPSU Central Committee inspired each DOSAAF member as well as all of the country's workers for an even higher creative tone in work.

"Our deeds and thoughts for our native party!" Each DOSAAFite is working or mastering a military-technical specialty under this slogan.

Good news about remarkable labor achievements and about the new, even broader scale of military-patriotic work is arriving these days from the most diverse corners of the fatherland. The initiators of the pre-congress socialist competition--the Olyanovites--report that they have given their word to increase considerably the number of specialists for the national economy, to intensify work in propagandizing the behests of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, the decisions of the party, and the requirements of the Soviet constitution concerning the defense of the socialist fatherland, and to raise higher the quality of training of the pre-draftee youth and specialists for the national economy. And they are keeping their word.

The Olyanovskaya oblast DOSAAF committee has considerable experience in military-patriotic and mass-defense work. During the year alone, more than 3,000 lectures, reports, and talks on military-patriotic subject matter were conducted in the city and rural defense organizations of the oblast, more than 600 meetings with army, aviation, and fleet veterans took place, and 134 trips to places of revolutionary, combat, and labor glory were conducted. DOSAAF school organizations are participating actively in the "Zarnitsa" and "Orlenok" military-sports games. Through the efforts of school children and students who are members of the defense society, 140 corners and museums of soldierly and labor glory have been newly created or improved in the oblast and 89 monuments and memorial plaques have been set up. On the initiative of the DOSAAF committee 80 special radio broadcasts were organized during the period of preparations for the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and the 31st anniversary of the victory and 40 exhibitions were opened in the cities and at the enterprises, kolkhozes, and sovkhoses whose exhibits tell about the heroic exploits of the Soviet fighting men at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War,

about the routine training days of the Soviet Armed Forces, and about the many-faceted activity of the defense society. Discussions of the books by Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, "Malaya Zemlya," "Vozrozhdeniye" [Renaissance], and "Tselina" [Virgin land] took place in all DOSAAF primary organizations with great activity and exceptional interest.

Working especially actively are the DOSAAF primary organizations of the Ul'yanovsk Polytechnical and Pedagogical Institutes, the construction technical school, the instrument-building and sewing technical schools, secondary school No 1 imeni V. I. Lenin, and others. The oblast and city committees of Ul'yanovsk are displaying constant concern for improving the material and technical base in the primary organizations and training schools. The DOSAAF oblast committee is devoting serious attention to the aeroclub and improving the training of the aviation sportsmen.

Socialist competition for raising the quality of instruction of the youth in military-technical specialties has been widely initiated in the oblast's organizations. The obligations, individual as well as collective, are distinguished by their specific nature. The course of their accomplishment is checked regularly by special commissions and the results of the competition are discussed at meetings of collectives and sessions of party bureaus and local trade union committees.

Is the matter posed in this way everywhere? Unfortunately, still not everywhere. We have committees, primary organizations, schools, and aeroclubs where the level of mass defense, military-patriotic, and training-indoctrinational work lags behind the requirements which are imposed on each of us by the decisions of the 25th Party Congress and the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On further improvement of ideological and political-indoctrinational work." There still are many elements of formalism and conventionalism, including that found in the direction of socialist competition and in the practical activity of some DOSAAF committees and primary and training organizations. Such defects in work were disclosed in the defense organizations of Tadzhikistan, Estonia, Udmurtia, and in Belgorodskaya oblast.

It is hardly necessary to prove the significance which is had by military-technical types of sport, to include aviation types. Our youth passionately love aviation and are striving for the sky with tremendous enthusiasm in order to conquer the air expanses boldly and with inspiration. A number of DOSAAF aeroclubs and aviation sports clubs are organizing their activity skillfully in accustoming the young boys and girls to lessons in airplane, parachute, glider, and model airplane types of sport, and sections and study groups in hang-glider sport. We also find without fail in the socialist obligations adopted by the DOSAAF committees of oblasts and republics obligations on the development of the mass nature of the sport of the sky's valiant romanticists in every possible way.

However, some DOSAAF oblast and republic committees consider aviation types of sport to be kind of secondary for themselves. They assume obligations for their development and that's the end of it. The personnel of such committees rarely visit the aeroclubs and aviation sports clubs and do not delve deeply into the details of their activity. Only this can explain the fact that right now the Vyazemskiy aeroclub (Smolenskaya oblast) has not completely accomplished its plans and socialist obligations for training aviation sportsmen for several years already and that the Makhachkala aeroclub and the aeroclubs of Yaroslavl' and Saransk are working far from rhythmically. The youth is not attracted to aviation sport with sufficient activity in Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, Saratov, and Astrakhan'. Some DOSAAF committees



display extreme sluggishness in the creation of normal conditions for the youth for lessons in model airplane sport. In such cities as Astrakhan', Makhachkala, and Smolensk, the matter of constructing flying fields for tethered model airplanes and specially equipped grounds for model airplane enthusiasts has been dragging on for years.

The country is moving toward the party congress and the scale of socialist competition is expanding with each passing day. The Soviet people are sparing neither strength nor labor to arrive at the day for the opening of the highest forum of our native party with their labor gifts. It is the duty of each member of the defense society and of each DOSAAF collective to make its worthy contribution to the early and high-quality accomplishment of the assignments for the concluding year of the Tenth Five-Year Plan and the majestic plans of the party for the further strengthening of the motherland, its economic and defensive might, and social flourishing.

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#### Lack of Attention to Aircraft Maintenance Criticized

Moscow KRYL'YA RODINY in Russian No 11, Nov 80 (signed to press 14 Oct 80) pp 10-11

[Article by I. Korovin, chief of Aviation Equipment Maintenance Department, Aviation Training and Aviation Sport Directorate, Central Committee, DOSAAF USSR: "A Mandatory Safety Condition"]

[Text] The training year is concluding in the DOSAAF aeroclubs. The overwhelming majority of the aviation organizations have coped successfully with the training of sportsmen-pilots, parachutists, glidermen, aviation technicians, and mechanics. Much has been done this year to improve the training bases, classrooms, and laboratories. The accomplishment of the tasks was furthered by the widely initiated socialist competition to mark the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 15th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War.

The last months of the current year are characterized by a new rise in the socialist competition which is taking place under the slogan, "A worthy greeting for the 26th CPSU Congress." The collectives of all aviation organizations have adopted additional obligations which are directed toward the successful completion of the last year of the Tenth Five-Year Plan and the program for the first months of the new five-year plan. The collectives of the Volchansk aviation school for pilots, the Kaluga aviation and technical school, Zaporozh'ye, Vitebsk, Kinel'-Cherkassy, 3d Moscow, city, and a number of other aeroclubs are coping well with the socialist obligations which have been accepted.

Socialist competition furthered a rise in the work style of the Air Force Engineering Service (IAE) of the majority of aeroclubs and an improvement in their training and technical base. One of the leaders in this regard until recently was the collective of the Air Force Engineering Service of the Volchansk aviation school headed by the experienced engineer, V. Balashov. The school keeps a careful record of the typical malfunctions of the L-29, An-2, and Yak-52 airplanes and the Mi-2 helicopters which are disclosed in the course of daily servicing and periodic maintenance work, and on the basis of available experience, measures are worked out annually for the prevention and rapid elimination of such malfunctions, permitting the prevention of equipment failures in the air and obtaining the airplanes' high operational readiness for flights.

The introduction of "The Engineer's Workbook" in the school also furthers this. Each day, the engineers record in it the time of the actual operation of the engines, airplanes, and helicopters, which permits each one to know precisely when "his machine" is to go for periodic maintenance and how many airplanes and helicopters can be used for practical flights on any day. The senior engineer of the school's technical maintenance service (TES), Comrade Stepanov, distributed the aviation specialists in a well thought out way, organized their work well and, relying on the assistance of the party organization, mobilized the technicians and mechanics for the struggle for high-quality servicing of the airplanes and helicopters, which is one of the main conditions for the accomplishment of the flight training plan without accidents and incidents.

The subunit has worn the title of "Collective of Communist Labor" for several years already. Ten airplanes have the sign "Outstanding" on their sides. In this technical maintenance service, both on days for the preliminary preparations of the aircraft for flight and during the flying days the accomplishment of work which permits preventing the possible appearance of typical malfunctions in the materiel is planned ahead of time.

The constant rise in the style for maintaining aviation equipment is furthered to no small degree by the fact that the head of the school, G. Krutilin, and his deputy for Air Force Maintenance Service as well as the party organization devote great attention to propagandizing the experience of the competition leaders, the improvement of the training base, the technical equipping of the work sites of the maintenance personnel, and improving their working conditions. To a great extent, thanks to this a noticeable rise in the quality of preparing the aviation equipment for flights has been attained in the school and preconditions for flight accidents through the fault of the materiel have been virtually eliminated. Malfunctions which are disclosed in the course of pre-flight preparations or in the course of the flying day are thoroughly analyzed at critiques which are usually conducted with the participation of all personnel. Where necessary, the critique is conducted directly on the airplane.

Unfortunately, the personnel of the Air Force Engineering Service, flight instructors, and students still do not strictly follow the requirements of the manuals and instructions on the maintenance of aviation equipment which have been tested by life in all our aviation training organizations. Analysis of the results of 1979 and the first half of 1980 shows that in a number of aeroclubs, to include even good ones, so-called "minor" deviations from the established rules for the maintenance of airplanes and helicopters have not yet been overcome. Because at times the flight instructor, student, and flight technician do not check whether the cockpit canopy is correctly closed, it breaks away in flight and a real pre-condition for a flight accident is created. Such incidents occurred in the Volgograd, Stavropol', and several other clubs.

The struggle to raise the quality of student instruction is not conducted with sufficient persistence in some clubs and their knowledge and practical skills in operating the equipment in the air is not checked everywhere and with genuine demandingness. It is this which explains the violation of temperature conditions for engine operation, errors in the use of airplane and helicopter control levers, failures of cockpit fittings, and rough landings with damage to the alighting gear as happened, for example, in the Kazan' and Ryazan' aeroclubs. Even such impermissible cases

as forced landings because the technician and pilot did not satisfy the basic requirements of the manual and did not check the amount of fuel in the tanks have not been completely eliminated. And such landings had to be made by pilots of the Riga and Tomsk aviation sports clubs.

In order to reduce any preconditions for flight accidents to a minimum, the chiefs of aeroclubs and their deputies for the Air Force Engineering Service, together with party and Komsomol organizations, must persistently instill in the personnel a high sense of responsibility for care of the aviation equipment and its correct maintenance on the ground and in the air. One of the effective methods for indoctrination, as the experience of the leading clubs shows, is daily monitoring, and sometimes even the personal participation of club chiefs, engineers, and teachers in lessons on simulators and airplane cockpits called for by the program during which basic practical skills were worked out in the correct maintenance of the airplanes and helicopters and theoretical knowledge was consolidated. Some part of the takeoff time and park days can also be used for such drills.

In the overall struggle for high effectiveness and style in maintaining aviation equipment and for its faultless operation in the air, the paramount role belongs to those who directly prepare the airplanes and helicopters for flight--the technicians, mechanics, and their teachers, the technicians-brigadiers. The majority of aviation specialists of our clubs perform their service duty irreproachably. In preparing the airplanes and helicopters for flights, they observe precisely the rules for inspections, perform the entire list of work without fail, and display skill and high vigilance in so doing. Aviation technician of the Vyazemskiy club N. Kurnosov, for example, managed to discover the failure of a reinforced tube which connects the nipple of the negative overload cell with the connection for feeding fuel to the engine thanks to such an attitude toward matters. It was located in a place difficult to reach with the use of bias lighting. In the aeroclub, this was taken as an alarm signal. A special-purpose inspection of the park was conducted and the same defect was discovered on one more airplane. Good knowledge of the equipment and vigilance helped the technician of the Alitus aviation technical club, A. Labakas, to discover a defect on the forward assembly of the stabilizer on a "Vilga-35A" airplane. Using a magnetoscope, the senior engineer-inspector of the Lithuanian DOSAAF committee, G. Yezhov, personally checked the reliability of this assembly on all "Vilga-35A" airplanes which are maintained in the republic's aeroclubs. Such a check showed the high effectiveness of checking aviation equipment under ground conditions. Thanks to a zealous attitude toward the matter, the absolute number of defects (97 percent) discovered during this year were eliminated before the airplane or helicopter rose into the air.

The collective of specialists of the Vyazemskiy aeroclub which is headed by engineer N. Shevchenko has been occupying the leading place among the Air Force Engineering Services (IAS) of the DOSAAF aeroclubs for several years. Here, the percentage of airplanes ready for operation in the air is always high and all measures which ensure their reliability in flight are accomplished systematically. Technical servicing, periodic maintenance, and planned repairs are accomplished with high quality.

The secret of their success is that the leader and the party organization were able to rally the personnel of the service and to stimulate and develop in each specialist the striving to raise his qualification constantly and attain high quality in the performance of any work. Great significance is had by the well thought out

distribution of cadres and the rigid daily monitoring of how measures which permit preventing possible malfunctions of the materiel which have been worked out in the club are actually implemented. Comrade Shevchenko himself and his assistants are tirelessly looking for ways and methods for further improvement of the service's work and to ensure accident-free flights.

Park days are thoroughly planned and organized in the club. Engineers and technicians-brigadiers rigidly monitor the quality of accomplishment of the most difficult work, personally inspect the important units and assemblies of the airplane and engine, and teach subordinates on the spot the skill of the irreproachable preparation of each assembly, unit, and the airplane as a whole.

The work of the Air Force Engineering Service of the Vitebsk aeroclub also deserves a high grade. Its leader, V. Druy, who has great experience in helicopter maintenance, devotes constant attention to teaching the flight personnel the art of maintaining aviation equipment. He, himself, systematically conducts lessons on the difficult subjects of helicopter construction, analyzes the physical meaning of the processes which occur in flight, and explains the consequences of one or another violation of operating conditions of the helicopter engines and systems.

The aeroclub's collective, has something of which to be proud. The technical maintenance unit of the club has retained the title, "Outstanding TECh [technical maintenance unit] of DOSAAF aviation organization," confidently for two years in a row. The technical position has been equipped with centralized replenishment of fuel, air, and electric power. An entire galaxy of qualified specialists and equipment experts such as competition leaders Comrades A. Popelenok and K. Lavrenko, technicians-brigadiers Comrades N. Korotchuk, V. Mamshin, Ye. Ziyangurin, and others has grown up in the club. Thanks to their labor, the aviation equipment is prepared for flights with high quality. The aeroclub's pilots know that the aircraft technician's signature in the log of preparation of the helicopter as regards its readiness for flight is the guarantee of the machine's complete good working order.

But the aviation equipment is still not so carefully prepared, maintained, and cared for in all our aeroclubs. Through the fault of the technical personnel, there still are equipment failures in flight which are preconditions for flying accidents. Instances of superficial preparation of the airplanes and helicopters for flights and of failure to perform the established volume of work completely have not been overcome. Not all engineers, and especially the technicians-brigadiers, constantly and rigidly monitor the quality of their subordinates' work, do not teach them sufficiently using the example of the leaders, and do not transmit their experience. Because of this, there still are instances where airplanes and helicopters move out for takeoff with open-access holes of the filler necks which have been filled with substandard fuel and lubricants and with foreign objects in the pilots' cockpits. Such cases are the direct result of poor checking of execution of requirements set forth in the manual for the Air Force Engineering Service, insufficient practical skills in performing inspections and assembly and adjustment work, and unclear organization of labor.

In the course of the competition for a worthy greeting for the 26th CPSU Congress, the club chiefs and their assistants for Air Force Engineering Service and party, komсомол, and trade union organizations should propagandize leading experience more actively. In analyzing violations of the manual and rules for servicing equipment, they should determine their type and causes and work out effective measures to



prevent the repetition of errors and violations of the rules. Machines which are being prepared for test flight after repair, periodic maintenance, or the replacement of engines and important assemblies as well as airplanes and helicopters which are being serviced by specialists who have little experience in independent work should receive special checking.

When falling behind in the plan for flight training for some reasons, some aeroclub leaders try to speed it up through the cancellation of park days and delaying the turnover of the machines to the TECH for periodic maintenance. Sometimes the matter reaches the ordered, organizationally and technically unsubstantiated reduction of time for preparation of the machines by the TECH personnel. The aviation specialists of DOSAAF oblast, kray, and republic committees are required to stop this practice decisively since, as a rule, it entails a deterioration in the technical condition of the airplanes and helicopters which is fraught with the emergence of preconditions for flight accidents.

The aviation equipment which is at the disposal of our aeroclubs is national property. It is the duty of all personnel to care for the airplanes, helicopters, and gliders thoughtfully and to maintain them skillfully and effectively. Now, at the threshold of a new training year, the leaders of aeroclubs must thoroughly check the condition and working order of the aviation equipment, generalize leading experience in its maintenance and storage, analyze all cases of failures which occurred in 1980, and work out effective measures for their prevention. It is very important to evaluate and make the property of all the contribution of each specialist to the collective's common struggle to ensure the high reliability of aviation equipment.

Especially great attention should be turned to the preparation of the personnel and materiel for the conditions of winter maintenance. This is important and difficult work which cannot be put off for even one day.

The new upsurge in the creative activity of our club's personnel and their striving to greet the 26th CPSU Congress with labor gifts should be directed toward the further improvement of the entire Air Force Engineering Service, toward raising the aviation equipment maintenance style and the effectiveness and quality of the labor by the maintenance and repair men, and toward the unconditional ensuring of flight safety.

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#### Kaliningrad Oblast Committee Criticized

Source: SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 12 Nov 80 p 2

[Article: "More Attention to Reports in the Primary Organizations: Lead Efficiently and Specifically"]

[Text: The report of the deputy chairman of the Kalininskiy DOSAAF obkom, N. Anan'yev, on the course of report meetings (conferences) in the defense society's primary organizations and materials on checks were heard at a conference in the Directorate for mass-organizational work and military-patriotic propaganda.

In the reports and presentations of the chief of the directorate, A. Mamayev, and of other conference participants it was noted that active preparation in the oblast's DOSAAF organizations for the 26th Party Conference is exerting a mobilizing influence on the course of the reporting campaign. The initiative and activity of the defense society's members and their striving for the successful conclusion of 1980 and accomplishment of socialist obligations are growing.

In the preparatory period, the obkom accomplished a number of organizational measures directed toward the conduct of reports on a high level. The course of report meetings and conferences shows that at many of them successes and shortcomings in military-patriotic propaganda, mass defense work, and training and sports work are analyzed in a business-like manner.

Report meetings are conducted in an organized manner in Konakovskiy rayon. This is furthered by the timely briefing of the chairmen of DOSAAF committees and the propagandizing of favorable experience. Committee members and the broad range of activists have been attracted to participation in the preparation and conduct of report meetings. They are all supplied with informational material on the activity of the rayon DOSAAF committee and the accomplishment of the orders of the society's members.

Schedules for the conduct of the meetings and conferences which have been carefully thought out and coordinated with the administration of the labor and training collectives and party organs and good checking permit the conduct of reports in a quality manner and at the established times.

The DOSAAF obkom analyzed the course of the first report meetings and conferences in the Andreapol'skiy, Zharkovskiy, and Pzhevskiy rayons. The results of the check were discussed at a session of the obkom presidium.

At the same time, it was noted at the conference that there are substantial shortcomings in the organizational work of the obkom and rayon (city) committees. The obkom did not correct in good time the rayon (city) committees which approached the preparation of the meeting schedules in a formal manner, without consideration of actual capabilities. Thus, for example, the Selizharskiy rayon committee [12] planned the conduct of all report meetings in October. As could be expected, no meetings took place in more than half the primary organizations. Postponements of the times for the meetings are a frequent phenomenon in other rayons of the oblast, too. In Sarlovskiy and Rezhovskiy rayons, there now are no chairmen of DOSAAF rayon committees and the course of the reports was allowed to drift here.

In a number of rayon (city) committees, attention has not been drawn to those DOSAAF primary organizations where election meetings are to be conducted. More than 10 percent of the organizations are like this in Maksatikhinskiy rayon alone.

It was also noted that at some meetings measures which were conducted were only listed in the committee reports and there was no thorough analysis of the accomplishment of the CPSU Central Committee's decree on further improvement of ideological and political-indoctrinational work and the decisions of the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress. The meetings' participants did not hear from the summary reports just which committees accomplished the decisions of the election meetings, the critical remarks and suggestions of DOSAAF members, and whether all committee members justified their confidence. This, of course, lowered the level of the meetings and their mobilizing significance in developing the activity of all defense society members.

Other shortcomings which were permitted in the preparation and conduct of reports were also noted in the presentations of the conference participants. In some defense collectives, proper attention is not devoted to the conduct of shop-organization meetings. In some places, the norm for representation is lowered when electing delegates to conferences.

Reports are not used in all primary organizations for the comprehensive check of financial and administrative activity and the status of reporting and accounting in the committees. The chairmen of the auditing commissions did not come forth with reports on their activity everywhere.

The necessity to raise the personal responsibility of representatives of raykoms, gorkoms, and obkoms for the timely rendering of assistance to committees of primary organizations in ensuring the high ideological and organizational level of the reporting campaign and objectivity of information about the quality of the meeting or conference was stressed at the conference. It is important that the members of raykoms, gorkoms, obkoms, and kraykoms inform about the committees' specific organizational work in their presentations.

It is impossible to generalize experience in good time, disclose the reasons for shortcomings, or have an effective influence on the elimination of deficiencies without the active personal participation of the leaders of raykoms, gorkoms, and obkoms and their regular personnel in the preparation and conduct of meetings and conferences. Facts show that some committee leaders are forgetting this truth. Thus, for example many personnel of the Kalininskiy DOSAAF obkom do not attend even one meeting. And that is why they can be judged only from reports and papers. It is not out of place to recall that if the representative of the higher committee arrives at the primary organization only at the hour of the meeting's opening then, as they say, no results can be expected from such a visit.

It is important to ensure a business-like atmosphere and an objective conversation on the basis of principled criticism and self-criticism and without any kind of bragging and idle talk everywhere at report meetings and conferences.

It is necessary to avoid in every possible way smoothness and window dressing in reports and presentations, empty self-accounting, and assurances which oblige no one to anything. A business-like tone and business-like reaction to critical presentations are the guarantee of work effectiveness.

Report meetings should provide a powerful impetus to raising the activity of DOSAAF primary organizations and should contribute to new successes in socialist competition for a worthy greeting for the 26th CPSU Congress.

The results of discussion of the course of reports and tasks to improve efficiency of leadership of the reporting campaign in the primary organizations were summed up in his presentation by the deputy chairman of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee, V. Mozaykin.

## Military-Patriotic Training in Primorskiy Kray

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 (signed to press 9 Oct 80)  
pp 6-7

[Article by V. Safronov, secretary of CPSU Primorskiy kraykom: "We Grow Patriots"]

[Text] The Primorskiy kray is especially dear to all Soviet people. Each person's heart beats with excitement when he sets foot on its land. And not only because our kray is wonderfully beautiful, that its expanses are grippingly broad, and nature is of a rare variety. The Soviet Primor'ye is a land of heroic history where each foot glorifies the bravery, boldness, valor, and inexhaustible patriotism of the Soviet man. It is a land which is covered with legendary glory, a highly-developed industrial region of the country, a kray of newly-erected buildings.

Our ports--Vladivostok, Nakhodka, Vostochnyy, Pos'yet--are the motherland's sea gates on the Pacific Ocean. The fishing industry is the kray's leading branch. We produce domestic refrigerators, metal-cutting tools and radio receivers, wood-working machine tools and washing machines, lead and tin, fluorspar, coal, and tungsten are mined, footwear, knitted and leather goods, clothing, and pianos are produced....

But the chief wealth is people. Thanks to their selfless labor the plans of the Tenth Five-Year Plan are being accomplished successfully. In four and a half years the volume of industrial production increased by 22 percent and the productivity of labor--by 15.8 percent. Seventy industrial enterprises and shops, four million square meters of housing, and many schools, hospitals, and polyclinics have been constructed.

The workers of the Primor'ye have also achieved certain successes in the development of agriculture. The gross production of its products during four years in comparison with the same period of the Ninth Five-Year Plan increased by 20 percent. Socialist obligations for the sale of grain, milk, eggs, fruit, honey, and products of velvet-antlered reindeer breeding and caged fur breeding have been accomplished. The number of large-horned cattle, swine, and fowl grew and their productivity increased.

In short, during the years of the Tenth Five-Year Plan the kray's national economy moved forward substantially in all directions of economic and social development. Recognition of the labor successes of the Primor'ye residents is the awarding of the Challenge Red Banner of the CPSU Central Committee, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the All-Union Central Trade-Union Council, and the Komsomol Central Committee in accordance with the results of the All-Union Socialist Competition in 1978 and 1979.

These successes are the result of daily painstaking organizational and ideological-political work of the kray party organization and the tireless concern for the development of the economy and culture of the Primor'ye on the part of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government.

The 1978 trip of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, through Siberia and the Far East became a brilliant manifestation of such concern. Being in the Primor'ye, Leonid Il'ich expressed many valuable suggestions and much advice on problems for the kray's further combined socio-economic development in talks and



and meetings with workers, party and economy leaders, and fighting men of the Pacific Fleet. These instructions were a program of action for the kray party organization and for all Primor'ye residents. During the past period, considerable work has been accomplished in improving the structure of industry. The proportion of machine building, metal working, and the mining-chemical and light industries is increasing in the kray from year to year. The fuel-energy base is becoming more and more reliable.

The decree of the June (1980) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on the convening of the regular 26th Congress of our party and the report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the plenum caused in the Primor'ye residents, just as in all Soviet people, a flood of new strength and enthusiasm in the struggle for the successful completion of the plans for the current year and the five-year plan as a whole. From day to day the Primor'ye residents constantly feel the indissolubility of their labor efforts with the motherland's successes in the international arena and they understand well that the Far East has ever growing significance in the foreign-economic ties of the countries of the Pacific basin. The workers of the kray and the servicemen of the Far East are reacting keenly to events in this region, are following attentively the intrigues of the American imperialists and the Chinese hegemonists against peace in this area, and completely share the conclusions of the June plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that the intrigues of imperialism and the other enemies of peace require constant vigilance and the strengthening of our state's defensive capability in every possible way in order to frustrate imperialism's plans for the attainment of military superiority and the implementation of a world dictatorship.

In implementing the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the instructions and recommendations of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the kray, city, and rayon committees of the CPSU and the primary organizations are constantly concerned about strengthening the ideological work and are improving the direction of the military-patriotic indoctrination of the workers and, first of all, of the youth. In recent years, certain experience has been accumulated in the combined accomplishment of tasks for molding internationalist and patriotic feelings in the youth and practical training for the defense of the socialist fatherland.

Questions of military-patriotic indoctrination are constantly in the field of view of party committees and primary organizations. During the years which have passed since the 25th CPSU Congress, more than 200 questions concerning the activity of party, soviet, DOSAAF, and other public organizations and ideological institutions on the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth were examined at plenums, meetings of activists, and bureau sessions. The number of theoretical, scientific-practical, and methodological conferences and seminars on problems of socialist internationalism and Soviet patriotism has grown.

Various means and methods for work on the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth are being used more and more widely in the practice of ideological activity. This is furthered to a considerable extent by the system of party and Komsomol political education. Party and Komsomol organizations, jointly with the political organs of the Armed Forces and the border troops, regularly conduct special lessons for communists and leaders of schools and seminars on questions of military-patriotic work and the profound explanation of the Lenin teaching on the defense of the socialist fatherland and the propagandizing of the heroic revolutionary, labor, and combat traditions of the Communist Party, the Soviet people, and their Armed Forces.

Lecture bureaus and organizations of international friendship and the future fighting men, in whose work VOAAT committees take an active part, are widely used for military-patriotic indoctrination.

More than 50 thousand youth collectives included members of the PVD and Great Patriotic War (GPP) competitions. The output standards are over-accumulated in such brigades and the salaries of the heroes are transferred to the youth fund. The contribution of the young Primorsky residents to this fund grew from 20,000 rubles in 1970 to 30,000 rubles in 1979.

Each year more than 1,000 thematic schools are conducted in the army with the participation of veterans of the party, revolution, labor, and the Armed Forces as well as more than 25,000 meetings of the youth with them. This work is made more active during the period of months for mass-defense work.

values of the Great Patriotic War are the most desired source among planners and young citizens, pillars of the vocational and technical schools, students of higher educational institutions, and men of the Armed Forces and border troops. Not considering their personal lives, the veterans who are ready with and go to youth schools, to help in the Party, to barracks, and to border outposts and battalions. The younger generation is proud of knowledge from the first generation and is ready now to defend its freedom and independence.

The young! women are interested by Alexander Petrovich Gerasimov, a participant in the battle of Berlin, who resided Berlin with wife and two Soviet sons, Vladimir Ivanovich Gerasimov who participated in the liberation of Germany and in the Victory Parade in Moscow, Dmitry Gerasimovich Gerasimov, a member of the Order of the Patriotic War, Vladimir Gerasimovich Gerasimov who participated in the defense of the Soviet frontiers, Dmitry Gerasimovich Gerasimov, corresponding member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and Chairman of the "Knowledge" Society, USSR organization, and many other war veterans.

Political indoctrination is conducted to a great extent by the numerous movies and cartoons of revolutionary content, and labor songs. The historical and patriotic movie series and cartoons have been popular in the army's territory. The commercial picture series and cartoons have been popular in the army's territory. The historical and patriotic movie series and cartoons have been popular in the army's territory. The historical and patriotic movie series and cartoons have been popular in the army's territory.

It is a farce to claim that the industrialization of the youth is played by trials to glorify the revolutionary combat, and labor glory of the Soviet people, the number of whose participants is growing from year to year. The thousands and tens of thousands of young people who are working in the Red Banner Pacific Fleet and the border guard units are not glorified as the winners of the all-union trip.

Successful pattern view of the labor collective and organizations will bring alive, active, and intense demands for the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth. These are consistently strengthening and developing.

A special mission of the kray Komsomol is the patronage and participation of young Primor'ye residents in guarding the state boundary. The following have become the basic forms of this work: the creation of specialized detachments of voluntary people's militia and the joint conduct of sports festivals, conferences, and kray Komsomol-youth "relay races" along the state boundary.

A complex of measures is being implemented in the kray in training the youth for military service. They include primary military training, the training of specialists for the Soviet Armed Forces in the DOSAAF training organizations and in the vocational and technical schools, medical and health-improvement work, physical culture work, and raising the general-educational knowledge of the draftees.

Considerable attention is devoted to primary military training of the pre-draftee youth. Inspections are conducted annually in the general-educational schools and vocational and technical schools, and they are organized by the Komsomol, pedagogical enterprises, and DOSAAF committees with the assistance of the communists.

During the last five years, the number of military-sports camps for the draftee youth has doubled in the kray and the number of youths who are engaged in DOSAAF technical sports clubs and children's clubs with house committees has increased significantly. About 2,500 military-technical study groups in which 200,000 people are engaged are operating.

The consistent, purposeful work of party organs in improving NVP [primary military training] is providing favorable results. In comparison with 1971, among those called up to the Armed Forces the number of Komsomol members has increased by 17.6 percent, the number of people with a higher and secondary education--by 25.6 percent, and the number of GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] badge wearers--by 17.4 percent. One out of every three draftees has a military-technical specialty which, as a rule, was obtained in DOSAAF.

The mobilization of the draftee youth for the right to serve at the warships "Primorsky, with salute," "Vladivostok," and "SS let shchetya VLASTI" has become traditional. The remarkable patriotic movement, "Brother to replace brother," began its operation through the country from the Primor'ye boundary.

The Party and Komsomol organizations together with the military commissariats are organizing the ceremonial send-off of the youths to the army, maintaining ties with them during the period of their training and service, and conducting gatherings of conscripts' mothers.

The VVP program, soviet organs, administrative leaders, and public organizations consider as a necessary condition for the training of the youth for the defense of the Motherland the readiness of each youth for the accomplishment of civil defense duties. These questions are discussed regularly by party and soviet organs.

Mass information and propaganda are widely used in military-patriotic instruction. The permanent headings "Song of the Motherland," "Festive days of the Motherland," "We have worthy of our fathers," and "We are Internationalists" are found on the city newspaper PRIMORSKY KRAI [Red Banner], and the permanent heading of the youth newspaper, "Song of the Motherland," has been introduced in the youth newspaper PRIMORSKY KRAI [Red Banner]. Broadcasts of the television

club of young defenders of the socialist fatherland, "Otvaga" [Valor], on television are regular.

The Primor'ye residents, just as all Soviet people, fully and completely approve the decisions of the June plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the basic Leninist foreign policy line of the party, and measures for the defense and assurance of our motherland's security. In going to meet the 26th CPSU Congress, the communists and all workers of our order-bearing kray are filled with the resolve to strengthen even more the economic and defensive might of the Country of Soviets--the basis of the effective implementation of the Communist Party's Leninist peace-loving course.

СОВЕТСКИЙ "СОВЕТСКИЙ АЗЕРБАЙДЖАН", 1980

Report on VSCSAP Central Committee of Azerbaijan SSR Plenum

Базу ПТВМВ в Баку 17 Дек 80 p 4

[Article: "Bring 'p'atriots!"]

[Text] The conduct of the all-union trip of Komsomols and the youth to places of revolutionary, combat, and labor glory of the Soviet people has become a good tradition of the Azerbaijan VSCSAP organizations. More than 120,000 boys and girls of the republic took part in this mass patriotic movement. They followed the route of the 11th Red Army and visited the places where the celebrated sons and daughters of Soviet Azerbaijan accomplished combat and labor exploits.

Local readings, lecture bureaus, and universities of the pre-draft youth, which play an important role in improving the military-patriotic indoctrination of the workers, in improving the training of specialists for the Soviet Armed Forces and the national economy, and in the further development of technical and military-sport types of sport are acquiring ever greater popularity among members of the defense society of the republic.

These facts were noted at the plenum of the VSCSAP Azerbaijan Central Committee which took place on 14 December and which discussed the course of accomplishment of the VSCSAP Central Committee's decree, "On further improvement of ideological and political-educational work," and the tasks for improving the practical activity of the defense society's organizations in the republic. A report was given by the chairman of the VSCSAP Central Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR, Major General of Tank Troops I. B. Akhmedov.

In the context of nationwide preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress, it was noted at the plenum, the VSCSAP organizations have widely initiated agitation-propaganda work among the population. Mass military-patriotic measures, automobile runs, competitions in military-technical types of sport, exhibits of technical creativity, and others are devoted to this event. To greet the party congress in a worthy manner, directed the speaker and participants in the debate, means to make our contribution to the accomplishment of the main task--to render every type of assistance to the strengthening of the country's defensive capability and the training of the workers for the defense of the motherland.



At the same time, to improve the republic's DOSAAF activity it is necessary to eliminate shortcomings which are present. Thus far, the leading experience in the work of the best lecture groups and departments for military-patriotic indoctrination has not yet been widely introduced in all organizations and, in some places, it is conducted in the old way. Further improvement is required by the training of specialists for the national economy and propagandizing military-technical knowledge and types of sport among the population. The level of organizational work should be raised in every possible way and the ranks of the society's activists should be broadened.

#### Estonian DOSAAF Central Committee Chairman on Achievements, Problems

Tallinn SOVETSKAYA MOTOVIYA in Russian 11 Jan 51 p 2

[Article by Ja. Narispe, chairman DOSAAF Central Committee, Estonian SSR: "A School for Patriotism"]

[Text] The republic's defense society is conducting important work in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the population. In the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, "On the conditions and measures to improve the work of the All-Union Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and the Fleet," it is stressed that the DOSAAF organizations are required to ensure the active participation of the society's members in mass defense work and to perfect their indoctrination in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism and constant readiness for the defense of the motherland.

The defense society of the Estonian SSR, being a component part of DOSAAF USSR, has become an appreciable force in the accomplishment of important socio-political, defense, and national-economic tasks under the leadership of party and Soviet organs. Today, the republic organization consists of more than 2,000 primary organizations comprising in its ranks more than 500,000 people. To support its indoctrinational, training, and mass sports functions a broad network of training organizations (technical and sports-technical, sports-rifle, and aviation clubs has been developed. The society's material-technical base is constantly being strengthened.

Among the tasks which the DOSAAF organizations are called upon to accomplish, an important place is occupied by the broad propagandizing of military knowledge and the heroic traditions of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces among the population by systematic work in preparing the youth for military service, and by active participation in the conduct of civil defense measures.

Each one out of every three draftees receives a needed military-technical specialty, military knowledge, and practical skills in the republic's DOSAAF training organizations prior to service in the army. This permits him more rapidly to become a member of the equipment and to become a full-fledged defender of the motherland. We should distinguish the collectives of the DOSAAF type technical school, and the Tallinn Level and Radio Engineering School.

One of the specific features of our society is that it organically unites the accomplishment of important defense and national economic tasks. The DOSAAF organizations train more than 16,000 specialists a year, the majority of whom are engaged in branches of the national economy.

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Thirty-five types of military-technical sport are cultivated in the republic. More than 100,000 people are constantly occupied in the sections and on teams, among them 25,000 school children. During last year alone, 55 masters of sport of the USSR, 214 candidate masters, and more than 1,600 first-class sportsmen were trained. Our sportsmen won 70 medals in championship tournaments of the USSR and Europe.

However, in noting what is favorable, the DOSAAF committees, clubs and schools and the sports federations also clearly see existing shortcomings and incomplete work.

In the draft of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress, it says: **"Increase the publicity of competition and surround the leaders and innovators of production with honor and respect. Ensure the timely generalization and systematic propagation of leading experience"** (in boldface).

We must make better and more effective use of leading experience to eliminate lagging in a number of rayons and cities—in Pyskaskiy and Pylvaskiy rayons and in Tartu and Narva. Here, much depends on the combat vitality of the committees and on their ability to present experience intelligibly, explain the essence of the leaders' successes, and show how the introduction of everything progressive which has been accumulated by others can be attained. And there are people to learn from. The majority of our collectives accomplished their socialist obligations ahead of schedule. Among them—all DOSAAF rayon committees of the city of Tallinn, committees of the cities of Keskla-Tarve and Pihlamäe, and Khar'yuskly, Kapiaskiy, Keskla-Tarvaskiy, and Valmuskly rayons.

We are facing important tasks in the matter of raising the quality of training of specialists for the Armed Forces, improving the results in training cadres for the mass technical professions, and expanding further the mass nature and growth of skill in military-technical types of sport.

The requirement to improve the criteria for evaluating results attained, to spread leading experience widely, to support creative initiative from below in every possible way, and to attain publicity and comparability of competition results has been written in the resolutions of the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress. On the recommendations of the congress, we have begun to devote more attention to improving leading conditions in the training organizations, to introduce progressive measures and technical means of instruction more widely, to make better use of scientific recommendations and leading experience for this, and to attain the unity of instruction and indoctrination.

## MILITARY SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES

### DZERZHINSKIY MILITARY ACADEMY ACTIVITIES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNIYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 80 (signed to press 4 Dec 80) pp 39-45

[Article by Lt Gen V. Orlov, chief of the Political Section of the Military Academy (imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy: "The Primary Concern of the Communists--The Effectiveness of the Training Process")]

[Text] The decisions of the 25th Party Congress and the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On the Further Development of the Higher School and Improving the Quality of Specialist Training" have had a profound and all-round influence on the activities of the higher military school in the area of training command, political and engineer personnel. The demands of these most important party documents find their practical embodiment in the work of the command, the political section, the faculty and the students of the Military Academy (imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy). On the threshold of the 26th CPSU Congress, in a spirit of the decisions of the October (1980) Plenum of the Party Central Committee, an active process of critically analyzing what has been achieved is underway in the party organizations of the institution of learning and the ways and means are being outlined for further implementing the party's program provisions on the higher school and on the training of ideologically convinced, highly trained officer personnel who are totally dedicated to the motherland and to the cause of communism.

The carrying out of the ever-increasing demands of the party and the USSR minister of defense on the higher school assumes a strengthening of the party's influence primarily on the content of the training process. The academy's political section is endeavoring to constantly keep an eye on the entire range of questions related to the training and indoctrination of the students in increasing in every possible way the activeness and militancy of the party organizations.

The decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination" emphasizes that the development in the Soviet people of a scientific ideology, of wholehearted dedication to the cause of the party and communist ideals, love for the socialist motherland and proletarian internationalism has been and remains the core of ideological activities. Under the conditions of any military school, in this process the leading role is played by social sciences. A profound and creative study of CPSU history, philosophy, political economy, the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin, the party documents and the

works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and the other party leaders directly develop a communist ideology and high political awareness in the students. Proceeding from this the political section of our academy has been constantly improving work in the area of the leadership over the social science chairs, their internal chair and pedagogical activities. This is aided by the regularly held joint sessions of the chairs, by theoretical seminars and pedagogical training courses for the instructors. Here they discuss the urgent problems of Marxist-Leninist theory and analyze pedagogical practices. Thus, at a joint session held at the beginning of this academic year, there was a thorough discussion of the coordinating of efforts by the faculty in improving the teaching of social sciences. The recommendations worked out in the course of it have contributed to the closer interaction of the chairs. At the same time, the political section has been concerned with improving the work of the special subject pedagogical commissions, the quality of the lectures, seminars and exams. An analysis of the practical activities of the instructors and pedagogical collectives makes it possible to determine the ways for further increasing the ideological and pedagogical level of the exercises and the independent work of the students. Indicative in this regard is the experience of the chair of CPSU history and party political work, where the content and procedures of the special problem lectures have been improved by the joint creative efforts of the instructors. Here in conducting the exercises primary significance is given to studying and generalizing advanced experience. As an example, let us take the lecture given by Col V. Krotov on the subject "The Book of V. I. Lenin 'What is to be Done?' and Its Significance in the Struggle against Bourgeois and Revisionistic Ideology." In his speech the officer profoundly disclosed the content of the inspired work and the methodology for analyzing the basic forms of the class struggle. The lecture was marked by a scientific approach to showing the succession of Lenin's ideas on the party, on revolutionary theory, the political indoctrination of the working class and the struggle against bourgeois ideology in the theoretical and practical activities of the CPSU under contemporary conditions. The generalized experience of the working out of this and other special-problem lectures is now being introduced on all the chairs.

The complicating of the international situation and the growing class struggle and ideological subversion of imperialism at the present stage has necessitated the arming of the officers with a Leninist methodology of combating bourgeois, revisionistic, Maoist and Zionist ideology. At the same time we are concerned by the fact that in the course of the training process the students are still not sufficiently instilled with the ability to unmask various hostile ideas and views in a well-argued manner and from class, offensive positions. We have made corrections in the curriculums. Now lectures, seminar exercises, abstracts and theoretical conferences for the students are specially devoted to this problem. In the academy great interest has been shown in the teaching aids prepared by the collective of social science teachers on "Ideological Work: Methodology, Theory and Practice," "Criticism of Modern Military-Political Concepts of Imperialism" and "Zionism--A Weapon of the Imperialist Reaction."

The instilling in the students of a profound interest in studying the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism is a question of special concern for the political section and all the instructors. Here we proceed from the recommendations of the All-Union Conference of Ideological Workers where emphasis has been put on the urgency of a direct resorting of all personnel to the works of Marx, Engels and



Lenin which give the rudiments of revolutionary theory. It is a question of their profound and integrated study and propagandizing and not a cursory and superficial familiarization with individual works.

In analyzing the independent work of the students, it is essential to admit that we have still not succeeded in ultimately overcoming such an essential shortcoming as a cursory, so to speak, fragmentary approach to the study of primary sources by individual students. In eliminating this shortcoming, the political section together with the social science chairs for the entire period of instruction has defined a group of works recommended for complete study. On these works by the founders of Marxism-Leninism, lectures are given, seminars are held, consultation is provided, and they are given in the semester and state exams. Experience affirms that such an approach provides soundness of knowledge and a mastery of the Leninist methodology. The social science curricula should orient the students to this, and in our view these curricula require a substantial improvement.

In our work of developing a scientific ideology among the students, we consider the circumstance that the academy trains officers who already have a higher specialized military education and definite experience. Here it is very important to develop their ability to independently acquire knowledge and to develop creative thinking in every possible way. For precisely this reason the social science instructors pay great attention to working with each student considering the level of his erudition and political knowledge and to developing his capacity to assimilate the work completely, logically, and with an understanding of the entire urgency of the designated problems. The practice has become firmly established of holding planned individual colloquiums. This is difficult and painstaking work, but, as we are firmly convinced, it produces tangible results.

The scientific ideology of the Soviet officer encompasses the most important provisions and conclusions not only of the social disciplines but also the general scientific, special and military technical ones. For this reason the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on the higher school emphasizes the need to strengthen the responsibility of all the chairs for the ideological-political, philosophical and methodological focus of the training process.

In being guided by this requirement, the political section is directing the activities of the chair party organizations in such a manner that each exercise is based on a solid foundation of Marxism-Leninism and be permeated with true party loyalty. Upon the initiative of the political section, the academy's council discussed the question of measures to further raise the ideological element of instruction in light of the demands of the CPSU Central Committee. This was preceded by a study of the state of affairs at a number of chairs.

During the years which have passed since the 25th CPSU Congress, the academy has developed a definite system which helps to raise the scientific and ideological level of the educational process. Theoretical studies have been created which define the ideological and methodological bases and content of the principle of party loyalty in instruction. The practice has been established of having the annual elaboration of pedagogical recommendations at the chairs, and these recommendations are directed to reflect the decisions of the party and the government and the demands of the USSR minister of defense.

The questions related to ensuring a high ideological level of instruction are periodically discussed in the party organizations and are also taken up at the faculty councils, the training and pedagogical courses and sessions of the chairs. The subject of the latter is set for the year and their carrying out is provided for in the calendar plan of basic measures. At the same time, we have noticed that individual leaders of the chair collectives do not bother themselves with a careful and serious elaboration of recommendations for the instructors on the application of the methodological principles to the specific disciplines. The sessions of certain chairs do not always discuss the major questions which are of important political and military significance. For this reason it is not accidental that individual instructors close themselves off in the confines of a narrow problem or the purely technical aspect of the subject and do not rise to broad theoretical generalizations and political conclusions needed by the students. At present the lectures are weak in cognitive and methodological terms. We see the overcoming of these shortcomings as an important condition for improving the ideological and political focus of the academic process.

The political section has stressed for the party organizations the creation of a creative situation in all the collectives and has organized the cooperation of the social science chairs with the chairs of the military and special disciplines. At the report and election party meetings, many communists commented that joint sessions of the chairs, the reviewing and discussion of textbooks, teaching aids, lectures, pedagogical studies and other didactic materials have been of great help in this regard.

An important area of daily organizational activities for the political section is concern for improving the ideological and theoretical training of the pedagogical personnel. Particular attention is given to having the instructors make a thorough study of the component parts of Marxism-Leninism in close relationship to military problems. Along with the planned studies there has also been the development of such forms as theoretical and scientific-practical conferences and seminars and the discussion of abstracts. For giving lectures to the faculty highly skilled scientists, responsible workers from the party and soviet bodies of Moscow and the leadership of the academy are employed. All of this broadens the theoretical base of the military pedagogues, it improves their methodological training and serves as a good basis for a high ideological level of instruction.

The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers on the higher school emphasizes the necessity of strengthening the role of the chair as the main unit at the higher school which defines the content and quality of the educational, scientific and indoctrinational process. In working for this, the officers from the academy's political section as part of interdisciplinary groups or a separate group with the involvement of competent specialists each month study the activities of one or two chairs on the basic questions of the academic process and internal party life. The results of such a study are brought up for discussion by the party meetings, the sessions of the bureaus and faculty party committees. The basic aim of the work by the political section in a primary party organization is to indoctrinate an effective party aktiv and to make its influence on the communists and all the personnel more effective.

The purposefulness of party work depends largely upon the qualitative composition of the secretaries from the chair party organizations, their authority and competence. At present 90 percent of them have academic degrees and titles. The political section is working to strengthen such a composition of the party aktiv.

As we have become convinced, the nature of the tasks carried out by the chair party collectives requires that their secretaries be assigned to a separate group for practical training. And this is what we do in organizing regular exercises. At the seminars, along with the party workers, speaking to them on the questions of improving the training of commanders and engineers for the troops, the raising of the scientific and pedagogical skills of the instructors and the development of initiative and creativity in training are the chief of the academy, Doctor of Military Sciences, Prof, Col Gen F. Tonkikh, the deputy chief of the academy for academic and scientific work, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Prof, Engr-Lt Gen A. Solodov and other leaders.

In directing the party organizations of the chairs, the political section makes active use of such a form as hearing reports from the secretaries. It sees this primarily as a means for providing aid and careful control over the state of affairs in the training subunits. The reports in the political section pursue also the goal of disseminating advanced experience in the instruction and indoctrination of the students.

Substantial experience in ensuring a high quality of military specialist training has been acquired on the chair where Col V. Nadin is the party bureau secretary. Here the party meetings and sessions discuss the urgent questions of improving the academic and indoctrinational process, improving the quality of the diploma projects and developing the training facilities. Reports are heard systematically by the communist instructors on the experience of training and indoctrinational work with the students and on improving their professional skills. The effective activities of the chief of this chair and the party bureau have brought about the development of initiative and the search for new solutions to intensify the training process. The work of the communists is concentrated in the main, promising areas of instruction with the extensive introduction of automated control and modeling systems.

The greater role of the chairs in the training process necessitates a differentiated approach to the various categories of the faculty. In the past this aspect of the question was not always considered in the activities of the faculty party committees or even the political section. At present, the party committees and bureaus have begun to have a more active influence on all aspects of the training of the instructors, they have begun more frequently and specifically to discuss these questions at their sessions and work out specific measures. The academy, in particular, has clearly designated the basic areas of work with the higher skilled specialists, the doctors of sciences and professors. With them the most important questions are discussed relating to scientific, pedagogical and political indoctrination work.

It is generally recognized that the instructor is the central figure of a VUZ. From him run the basic threads of the all-round influence on the students. "A great scientist and a true pedagogue," commented Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "repeats

himself in his students. The student takes over the ideological conviction of the teacher, his attitude toward labor, scientific erudition and work methods." For this reason one can understand the attention which we devote to further improving the work with instructors.

The academy has established a strict procedure for improving the skills of the pedagogical personnel. A portion of them undergoes retraining at the permanent advanced training courses. Significant work in improving skills is carried out directly on the chairs. But the basic form for raising the professional expertise of the military pedagogues has been and remains independent study and the painstaking assimilation of all that is new and advanced which has appeared in science and technology and in educational and indoctrinational practices. On this level of particular significance is a greater responsibility of the communists for their professional growth.

I would like to point out the importance of the scientific pedagogical conferences. They discuss questions of a general methodological nature, they examine the results of scientific research in the area of training and indoctrination, pedagogical experience is exchanged, a unity of views is arrived at concerning the procedures of the exercises, and procedural coordination of the teaching of related disciplines is carried out. Here the collection which we have published entitled "The Scientific Organization and Improving of the Training Process at the Academy" is a good help.

The communists of the chairs link the effectiveness of instruction with the realization of interesting creative ideas in the area of intensifying the training process by creating first-rate laboratory training facilities equipped with modern teaching equipment. The party organizations have been the initiators of this work. Here the main concern is to ensure a practical focus of instruction using large training complexes for the students in the basic specialties with the introduction of a computer. Many auditoriums are equipped with television and multiscreen units.

Recently the academy began using an unique auditorium for party political work. It is equipped with eight television sets which can relay the central broadcasts as well as reproduce various training material. The instructors have an opportunity to utilize amateur and professional films as well as a video tape recorder. The auditorium has the required visual aids. Unfortunately we cannot assert that the auditoriums equipped with modern teaching devices are used sufficiently effectively by all instructors. One can still feel the affinity of individual comrades for customary working methods and the timid assimilation of new promising procedures and means of instruction. The party organizations of the chair collectives are focusing the communists on eliminating such omissions.

The ties between the chairs and the troops have acquired a new quality. And here one can feel the party's concern for improving instruction and the adopting of advanced troop experience. Individual trips by instructors to the troop units are now complemented by trips by the entire basic personnel of a number of chairs. These are included in the curriculum and schedule of exercises. The instructors give lectures and reports to the personnel and participate in conducting scientific conferences, exercises and drills. Thus, the professional ties between the chairs and the units, in being planned for the year, encompass the main questions



of scientific, educational and indoctrinational work. The political section sees its task in further raising the role of the chair party collectives in training officer personnel considering the needs of the troops.

Instilling in the officers the skills of conducting party political work is an inseparable component part in the development of a military specialist. The commanders, political workers, the faculty, the party organizations of the faculties, the courses and training divisions take a most active part in this. All their activities are organized according to a single comprehensive plan which makes provision for a consistent system of measures for the entire period of instruction for the students. It is a question that a graduate of the academy, having mastered the program, could subsequently correctly define his place and role in carrying out the complex questions of troop life, ably direct indoctrination, rely on the party and Komsomol organizations, monitor the fulfillment of the designated measures, analyze the level of all indoctrinational and organizational work and draw correct conclusions. The realization of such skills in the commanders who lead troop collectives is carried out in all forms of the training and indoctrination process. Our concern is to see to it that the lectures in the course on party political work and other disciplines be saturated with the materials of troop practice so that useful recommendations be voiced in them.

In the troop, command-staff exercises and integrated drills the students deepen their knowledge, they check their approach to solving various questions of party political work and gain skills in planning, preparing and carrying out organizational and ideological indoctrination measures. In the course of seminars the instructors direct the efforts of the students at a creative search for the most effective ways to improve practical skills and abilities, they provide an all-round assessment for the students giving reports and teach them to draw up plans and form the subjects of lectures, reports and talks.

The ability to organize and conduct party political work is also instilled in the students in the process of their participation in sociopolitical activities. These include the work of the communists in the party organizations of the training squads, courses and faculties, the political-indoctrination, cultural-educational and mass sports work in the academy as well as the carrying out of political measures at the enterprises and institutions of the city. The students participate in the VNO (Military Scientific Society) circles and they attend faculties on ethics, aesthetics and legal indoctrination as well as additional exercises in psychology and pedagogics.

On the question of instilling skills we endeavor to develop in the students a need and taste for oral political statements and to improve propaganda skills. In the academy the propagandist's school has proven effective and political information workers from the training squads participate in this. In recent years hundreds of officers have completed it. The political section has received numerous positive comments from the troops on their indoctrinational work. Here is one of them: "The academy graduate who completed propagandist's school, Sr Lt Yu. Bol'shakov, is an intelligent specialist and a fine propagandist. His speeches as a political information speaker attract the men and inevitably evoke a vital interest among them." We are following the work of the school graduates in the units and are sending them the necessary reference information materials.

Tours of duty in the troops for the students play an important role in reinforcing and improving their skills as indoctrinators. Here a great deal depends upon the leaders of the tours and for this reason the political section at the academy is particularly thorough in examining the plans of their practical work and does everything possible to make rational use of time. Due to this the men on the tours of duty year after year more successfully master their specific official duties, they adopt the advanced experience of the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol activists and they take a more effective part in the preparation and conduct of party political measures. We consider useful the missions to the units for supervising the effectiveness of the tours of duty by the chiefs of the faculties, their deputies, the officers of the training section and the chiefs of the social sciences chairs. This provides an opportunity to increase the influence on the process of improving officer skills in accord with their duties.

The academy also employs other forms of ties between the units and the subunits and for studying troop practices. The political section has helped to reinforce the successes on this level and in every possible way encourages the initiative and creativity of the organizers of effective political indoctrination on all levels.

The communists and all the personnel of the academy have viewed the decisions of the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the provisions and conclusions given in the vivid speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev as a fighting program of action. In light of the party's demands, in party work the basic emphasis is being put on a critical assessment of the achieved level and a concentrating of attention of all the communists on unsolved problems. The academy has many such problems. The party organizations consider their basic task to be greater responsibility of the communists for the assigned job. We still have much to do in order that dissatisfaction with the achieved results, self-criticism, and the mobilizing of all reserves and opportunities for further improving the training process become the determining motives in the activities of each party organization and each communist. This is an indispensable condition for the successful training of the student officers for honorable service in the troops.

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## PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

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## PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

### U.S.: 'NEW NUCLEAR STRATEGY'

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 11, Nov 80 (signed to press 14 Nov 80) pp 7-10

[Article by Engr-Col A. Fedorov: "The 'New Nuclear Strategy' of the United States"]

[Text:] At the beginning of August 1980, the American press announced the Directive No 59 which had been approved by President Carter and purportedly made serious changes in U.S. nuclear strategy. After this the propaganda machine of Washington was put into action to "explain" the essence of the "new strategy." There followed numerous messages, speeches and interviews by highly placed representatives of the Pentagon and White House, including Carter himself.

How have the authors endeavored to depict this "new nuclear strategy" of the United States?

They have reduced the essence of the question to the fact that Directive No 59 has officially introduced a concept worked out over the last 2-3 years for employing nuclear strategic forces. This concept makes available to the President as the supreme commander-in-chief of the U.S. armed forces "a broader choice of variations of nuclear strikes commensurable with the developing situation." In their opinion, the availability of previously thought out plans for a multivariant, including selective, use of strategic weapons makes it possible in a number of instances to "limit" a nuclear war and prevent it from developing into an all-out one. At the same time, as was officially stated by the U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown, this "strategy" does not repudiate an unlimited nuclear war. On the contrary, the Pentagon as before considers such a war with the making of a massed nuclear strike against the entire range of installations to be hit as the basic variation for employing its strategic offensive forces. Obviously for precisely this reason Brown also emphasized that "the Presidential Directive No 59 is not a new strategic doctrine and does not represent a radical departure from the U.S. strategy which has been in force over the last decade."

Why then has so much been said about it by the Washington leaders? In what direction has it been "modernized" according to the order issued by President Carter in the summer of 1977 for a "fundamental revision of plans for the use of the strategic forces"?

The foreign military specialists feel that the idea of modernizing U.S. nuclear strategy and incorporating in it an ever-greater number of variations for employing the most modern weapons in addition to the desire to supplement an all-out nuclear war with a so-called "limited nuclear war" are not new. Even in 1962, the former U.S. Secretary of Defense R. McNamara formulated the strategic concept of a "counterforce" in accord with which the aim was set of attaining a rapid and comparatively safe victory by making the first nuclear strike against the Soviet strategic weapons. The concept of a "choice of targets" (1974), along with the other methods of utilizing the U.S. strategic forces, also included the so-called "disarming" nuclear strike which at that time was publicized as one of the variations of a "limited nuclear war." Its essence came down to the idea that by a carefully planned preventive strike against Soviet military installations, and primarily the strategic nuclear weapons, it would be possible to prevent or maximally weaken the retaliatory nuclear strike.

Precisely these "ideas," the foreign press has emphasized, have been further developed in the Directive No 59. "The new strategic concept" termed by Brown a concept of "counteraction" (more accurately, active "counteraction"--A.F.) does not reject the variations for utilizing strategic weapons provided in the concept of a "choice of targets," but rather supplements them with new ones. Among them the Pentagon has isolated the variation of such a "limited" (several thousand objects are hit) nuclear strike which would be made against the Soviet higher state and military leadership bodies, military objectives and troop groupings, major enterprises of the key industrial sectors and the communications junctions. The aim of such a nuclear strike, as it is conceived of by its developers, consists in endeavoring to deprive the Soviet Union of the ability not only to make a strong retaliatory strike and to continue the war but also to restore its military-economic potential.

Another important particular feature in the strategic concept of active "counteraction," its authors have emphasized, consists in the ideas contained in it of conducting a protracted--"for several weeks or even months"--nuclear war. For this reason provision has been made to have a reserve of strategic forces (including forces of "guaranteed destruction"). Then, in the event of a failure or insufficient effectiveness of the first strike, the United States could try to achieve a favorable outcome to the war by making subsequent nuclear strikes, including against cities.

Thus, the "modernization" of U.S. nuclear strategy is aimed at seeking out new methods of achieving the aggressive objectives of international, and above all American, imperialism. Like all the previous strategies, it is based upon the bankrupt policy of "from a position of strength" and on the hopeless search with the existing balance of forces for "radical" methods for resolving the disputed problems of modern times unilaterally, that is, in a direction advantageous for itself. At the same time, in being supplemented by new variations for the employment of the strategic offensive forces, this modernization significantly lowers the "nuclear threshold" and increases the probability of the unleashing of a nuclear war. This is the main and very dangerous "newness" of Directive No 59.

In giving a "legitimate" nature to an ever-greater number of different "limited" variations for the use of strategic nuclear weapons, the reactionary forces are

pushing the world toward the abyss of an all-out nuclear war. This cannot be denied even by the very authors of the "new strategy," including Brown himself who was forced to admit that "a limited nuclear strike which is started hypothetically as controllable can grow into an all-out nuclear war."

In such an instance, what has been the purpose of the White House leaders in adopting the "new nuclear strategy" and what goals does it pursue?

An exhaustive answer to this question was given by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in his speech in Alma-Ata: "Recently the U.S. government has announced a so-called 'new nuclear strategy.' Its main essence in fact comes down to making the very idea of nuclear war more acceptable for public opinion. This also is the purpose of arguments about the supposed 'limited' or 'partial' use of nuclear weapons as these have nothing in common with reality and merely confuse people."

The militaristic circles in the United States have long been voicing concern that the Pentagon has been restricted in the possibility of employing the enormous arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons available to it as a real force. They consider one of the restraining factors to be the previously existing concept of "guaranteed destruction" according to which in the event of an escalation of a conventional conflict "the U.S. President would have no other choice but to resort to massed nuclear strikes or admit defeat." It would be a different thing, the American military theoreticians assume, if there were plans for a multivariant use of strategic nuclear weapons. In this instance, supposedly greater opportunities are opened up for using the armed forces to an immediate U.S. "influence" on the affairs of the countries of the Near and Middle East, Southeast Asia and other regions, since, if need be, there could also be a "limited" use of nuclear weapons. Here they proceed from the view that in such a war the United States would not suffer seriously. Moreover, as the Pentagon assumed, a war using nuclear weapons could even possibly be "restricted" to the scale of regions remote from the United States, in particular Europe.

In speaking on American television, Brown, to the question of whether the new plans envisaged the use of U.S. strategic nuclear forces in Europe in the event of the starting up of a conventional war there, was forced to admit that "to a significant degree this would depend upon the existing circumstances" however he "did not exclude the use initially of tactical nuclear weapons."

In the opinion of foreign specialists, if a war started against the socialist countries using conventional weapons were to develop not according to the plans worked out at the NATO staffs, then under the "existing circumstances" Washington would endeavor to seek a way out of the hostilities in its favor, employing the American nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe including cruise missiles and the Pershing-2 guided missiles. And if this is not sufficient, then, as is felt at the Pentagon, it would be possible to make selective strikes with strategic weapons without supposedly exposing the United States to the risk of a retaliatory strike without fail. Such adventurist views of the new proponents of a policy of "from a position of strength" are extremely dangerous not only for any individual country. They jeopardize the peace and security of all states and peoples. However, as was

emphasized by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "the Soviet Union is intimidated by no one. Our forces and capabilities are enormous. We and our allies can always defend ourselves and rebuff any hostile actions,"

Another, equally dangerous aim of the "new strategy" consists in attaining the unconditional satisfaction of the requests of the military-industrial complex for the production of modern nuclear weapons, delivery systems, combat control and communications systems. For this reason, simultaneously with the approval of Directive No 59, the leaders of the U.S. military department hurried to announce that the strategic nuclear forces available to the Pentagon did not fully meet the requirements of the "new strategy." For implementing it it was essential to have higher-precision and more powerful intercontinental missiles, new nuclear-powered submarines, longer range cruise missiles, modern strategic bombers including those "undetectable by air defense weapons," advanced airborne command posts, communications equipment and so forth.

The Pentagon proposes to use the weapons currently being developed for making the first nuclear strike which has been widely condemned by public opinion. In the "new nuclear strategy," the United States has carefully camouflaged this first strike in the guise of "limited," "selective," "alternative" and "partial" strikes. In particular, it is a question of the accelerated development of the mobile-based M-X intercontinental ballistic missiles (the cost of the program is over 55 billion dollars) building new nuclear submarines of the "Trident" system (60 billion dollars) and developing the "Trident-2" missiles for them (over 8 billion dollars), the mass series production of cruise missiles (9 billion dollars), the creation of a new strategic bomber (12.5 billion dollars) and the deployment of new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe (3 billion dollars). Here also we should put the programs for introducing highly efficient combat control, communications and reconnaissance systems provided for by the U.S. presidential directives No 53 and 58 and the development of well protected ground and airborne command posts and control centers which should provide dependable control of the armed forces in an extended nuclear war.

It is quite apparent that the recent ideas of Washington about U.S. nuclear strategy are a specific program for preparing a qualitatively new material base for preventive nuclear war. In relying on this the White House is hoping to create conditions to dictate to the world and at any price disrupt the existing military-strategic equilibrium between the socialist and capitalist worlds.

However, the plans to disrupt this equilibrium are doomed to failure. The attempts by imperialism to return the world to a new Cold War and to intensify the arms race are being resisted by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries supported by the progressive forces throughout the world by an active policy of detente and an improving of the international situation and a policy of limiting and curtailing weapons with the strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security.

The Soviet military completely and fully approve and support the peace-loving policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government. They are responding to the adventurist intrigues of American imperialism by a further increase in combat readiness and together with the fraternal armies of the socialist commonwealth are vigilantly guarding the victories of socialism.

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## PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

### NATO: AIR RECONNAISSANCE COLLECTION, PROCESSING

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 11, Nov 80 (signed to press 14 Nov 80) pp 47-50

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences, Docent, Engr-Col L. Safronov: "The Collecting and Processing of Air Reconnaissance Data"]

[Text] The militaristic circles of the aggressive NATO bloc, in continuing active preparations to start a war against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth, are giving great attention to the development of all types of reconnaissance, including air reconnaissance. The Western military experts consider the latter one of the most important means for supporting the combat operations of the air force, ground forces and navy. Proceeding from this notion and considering the possible nature of wars under present-day conditions, they are placing rigid demands on air reconnaissance\* with the promptness of obtaining information by the control bodies interested in it being in first place. The carrying out of this requirement depends largely upon the speed of handling the air reconnaissance data.

Below, on the basis of materials published abroad, let us examine the questions of the collection (and here one understands the transmitting of data from the aircraft and receiving them on the ground) and the processing of the information by the ground station crews.

*The collecting of information* acquired by air reconnaissance resources (the exposed film, tape recordings and so forth) is carried out in the NATO armed forces by several methods: by the delivery of the materials by the reconnaissance plane (helicopter) itself to the airfield or landing pad; by the transmitting from the aircraft of verbal reports by the crew, images or signals over radio channels to the ground receiving stations; the dropping of canisters with the information recorded in one or another manner in a designated area. As has been pointed out in the foreign press, at present the first two methods are most widely found in NATO

As a rule, the reconnaissance planes deliver a large quantity of aerial photography materials. Cumbersome equipment is required for processing them, and the facilities

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\*For more detail on the demands made on air reconnaissance, see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 9, 1980, p 43.--Editors.

would include automatic developers which can process black-and-white films at a speed of 2.5-7.5 meters per minute, and colored and special-spectrum films at 1-1.5 meters per minute. Sometimes with a small amount of materials, the photochemical processing of the exposed frames can be done on board the aircraft immediately after their exposure. For this purpose aerial cameras are used with special cassettes in which the exposed film, in winding, comes into contact with another the sensitive layer of which is coated with high-speed developers. As a result negative and positive images, correspondingly, are fixed on the films. It takes 7-10 minutes to create a film of 60 frames.

However the possibility of obtaining information by this method depends upon the probability of the return of the reconnaissance aircraft while the time of receiving the information by the interested party depends upon the time taken for the aircraft to return to the landing field, to have the cassettes with the films (tape recording and so forth) removed and processed. For this reason, in recent years, abroad there has been intense development of various methods of transmitting data from on-board to the ground collection stations using radio channels. Here the so-called digital method is being evermore widely used. Its essence is that the primary signals picked up by the onboard reconnaissance equipment operating by the scanning method (infrared and laser devices, side-viewing radars and so forth) are discretely converted into a digital form and transmitted to the ground data collection and processing center. Here, using computers, on the basis of geometric ordering and correlation of the received digits, the primary signals are reproduced and these, when necessary, are transformed into an image of the scanned terrain and the objects on it.

In the opinion of foreign specialists, this method possesses a number of substantial merits. The frequency band of the transmission channels is narrowed and their resistance to interference is improved; the quality of the image is enhanced in its reproduction by correcting the distribution of the optical densities in individual elements of the image. It is possible also to automate the processes of the detection and identification of certain standard objects and determine their coordinates; an opportunity is provided for reducing the overall times for obtaining intelligence information.

For shortening the time required to move the information to the consumer, many NATO reconnaissance aircraft are equipped with onboard television systems by which the image of the reconnoitered objects is transmitted to the ground virtually on a real time scale. Due to the use of video recording equipment at the data collection and processing stations, it is possible to reproduce individual frames and interpret them in detail. However, as a consequence of the limited range for the transmission of television signals and the low resistance to interference in the communications channels, this method, as is emphasized in the foreign press, finds use chiefly in carrying out air reconnaissance of the battlefield and the new tactical zone.

In the most modern models of foreign air radio engineering reconnaissance equipment, the processing of the signals received from the radars is carried out directly on board the aircraft using a special computer and already complete reconnaissance data (the types of detected radars and their coordinates) are transmitted to the ground data collecting stations. Moreover, these signals are recorded in a storage unit and this provides an opportunity for their subsequent detailed analysis and verification on the ground.

According to the views of certain NATO military specialists, the collection of the primary information ends at the stage of the recording and preliminary determination of the importance (the degree of urgency) of the materials delivered from the reconnaissance aircraft (photographic films, tape recordings, the written reports of crews and so forth) or the signals (radiograms and television images) received from these aircraft.

*The processing of air reconnaissance data* includes the developing of the films, the reproduction of the tape recordings and the conversion of signals obtained over the radio channels into a form convenient for interpretation.

According to information published in the foreign press, the NATO countries have adopted a two-phase interpretation system. Initially, on the basis of viewing the negatives, video recordings or TV images, the urgent (preliminary) reconnaissance data are detected and these immediately are turned over to the interested parties. Then there is a detailed study of them and a comparison with materials obtained from other sources. As a result complete intelligence reports are compiled (with photo-mosaics, maps and so forth) and these are issued to the consumers (one copy is kept in the archives).

In the opinion of the Western military specialists, the interpretation process is the most labor-intensive and crucial stage in processing the primary information. In this regard the United States and the other NATO countries are conducting research aimed at automating the solution to this problem. For example, the United States has developed an experimental unit in which a multicell perceptron is used as the receiving device and a "self-instructing" computer complex as the interpreting unit. According to information in the Western press, in testing it out high reliability was obtained in identifying such objects as ships, aircraft and tanks. There is another method also. This is using the principle of comparing the primary information signals expressed in a digital form with the standard models of certain typical objects stored in the computer's memory in the same form.

For the purposes of accelerating interpretation and the drawing up of the intelligence reports and their transmission over communications channels, the United States has worked out an experimental interpretation board which reproduces an image of the terrain area obtained using any reconnaissance equipment (infrared, laser, television or an aerial camera) against the background of a topographic map of the same area on an analogous scale. The board makes it possible semiautomatically to fix the geographic coordinates of any point of the examined image, to enlarge the entire frame or individual sections of it as well as convert the negative image into a positive one and vice versa. Moreover, on it it is possible to combine the images of the same terrain photographed at different times and this provides an opportunity to determine changes in the position of objects and detect new ones.

For ensuring the rapid compilation of an intelligence report, the panel has a keyboard with a set of standard terms, figures and a key as well as a display the screen of which makes it possible to read, verify and adjust the reports being compiled. In addition to this, the board is equipped with devices for storing and transmitting the reports to users.

The collection and processing of air reconnaissance data is carried out at points (centers) which are deployed by the forces of special subunits. In the air force these are detachments and squadrons (stationed, as a rule, at the base airfields of the reconnaissance aviation); in the ground forces these are companies and battalions (located as close as possible to the staffs served by them). They are all equipped with facilities for receiving and processing the information transmitted over the radio and TV communications channels from the reconnaissance aircraft. They also have equipment for the chemical processing of films and for reproducing the tape recordings delivered from the aircraft after their landing; they also have interpretation and duplicating equipment as well as facilities for transmitting the data to consumers.

As work areas for the ground data collection and processing stations they most often use special vans that have been adapted for air transporting on heavy air transports. For example, one of the American installations used for processing aerial photographic materials consists of eight trailers mounted on motor vehicle chassis. Two of them receive and mark the exposed films, two of them provide photochemical processing to print the positives and to provide the interpretation. Each trailer has the appropriate equipment and facilities as well as air conditioning which maintains a constant air temperature inside the trailer of  $21\pm 5^{\circ}\text{C}$  (with an outside air temperature of  $-34$  to  $+52^{\circ}\text{C}$ ). In the field all the trailers are placed close together and are interconnected by covered passageways. The time required to load the entire installation on military air transports is around 45 minutes, and for setting up it takes 5-12 hours.

As has been stated in the foreign press, the experience of the daily combat training of the U.S. Air Force and its allies in the NATO bloc has shown that at present, in using the regulation equipment, the average time for the processing of aerial photography materials from the moment of the landing of the reconnaissance aircraft to the issuing of the preliminary data to the users varies from 15 minutes to 1 hour 45 minutes (depending upon the length of the exposed film, the number of frames which have objects of interest to the command and the degree of their camouflaging). Approximately the same amount of time is needed to process the materials obtained using infrared equipment, while 2.5-3 hours are needed to process materials obtained by the side-viewing radars.

Significantly more time is needed for detailed interpretation and the compilation of a complete intelligence report. Such a situation is not to the liking of the bloc's military leadership, and for this reason the NATO countries are working on improvements in the existing and the development of new reconnaissance equipment and facilities for data collection, processing and transmission with the aim of increasing the speed of handling the information from the reconnaissance plane to the user. In the opinion of the NATO experts, the automation of all the processes and the extensive introduction of computers are the basic way to solve this complex problem.

According to statements in the foreign press, over the long run NATO intends to create a unified system for the collection and processing of air reconnaissance data using the following system: all the primary information obtained on board the reconnaissance plane, by using all its air reconnaissance equipment (aerial cameras, infrared, laser and radar equipment and so forth) will be transmitted by



radio channel to a unified ground data bank controlled by a computer and here automatic identification and analysis of the data will be carried out. Then according to the address programs contained in the computer, it will automatically transmit the information to the interested parties.

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## PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

### U.S.: SYNTHETIC AVIATION FUEL

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 11, Nov 80 (signed to press 14 Nov 80) pp 56-57

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences, Col Yu. Aleksayev: "Synthetic Aviation Fuels"]

[Text] In carrying out an aggressive foreign policy, the U.S. military-political leadership has set out on a path of further intensifying the arms race and one of the basic areas of this is the development of fundamentally new types of weapons. Among them an important place has been given to the air-, ground- and sea-based cruise missiles which are presently being developed.

A design feature of the cruise missiles is that relatively little space is allocated for holding the power unit with the air-breathing engine and fuel system. With the small capacity of the tanks the fuel should possess a high energy content in order to ensure the long flight range. For this reason the basic demand upon the fuels for cruise missiles is a high volumetric heat capacity, that is, the maximum possible combustion heat obtained in the engine from 1 liter of fuel.

The conventional aviation fuels (JP-4 and JP-5) which existed in the United States by the beginning of the development of the cruise missile, in the opinion of American specialists, did not satisfy this requirement. In their estimates, the best for use in the cruise missiles (in particular, on the sea-based Tomahawk cruise missile launched from submarines) was the RJ-4 hydrocarbon fuel which was specially developed for the ramjet engine of the ship-launched Thalos antiaircraft missile. This was obtained on a petroleum basis and represented a mixture of the isomers of endo- and exotetrahydrodimethylcyclopentadiene. Although the RJ-4 also has a relatively high freezing temperature and flash point, this shortcoming, however, under submarine conditions, in the estimate of the experts, is not of substantial importance. At the same time, it was considered that for the air-based cruise missiles it was essential to have a fuel with a performance that would provide an opportunity for the aircraft with the missiles to fly at great altitudes under conditions of low surrounding air temperatures.

According to the announcements in the foreign press, such demands are met by a new type of synthetic hydrocarbon fuel, the JP-9, which is a mixture of methylcyclohexane, the JP-10 fuel (exotetrahydrodicyclopentadiene) and RJ-5 (hydrogenated dimers of norbornadiene). Subsequently even higher-energy hydrocarbon fuels such

as the RJ-6 and SI-80 were developed. The first which is a mixture of 36 percent RJ-5 fuel and 37 percent JP-10 fuel is to be used on the future air-based strategic missile while the latter (80 percent RJ-5 and 20 percent isobutylbenzine) on the long-range air-to-air guided missiles being developed.

The comparative performance of the conventional and synthetic aviation fuels, as compiled from materials in the foreign press, is shown in the table [not reproduced].

In the assessment of American specialists, the potential to increase the volumetric heat capacity of already developed hydrocarbon fuels is virtually exhausted. For this reason, in the United States, the development of suspended fuels based on energy-intensive components (boron, carbon) and a hydrocarbon carrier is considered a new promising area. One of them is a suspension from micron-sized metallic boron particles in a liquid hydrocarbon carrier (an expected heat value of 15,000-16,600 kilocalories per liter). The foreign press has pointed out that this fuel is comparatively expensive (55 dollars a liter) and in addition has an essential shortcoming. In using it there is an extremely high level of wear on the fuel equipment (pumps and burners).

A suspension of carbon (micron-sized lamp black particles) in the JP-10 carrier is another, cheaper of the developed fuels. Its composition (by weight) is: 60 percent carbon, 38-39 percent JP-10, and 1-2 percent emulsifier. It is assumed that the heat value of the fuel will be 12,000-12,600 kilocalories per liter. For increasing its combustion rate (by at least a magnitude) a metallic catalyst (iron or vanadium) is applied to the carbon particles.

Judging from the information in the Western press, in recent years, simultaneously with intensive development of the missile weapon fuels, the United States has increased the research to develop production methods for synthetic aviation fuels made from fuel shales.

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## PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

### NATO: STRATEGIC COMMAND ON THE ATLANTIC

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 11, Nov 80 (signed to press 14 Nov 80) pp 59-67

[Article by Capt 3d Rank A. Orlov: "The Strategic NATO Command on the Atlantic"]

[Text] The Strategic (Supreme) NATO Command in the Atlantic was set up in 1952 for directing the operations of the NATO Joint Armed Forces (JAF) in the Atlantic theater of war which holds a special place in the aggressive plans of the NATO bloc. Its significance is determined by the fact that running across it are the lines of communications which would handle the strategic shipments of troops and cargo from the United States and Canada to reinforce the NATO JAF grouping in Europe. In addition, the Atlantic connects the military-industrial regions of the North American Continent with Europe, the Near East and Africa. The most important types of raw materials (primarily oil and petroleum products) are transported along its lines of communications and these products are essential for the economy of the NATO member nations. Each year more than 3,000 vessels are at bases or in crossings in the waters of the North Atlantic.

Located on the Atlantic coast of the basic naval bases of the leading NATO countries (the United States and Great Britain), the major ports and the shipbuilding centers.

Considering the particular importance and the great spatial scope of this theater, the bloc's leadership has put it into a separate strategic command the zone of which extends from the Arctic to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal waters of the North American Continent to the coasts of Europe and Africa with the inclusion of all the islands found here as well as the territory of Portugal. The area of the zone is around 12 million square miles. The English Channel and the coastal waters of Great Britain are not part of the zone of the NATO Strategic Command in the Atlantic.

As the foreign press has stated, even in peacetime here the necessary executive bodies have been set up for controlling the operational formations which are to be created.

The Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic is a representative of the U.S. Navy with the second position of commander-in-chief of the American armed forces in the zone of the Atlantic Ocean. His duties include the elaboration of operational plans, directing the field forces and joint exercises and maneuvers, determining



the training standards, allocating the forces to be turned over to the strategic command, as well as informing the NATO bodies of his operational needs.

In the event of war, along with making strikes against enemy territory, he should ensure the defense of the sea lanes, carry out the necessary measures to prevent the enemy from bringing its fleet into the Atlantic regions and organize the defense of the islands. In addition, his duties also include defining the disposition and regrouping of the armed forces, the leadership over their combat operations as well as organizing cooperation with the NATO allied command in the European theaters of war.

The Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic carries out chiefly operational missions. In contrast to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, he does not possess troops in peacetime. However during the period of conducting exercises and in the event of a war, the member nations make available to him the previously stipulated contingents of armed forces, mainly naval ones. Along with this, provision is made to also turn over to him formations of ground forces and air forces. He has the right to appeal directly to the chiefs of the member nation general staffs.

The staff of the NATO JAF for the Atlantic is stationed at the main naval base of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk. It includes up to 350 officers from all the armed services of the eight countries (the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Norway, the FRG, the Netherlands, Denmark and Portugal).

In peacetime, the staff plans and conducts exercises for the forces allocated to it and it clarifies and works out plans for operations in limited and all-out nuclear wars. Here great attention is given to increasing the combat readiness of the diverse forces of the member navies and to their ability to operate jointly in the event of an exacerbation of the international situation or the outbreak of an armed conflict. The "flexible response" strategy which has been officially adopted by NATO lies at the basis of the planning of naval operations in the initial period of a war.

For convenience and efficiency in the control of the allocated forces, three separate commands have been set up in the Western, Eastern and Iberian zones of the Atlantic and these in essence are independent sea theaters of war. Moreover, directly under the supreme commander are the NATO attack fleet in the Atlantic, the joint NATO submarine forces in the theater, the permanent NATO naval formation in the Atlantic and a special attack formation for operations under extraordinary conditions (see the diagram) [not reproduced].

Under peacetime conditions there are only the staffs of the designated commands. For conducting exercises within the NATO JAF and in a threatening period (prior to the start of combat operations) men and equipment (basically ships, naval aviation and marines) are turned over from the national naval forces to the commands and formations.

During wartime the NATO JAF in the Atlantic can be entrusted with the following missions: the making of nuclear strikes (using nuclear missile-carrying submarines and carrier-launched aviation) against enemy territory, winning supremacy at sea and in the air in the individual regions of the Atlantic, combating enemy submarines

and surface vessels, providing direct support to the NATO JAF in the Northern European and Central European theaters of war, supporting strategic troop and cargo sea shipments from the U.S. to Europe, conducting amphibious landing operations and participating in the antilanding defenses of islands. A significant portion of the naval and aviation forces from the navies of the United States, Great Britain, Canada as well as partially Norway, the FRG, the Netherlands, Portugal and other countries is assigned to the NATO commands in the Atlantic for carrying them out. According to information in the Western press, in the middle of the 1980's, these forces numbered up to 400 fighting ships, including 5 carriers and more than 1,000 combat aircraft and helicopters of carrier-based and land-based patrol aviation. The French ships are not included in the overall number, however in working out the operational plans the NATO command considers them in the groupings of the NATO joint navies in the zones.

The use of the navies under the national plans is to be closely coordinated with the operations of the joint armed forces.

*The High Command of the Joint NATO Forces in the Western Atlantic* is headed, as a dual command, by the commander of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet (headquarters in Norfolk). The zone of the given command includes the Oceanic and Canadian regions, where commands have been set up the headquarters of which are located in Norfolk and Halifax (Canada) and are headed by American and Canadian admirals, respectively.

In wartime there is provision to form island commands in Greenland (headquarters in Gronnedal), on the Azores (San Miguel) and the Bermuda Islands (Hamilton).

Also under the commander of the allied forces in the Western Atlantic are the commander of the joint submarine forces in the Western Atlantic (headquarters in Norfolk) and the commander of the special forces which can be formed if necessary.

The basis of the NATO JAF in the Western Atlantic will be comprised of submarines, ASW ships and shore-based patrol aviation of the U.S. and Canadian navies and designed mainly for combating submarines (above all nuclear missile-carrying ones) along the East Coast of the North American Continent.

*The High Command of the Joint NATO Armed Forces in the Eastern Atlantic* plays an important role in the plans of the leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance, and this is explained by the geographic features of the given theater of war which is directly adjacent to the European Continent. The commander of the allied forces in the Eastern Atlantic is an English admiral who simultaneously holds the post of the commander-in-chief of the NATO JAF in the zone of the English Channel and is the commander-in-chief of the Royal Navy.

The zone of this command is divided into three regions: Northern, Central and Biscay. In the first two headquarters of the joint navies have been set up, respectively, in Rosyth and Plymouth (Great Britain). The formation of a staff headquarters of the joint NATO navies in the Biscay region is provided with the outbreak of a war, and under peacetime conditions the carrying out of organizational tasks related to the use of the navies in this region is entrusted to the staff of the NATO JAF in the Eastern Atlantic.

Moreover, the commander-in-chief of the allied forces in the Eastern Atlantic has under him the commanders of the joint submarine forces in the zone (headquarters in Gosport, Great Britain), the joint shore-based patrol aviation (Northwood, Great Britain) as well as the commanders of the island commands which are to be created in wartime on the island of Iceland (Reykjavik) and the Faeroe Islands (Torshavn) and the commander of the special forces which can be formed when necessary.

From the evidence in the foreign press, the plans are to deploy the basic forces of the NATO navies in the waters of the Eastern Atlantic (including the attack fleet), having entrusted to them the winning and keeping of supremacy at sea, the providing of support to the ground forces, the countering of enemy submarines and surface vessels and the defense of the sea lanes.

*The Command of the Joint NATO Armed Forces in the Iberian Atlantic* was made an independent one from the High Command of the NATO JAF in the Eastern Atlantic in February 1967, soon after France pulled out of the bloc's military organization (1966). Its zone includes the territory of Portugal and the eastern portion of the Atlantic Ocean adjacent to the Straits of Gibraltar and the northwestern coast of Africa to the Tropic of Cancer. The post of commander is held by an American admiral, and a Portuguese officer is his deputy.

In the event of a war, there are plans to create an island command of the NATO JAF on the islands of Madeira with headquarters in Funchal.

As the Western press has pointed out, the command of the joint NATO armed forces in the Iberian Atlantic, along with carrying out the common tasks entrusted to the NATO JAF in the Atlantic, must also provide control over the Straits of Gibraltar and maintain favorable operational conditions in the regions with the most intensive navigation. From the experience of the annual exercises of the "Open Gate" type, for achieving these objectives carrier forces are to be used from the NATO attack fleet, the permanent formation of the NATO navy in the Atlantic, as well as ships and aircraft from the Western European NATO countries, the United States and Canada. In wartime, the forces which in operational terms are under this command are to be used in close cooperation with the joint NATO navies in the Central and Biscay regions of the Eastern Atlantic.

*The NATO Attack Fleet in the Atlantic* is considered the most combat ready and battleworthy operational formation of the JAF in the theater. It has been created on the basis of the Second American Fleet with the incorporation of individual ships from the navies of Great Britain, the Netherlands, the FRG and other member nations in the event of the exacerbation of the international situation or in the initial period of a war as well as for the period of carrying out joint exercises and maneuvers.

The commander of the Second U.S. Fleet is appointed the commander of the attack fleet. He is under the supreme allied commander for the Atlantic.

In organizational terms the attack fleet includes a multipurpose carrier, an amphibious landing and other formations organized when necessary to carry out specific missions.

its basic missions, in the views of the NATO command are: the winning of supremacy at sea in the regions of the Atlantic; supporting amphibious landing operations and participating in the antilanding defenses of the coast of Northwestern Europe; protecting the sea lanes of the bloc on the Atlantic, supporting strategic movements of reinforcements and military cargo from the United States to Europe; providing air support for the ground forces of the bloc in the Northern European and Central European theaters.

The multipurpose carrier formation is the leading combat formation of the attack fleet. It can include 3 or 4 American carriers and more than 40 escort ships. The carriers can carry 270-360 combat aircraft and helicopters of which around 30 per cent can carry nuclear weapons.

As has been stated in the foreign press, two carrier groups and one ASW group should be formed in the carrier formation. The carrier groups will include 2 carriers each, 1 or 2 guided missile cruisers, 10-12 destroyers and frigates and 1 nuclear powered torpedo-armed sub. They are to be entrusted with the missions to be carried out by the attack fleet, including the making of massed strikes by the carrier-based aviation against enemy ship groupings at sea and in bases, the providing of air support for landing forces in the landing and during the course of their combat operations on the shore as well as for ground forces and air forces in maritime sectors, the defense of sea lanes and so forth.

The main areas for the maneuvering of the carrier groups, as has been announced in the foreign press, will be (from the experience of the "Ocean Safari" and "Team Work" exercises) the Norwegian and North seas. Here they can operate jointly or independently.

The ASW group is to include one of the ASW versions of the English helicopter troop carriers (carrying up to 20 ASW helicopters), a guided missile cruiser, 6 destroyers and frigates and 1 or 2 submarines. The escort forces for the helicopter carrier can include, along with English ships, a Dutch guided missile destroyer and 3 frigates, 2 West German guided missile destroyers and 2 frigates as well as French destroyers and corvettes (in the event that France enters the war). These forces are to be used for ASW defense of the carrier groups in the regions of their combat maneuvering or be deployed on the Iceland Antisub Line.

The amphibious landing formation in operational terms is put under the command of the NATO attack fleet only for the period of conducting an amphibious operation. As was pointed out in the foreign press, it can consist of more than 15 landing vessels carrying marines on board with a total number of 20,000 marines of the United States and other countries.

The moving of the amphibious landing formation to the landing area and the landing of the forces are carried out, as a rule, under the cover of carrier-based aviation. As was pointed out in the foreign press, according to the experience of the "Ocean Safari" and "Anorak Express" exercises the coast of Northern Norway and the Baltic Straits Zone are to be the probable areas of landing the amphibious forces.

The questions of logistics for the formations of the attack fleet are entrusted to the auxiliary vessels which in organizational terms are put into a formation of



service forces. It can consist of up to 15 supply transports and tankers from the navies of the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands and other countries as well as chartered civilian vessels.

According to the views of the NATO command, the combining of carrier and amphibious landing forces in a single formation such as the attack fleet most fully meets the requirements of the "flexible response" strategy. For this reason the attack fleet is viewed as one of the basic forces in conducting combat operations in a limited war using conventional weapons or with the selective use of tactical nuclear weapons. When necessary the carrier based aviation can also be used in making nuclear strikes against the enemy shore installations.

The plans for utilizing the attack fleet in limited and all-out nuclear wars, as the foreign press has stated, are systematically worked out in the exercises of the NATO JAF of the "Wintex" type, in maneuvers of the joint navies involving other armed services of the "Ocean Safari" and "Anorak Express" type as well as special carrier force exercises. Characteristically a majority of them is carried out in the northern part of the Norwegian sea, that is, close to the northern frontiers of the Soviet Union.

During the period of an exacerbation of the international situation and the outbreak of centers of tension in individual regions of the Atlantic, upon a decision of the NATO Military Planning Committee, there can be formed a *Special Strike Force of the NATO Navies in the Atlantic for operations under extraordinary conditions*. It is planned that this would include a carrier and escort ships which are in the Eastern Atlantic or Mediterranean from the navies of the European member countries. Its main mission is to cover the most important zones of the sea lanes and support the transporting of reserves by sea between the European theaters of war until the arrival of carriers from the United States and the formation of the NATO attack fleet (the force can become its core).

The *Joint NATO Submarine Forces in the Atlantic* are formed with the beginning of a war. In peacetime, the questions of using submarines in the interests of the bloc are settled by the commander of the submarine forces of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and he simultaneously is the commander of the joint NATO submarine forces in the Atlantic as well as in the Western Atlantic. With the start of hostilities, he is to turn over the powers of the commander of the joint submarine forces in the Western Atlantic to another American admiral and assume the duties of the commander of the joint submarine forces in the Eastern Atlantic, replacing the English admiral in this position. In the views of the NATO leadership, such organizational changes will make it possible for the commander of the joint NATO submarine forces in the Atlantic to direct with the greatest efficiency and effectiveness the activities of the nuclear missile-carrying and multipurpose submarines, a majority of which is American.

In peacetime, the staff headquarters of the joint NATO submarine forces in the Atlantic (Norfolk) works out the plans for using the submarines of the NATO countries in limited armed conflicts and in all-out nuclear war, it coordinates them with the commands of the allied navies in the areas and with the national commands and also draws up proposals for the supreme allied commander for the Atlantic to employ the subs in the planned operations.

The joint submarine forces should include a significant portion of the American and all the English nuclear powered missile submarines as well as up to 100 nuclear and diesel-powered multipurpose submarines from the navies of the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Norway, Denmark, the FRG, the Netherlands and Portugal. In addition, the NATO command plans to incorporate in them the French nuclear missile and multipurpose submarines.

*The Permanent Formation of the NATO Navies in the Atlantic* is one of the components of the naval mobile forces of the bloc. It was first organized in January 1968 and included an American destroyer as well as English, Norwegian and Dutch frigates. Since then, each year in January, a ceremony has been held for the organizing of the formation in one of the naval bases of Western Europe or America. It permanently numbers 5-7 modern ships from the navies of the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Norway (see the colored insert) [not reproduced], Denmark, the FRG, the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal. Every 3-7 months these ships are replaced by an appropriate ship from one or another NATO country. Submarines and auxiliary vessels are included in the formations during the period of conducting exercises or in working on individual combat training missions. At the end of the year the formation is broken up and the ships which are part of it revert to national subordination.

An officer holding the rank of captain 1st rank in the navies of one of the NATO countries is assigned, in rotation, as the formation's commander. He is directly under the Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic. However due to the fact that the formation operates a large part of the time along the coast of Europe, it is also in operational terms under the commander-in-chief of the NATO JAF in the Eastern Atlantic.

The foreign press has announced that the creation of the formation was determined primarily by military-political aims, that is, to demonstrate the readiness and determination of the NATO countries "to defend their collective interests" at sea by the force of arms. In actuality this is nothing more than a NATO "fire brigade" the ships of which are constantly ready to immediately leave for an area of a tense international situation for putting political pressure on individual states, including the NATO member countries.

A daily task for the formation is to increase the level of the combat readiness of the ships of different nationality which are part of the joint NATO naval forces, on the basis of the many years of acquired experience. This is achieved by conducting independent combat training and by participation in exercises jointly with the national navies and in major NATO maneuvers. In the course of them the personnel trains in using various types of weapons, it learns the areas of navigation within the entire NATO zone and improves sea skills. In the opinion of Western military specialists, it is useful to have an exchange of combat crews for becoming acquainted with the equipment, weapons and the organizational structure as well as participation in practice firing on ships of other nationality.

Up to 20 ships and around 4,000 men of the navies of the nine NATO countries each year participate in combat training as part of the formation.

Judging from information in the foreign press, the military-political leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance during periods of heightened international tension plans to form a larger multinational operational naval task force on the basis of the permanent task force. This larger force can be entrusted with independent missions in winning supremacy at sea in individual regions, reinforcing the flank groupings of the NATO JAF in the European theaters of war, combating enemy subs and defending the NATO transatlantic lines of communications. All these questions are regularly worked out in the course of exercises conducted according to the plans of the NATO command.

The NATO Strategic Command for the Atlantic, in the assessment of the Western military specialists, holds an important place in the system of the joint armed forces of the North Atlantic Alliance. It has an extensive organizational structure which has been worked out in peacetime and this makes it possible to effectively direct the assigning of forces from the national navies, the organizing of the operational task forces (formations) of the joint navies and their use in various types of armed conflicts employing conventional and nuclear weapons.

At the same time, the organization of the command, they assume, is rather complex and cumbersome. This is explained by the contradictory ideas of the NATO members about the reconciling of national and general allied interests in using the navies in the Atlantic as well as by the desire to maintain the existing national organizational forms in the system of the NATO JAF.

In recent years, in line with the crisis in the Near East and in the Persian Gulf region, more and more frequently the NATO leading bodies have raised the question of the need to extend the zone of the bloc to the South Atlantic and to establish control over the sea lines of communications in this region. The most aggressive circles in the bloc have demanded the organizing of a "permanent NATO presence" in this region of the world's ocean. In the higher bodies of the North Atlantic Alliance plans are being hatched to put the oil-producing regions of the Near East and Persian Gulf under NATO aegis and to create here joint "fast response troops" with the inclusion in them of marines, aviation and ships from the navies of the United States, Great Britain and other NATO countries.

All of this shows that the North Atlantic bloc remains the chief weapon of aggression and an obstacle on the path to strengthening the peace and security of peoples.

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## PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

### U.S.: DEEP-SEA RESCUE EQUIPMENT

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 11, Nov 80 (signed to press 14 Nov 80) pp 72-73

[Article by Capt 1st Rank (Res) A. Ivanitskiy: "American Deep-Water Rescue Equipment"]

[Text] According to data in the foreign press, at the beginning of the 1970's the United States built two deep-water rescue devices, the "Avalon" and "Mystic" (a weight of 39 tons, a length of 16.4 meters, a width of 2.4 meters, a diving depth of 1,500 meters, the greatest submerged speed of 5 knots, a crew of three men, and the number of submariners who could be rescued in one dive, 24 persons). The devices were designed to rescue personnel from submarines in distress.

The outer hull of the units is made of fiberglass and has a streamlined, torpedo-shaped form. The inner pressure hull consists of three spherical compartments (each with a diameter of 2.3 meters) manufactured from HY-140 steel (plating thickness 18.7 mm). In the lower part of the middle section is located the entry hatch with a window and a semispherical lock (docking) tube by which the rescue device comes to rest on the coaming area of the sunken sub. In the upper portion of this same compartment there is a hatch and an extendable twill trunk and through them the sailor can be brought into the decompression chamber of the rescue vessel. In the bow compartment of the device which is the command post is found all the electronic and navigation equipment as well as the equipment of the life support system. Two operators remain constantly at the control panel. In the middle and aft compartments are found the personnel from the submarine and a third crew member who directly carries out their rescuing.

The diving, surfacing and trimming of the deep-water device are carried out by two main tanks, high-pressure air tanks, two main regulating tanks located in the centerplane and four small trim tanks and two heeling tanks, pumps and pipelines. There is also provision for a lead ballast weighing 230 kg.

The propulsion unit includes: a main diving-type electric motor (with a power of 15 hp) driving the propeller in a steering nozzle (this is used as the vertical and horizontal rudders at speeds over 2 knots), two bow and two stern turning thrusters with electric motors (each with a power of 7.5 hp), a battery of hydrogen-oxygen fuel cells with a capacity of 700 kilowatt hours, a silver-zinc storage battery (with a power of 58 kilowatts and a capacity of 56 kilowatt hours); mechanical



converters for turning direct current into alternating current for powering the propeller electric motors.

The propulsion complex and the variable ballast system make it possible to easily maneuver the deep-water device underway and in hovering, as well as to dock with the sunken submarine lying on the bottom with a trim and list up to 45° and with an under-water current speed of 1 knot. The deep-water device is equipped with sonar, television, optical and navigation gear. Regardless of the comparatively small size, it carries five different types of sonars.

Of the special equipment on the device, one should mention: the hydraulic manipulator with six degrees of freedom, magnetic anchors, a shock absorber for absorbing the blow in the docking of the device with the submarine in distress, a device for penetrating inside the pressure hull and for analyzing the inside air of the sub for the purpose of determining its toxicity, and two sound transponder beacons which are used as guides for subsequent docking of the deep-water device in rescue work.

The deep-water device is controlled by a complex system worked out on the basis of a digital differential analyzer used in the guidance system of the "Polaris" missiles and an electronic computer from the control and guidance system of an "Apollo" spacecraft.

In 1979, a joint exercise was conducted by the U.S. and British navies to rescue the personnel from a submarine "in distress." From the area of San Diego, the "Avalon" rescue device, a trailer, the necessary tools and supplies were delivered by C-141A and C-5A air transports to Glasgow Airport where they moved overland to the English naval base at Clyde. There the "Avalon" device was loaded on the nuclear submarine "Repulse" and this delivered the equipment to the area of the sub "Odin" which was "in distress." Around 40 hours were spent on delivering the equipment from the United States to the site of the exercise.

The rescuing of the personnel during the sea phase of the exercise lasted 7 days. During this time the crew of the sub "Odin" was brought to the nuclear sub "Repulse" which was also submerged. From the data of the foreign press, the exercise as a whole was conducted successfully and affirmed in practice that the device could be used for rescuing personnel from "in distress" subs of the navies of the NATO countries and the other U.S. allies.

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## PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

### NATO MILITARY-POLITICAL STRATEGY CRITICIZED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 80 (signed to press 4 Dec 80) pp 78-82

[Article by Yu. Babich: "A Strategy of Political Adventurism"]

[Text] At the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's, imperialism, primarily American imperialism, has undertaken a rabid counterattack against the victory of detente and against all that is positive in international life which had been attained in the previous period due to the consistent peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR and the other states of the socialist commonwealth.

As was pointed out at the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the imperialist forces have resisted the positive processes in international life with a policy dictated by a reticence to consider the reality of the modern world, namely, the strengthening of the positions of socialism, the successes of the national liberation movement and the growth of freedom-loving democratic forces as a whole. Imperialism would like to check the objective process of the renewal of the world. The leaders of the NATO military bloc and primarily the United States have set out on a course of disrupting the military equilibrium existing in the world in their favor and to the detriment of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries and to the detriment of international detente and the security of peoples.

The turn in Washington policy toward a strengthening of militaristic and expansionist tendencies, confrontation with the Soviet Union and the intensification of international tension was embodied, in particular, in the new U.S. nuclear strategy, a strategy of "limited" nuclear war. Its basic aims and principles were formulated in the Directive No 59 (PD-59) signed by President J. Carter on 25 July 1980. According to information in the NEW YORK TIMES, the president's assistant for national security, V. Brzezinski, and the Secretary of Defense, H. Brown, played the main role in working it out. Directly linked to this directive is Directive No 58 on the measures to defend the civilian and military leadership of the United States in the event of a nuclear war and Directive No 53 concerned with the protecting of communications facilities in a nuclear war. With the passage of these documents, a revision was completed in the former American military-political strategy of "containment" based on a threat of "massive retaliation" for a "possible nuclear attack on the United States."

U.S. military doctrine in its very essence has always had an aggressive, expansionistic nature which during various historical periods only to a greater or lesser degree of carefulness has been concealed by "peace-loving" phrases. But from the very moment of the appearance of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal, American military-political strategy has never excluded the possibility of employing it and has not excluded nuclear blackmail against other peoples and countries. Nuclear weapons have been continuously viewed by Washington as a key element in all the American concepts and doctrines during the period since World War II, be this the doctrine of "containment" or "rolling back" communism, "massive retaliation" or "flexible response." In all these doctrines which inevitably are focused against the USSR, the question was merely the degree of readiness to employ nuclear weapons and the scale of their possible use. Such a "nuclear inclination" in an of itself has constantly entailed a serious threat to world peace and the danger of an outright nuclear missile clash. With the coming of PD-59 into force, this danger has further increased. The proclamation of the strategy of "limited" nuclear war means not only a break with the policy of a lessening of international tension and the changeover to a new confrontation with the USSR. It shows the next attempt by the U.S. ruling circles to return for solving their foreign policy problems chiefly to the path of the use of force and all the military might of the nation, primarily nuclear weapons. This is viewed as a panacea against the undesirable changes for Washington in the modern world.

Such a change in the policy of the American administration to a certain degree has been facilitated by the fact that the most aggressive circles of the financial and industrial oligarchy of the United States from the very outset have viewed detente as a forced retreat, as a sort of undesirable historical inevitability related to the unfavorable balance of forces for them on the world scene. They have merely been waiting their time to put an end to the policy of detente, to return to the path of carrying out their own "imperial," expansionistic plans, to attempt to break the nuclear parity existing between the USSR and United States, including in the area of nuclear weapons, and achieve an "unconditional military superiority" over the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth.

Such a longing by the economically, financially and politically powerful groupings of monopolistic capital has been fired by the apparent duality of the approach of all the Washington administrations in the 1970's to the policy of detente. While speaking out publically for detente, at the same time, in proceeding from the interests of the military industrial complex, they have stubbornly refused to take the next logical step, that is, to complement political detente with military detente. Moreover, in order to "placate" the rulers of military business, Washington has in every possible way encouraged their militaristic aspirations, it has increased the arms race and actively aided the development of new, more expensive, and consequently, more profitable systems and types of weapons. Such duality sooner or later would have to tell on the political course of Washington and it in fact has told, particularly with the coming to power of the Carter Administration.

Even during the first year this administration was at the helm, under the pressure of the most reactionary and militaristic monopolistic circles, Washington began a reorientation in military-political strategy toward a strengthening of its aggressiveness, an anti-Soviet bent and the ensuring of strategic superiority over the USSR. For this, in the initial stage, "scientific research" was used on the balance

of military forces between the United States and the USSR. This had been specially prepared by S. Huntington, a colleague of Brzezinski at Columbia University, his constant co-author in the writing of works on "Sovietology," his close friend and like-thinker. The conclusions of this "research" were, naturally, unanimous. They stated that the USSR supposedly was "striving for military superiority" over the United States and "did not recognize the theory of mutual restraint," that is, was preparing for a "preventive" strike. In relying on such "research," which subsequently was designated the Presidential Research Memorandum No 10, Brzezinski, with the support of Brown, demanded a "improvement" in the former doctrine which would make it possible for Washington unimpeded to resort to nuclear blackmail during any political crisis.

The basic provisions of the memorandum were soon reflected in the Presidential Directive No 18 (PD-18) "U.S. National Strategy" which was signed by Carter on 24 August 1977. Here one can clearly trace the policy of strengthening the aggressiveness in U.S. global strategy and inseparably linked with the greatest round of the arms race since World War II.

Such a course was expressed in the decisions of the Washington (30-31 May 1978) Session of the NATO Council which approved a 15-year program for increasing NATO military might with a total cost of 80 billion dollars and demanding from the European allies of the United States an annual increase in their military budgets of at least 3 percent in real terms. This was also reflected in the decisions of the Brussels (13-14 December 1979) Session of the NATO Council to produce and deploy in five Western European countries new types of American medium-range nuclear missiles. This policy was also embodied in other practical steps by Washington, in particular, in the decision to increase in the 1981-1985 fiscal years the annual military outlays of the United States by an average of 5 percent.

Thus, the elaboration and signing of PD-59, together with the accompanying documents, in fact became the final stage on the path of revising the former American nuclear strategy.

In formal terms, the strategy of a "limited" nuclear war was promulgated by Brown in his speech to the Naval College in Newport, Rhode Island, on 20 August 1980, and later "explained" by the White House head in a speech on 22 August at the 62d annual national congress of the reactionary "American Legion" held in Boston. This organization brings together veterans from various wars conducted by the United States.

If one discards the "peace-loving" verbal dressings in which the Washington leaders clothe their military-political doctrine, the essence of the concept of a "limited" nuclear war consists in the following.

Above all the emphasis is put not on a lessening and preventing of a threat of a world-wide thermonuclear conflagration (although such an objective was certainly not set in the former doctrine), but rather on the "acceptability" and "possibility" of a nuclear missile war, on active, unconcealed preparations for it, and on reducing, hence, the "nuclear threshold."

In unmasking the dangerous nature of the doctrine of a "limited" nuclear war, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the



USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in his speech at a ceremony in Alma-Ata of 29 August 1980, emphasized: "Its main essence in fact comes down to making the very idea of a nuclear war more acceptable for public opinion. This is also the purpose of the arguments about the supposed 'limited' or 'partial' use of nuclear weapons which have nothing in common with reality and merely confuse people. This is a policy that is extremely dangerous for the peoples of the entire world! It is even hard to imagine that it derives from the government of a country which has signed an agreement with the Soviet Union to prevent a nuclear war."

Secondly, the new strategy sets the objective of "regulating" a nuclear war, placing the main emphasis on an "anticipatory" strike, but not against the cities, as before, but rather against military installations (rocket-launching silos, troop concentrations) and against the military-political command centers.

Thirdly, the strategy of a "limited" nuclear war is aimed at achieving U.S. military, and primarily nuclear, superiority over the USSR, although the joint Soviet-American communique on the results of the summit meeting held in Vienna on 15-18 June 1979, unambiguously stated the following: "Each side has declared that it is not and will not strive in the future for military superiority, since this could only lead to dangerous instability, in giving rise to a higher level of armaments and in not contributing to the security of either side." It must be added that the U.S. claims of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union fundamentally contradict the principles of equality and equal security of the parties, and all the agreements concluded between the United States and the USSR in the military-political area, including SALT-1 and SALT-2, are based on this.

Fourthly, the new nuclear strategy of Washington presupposes a further increase in the nuclear arms race and the development of qualitatively new types and systems of such weapons.

Fifthly, the strategy of a "limited" nuclear war turns the U.S. nuclear arsenal into a direct weapon of blackmail and the dictating of terms by Washington in its desire to attain its expansionistic and hegemonistic objectives on the international scene.

Nuclear blackmail is viewed by the overseas strategists as virtually the chief means for conducting affairs primarily with the USSR. In spite of all the previous Soviet-American agreements and arrangements, attempts are being made on the basis of PD-59 to create in the United States a political and psychological climate which would favor the taking of a decision by the American leadership, when it considers it advisable, to make an "anticipatory" nuclear strike under the guise of "defense." The Washington strategists count on minimizing the risk related to starting a nuclear war for the United States in order to cause the maximum damage possible to the other side. Need one speak about the danger of such illusory plans? Certainly the Americans themselves have estimated that in a modern nuclear war, if the United States would be involved, at least 140 million persons would lose their lives, or approximately three-fifths of the population, and 75 percent of the economic potential would be destroyed.

The new strategy of Washington also serves as a weapon of nuclear blackmail against the Western European countries with whom the United States did not even consider it necessary to consult before signing the PD-59. In an interview with ABC in

August 1980 in which the purpose of the strategy of a "limited" nuclear war was "explained," the U.S. Secretary of Defense Brown coolly stated that he "did not exclude the possibility" that the United States would be the first to use tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in the event of the outbreak of a local conflict there. To the question of whether or not the possibility was excluded of the limited use of strategic nuclear weapons in such a case in accord with the new doctrine, Brown replied that he "did not want to go into the details of such a situation since everything would depend upon circumstances."

The PD-59 clearly confirms that the American plan to deploy 108 Pershing-2 missiles and 464 land-based cruise missile of the Tomahawk type in a number of the Western European states has no bearing on the problems of ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, by such an action, the U.S. militaristic circles plan on shifting the threat of an inevitable retaliatory strike from their own territory and transfer a nuclear war to the territory of the Western European states which have been assigned the unenviable role of the hostages of Washington's nuclear strategy.

The new U.S. nuclear strategy also serves as a weapon of blackmail against the developing countries.

As is known, in accord with the fanciful concept of the so-called "arc of crises" which stretches from the Far East to the Persian Gulf and under the pretext of the events in Iran and Afghanistan as well as the Iranian-Iraqi conflict, the United States has been intensely increasing its military presence in the Indian Ocean, the Near East and in the region of the Horn of Africa. On the basis of the Presidential Memorandum No 51, instructions were issued to the commander of the Rapid Deployment Corps, Lt Gen P. Kelly to be ready to use nuclear weapons in the Near East.

Thus, the new U.S. nuclear strategy, in its essence, represents an attempt by American imperialism to put a military-political basis under its expansionistic desires in the present stage and an attempt to impose its will on other nations and peoples.

Curiously enough, the PD-59, as was stated at the beginning of October by the American columnist J. Anderson, there is a secret part which provides for nuclear strikes against 100 targets on the territory of Washington's new partner, China. Incidentally such a fact has not altered anything in the present American-Chinese relations. From the very outset it was clear that Washington, in playing the "Chinese card," was pursuing quite definite goals of its own. Precisely like Beijing which, incidentally, has already tested a missile capable of reaching U.S. territory.

It is also indicative that in the desire to quiet the wave of concern in the world community over the strategy of a "limited" nuclear war, certain leaders in the Washington Administration and subsequently the bourgeois mass information media have attempted to represent it merely as a certain "development" of the ideas stated back in 1962 in the "counterforce" concept of the former Secretary of Defense R. McNamara and which had undergone certain "concretization" in the doctrine of a "limited strategic war" which had been worked out in 1974 by the then U.S. Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger.

The new American doctrine, certainly, did not arise out of a vacuum. To a certain degree it in fact takes its roots from the concept of Schlesinger's concept of a

"limited strategic war" which envisages a shifting in the priority of the nuclear strikes from the cities to military objectives (for this reason it was sometimes called the "retargeting doctrine"). But it is beyond any doubt that the new U.S. nuclear strategy contains elements which make it more dangerous even in comparison with the "Schlesinger doctrine." It substantially broadens the list of objectives to be hit by "limited" nuclear strikes and adds the military-political command posts to the military and industrial targets. It is not merely an arithmetical increase in the number of targets but rather an obvious intention to gain victory in a nuclear war since the hitting of the entire complex of strategically important objects would be capable, in the estimates of the Pentagon, of not only "making an impression" on the potential enemy but also paralyzing its will to resist and forcing it to surrender. Although as before it remains unclear just how the overseas strategists intend to preserve the "limited" nature of a nuclear conflict without having it grow into an all-out nuclear missile war.

The ideological basis of the current U.S. nuclear strategy, as all the former American doctrines, is unconcealed anticommunism and anti-Sovietism which has long been turned by the Washington Administration and the monopolistic circles standing behind it into a weapon of struggle not only against the USSR and the other countries in the socialist commonwealth but also against all democratic, progressive forces of the modern world. In widely using anticommunism and anti-Sovietism for undermining the process of detente and for intensifying the arms race, the imperialistic politicians and bourgeois propaganda particularly importunately has spread the fabrications about the notorious "Soviet military threat" and the "aggressiveness" of Soviet military doctrine.

In decisively unmasking the anti-Soviet fabrications of the imperialists and their hirelings, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in a speech in Berlin on 6 October 1979, with all certainty stated: "...We are not endeavoring for military superiority. Our intentions have never included and do not include a threat to any state or group of states whatsoever. Our strategic doctrine has a strictly defensive focus."

The same idea also runs through the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact States approved at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in the Polish capital on 14-15 May 1980. It states that the Warsaw Pact countries "have never aspired and will not aspire to military superiority; they have acted unswervingly to achieve a military equilibrium on all lower levels and to reduce and eliminate the military conflict in Europe. They do not have, they have not had and will not have any strategic doctrine except a defensive one, they do not have, have not had and will not have any intention to create a first nuclear strike potential."

In speaking on 27 October 1980 at a Kremlin dinner in honor of the Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile-Mariam, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized with particular force: "We again and again affirm that for us at present and in the future the primary task remains a rise in the prosperity of the Soviet people and the fuller satisfaction of their material needs and spiritual wants.

"And this dictates a completely definite international policy of ensuring peaceful external conditions for the country, that is, a policy of detente, disarmament and cooperation."



The decision of the Fourth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Tenth Sitting, on the next reduction in expenditures for military needs also lies in this peace-loving vein. For 1981, such expenditures have been set at an amount of 17,054,000,000 rubles and this is 5.7 percent of all the expenditures of the U.S. state budget (in 1980, these expenditures were 17,124,000,000 rubles).

The militaristic aggressive policy of American imperialism has caused decisive protests in the world community, and including in the United States itself. "Nuclear madness" was the name given to the new U.S. doctrine by the General Secretary of the U.S. Communist Party, Gus Hall. Some 27 congressmen sent a special letter to President Carter in which, in speaking about the dangerous nature of PD-59, stated that in their opinion, "it would mean an end to the process of control over the arms race and make a nuclear war more probable." The doctrine of a "limited" nuclear war has also been protested against by the U.S. Peace Council, by the Federation of American Teachers, and by a number of trade union, women's, youth and other public organizations. Even the organ of the business circles, the journal FORTUNE sharply condemned the PD-59 having described it as "unnecessary and dangerous."

In expressing the mood prevailing among the sober-thinking Americans, the former leader of the Disarmament and Weapons Control Agency, P. Warnicke, emphasized on the pages of the newspaper BOSTON GLOBE: "Neither the mobile MX intercontinental ballistic missiles on which the U.S. administration has placed its basic hope, nor the construction of new plants to produce neuromuscular gases nor the annual increase in military allocations can in any way guarantee either our security or our survival in a "limited" nuclear war the waging of which is envisaged in the nuclear strategy outlined in the Presidential Directive No 59." "What we actually need," P. Warnicke went on to point out, "is talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons."

As is known, in the presidential elections in the United States on 4 November 1980, J. Carter suffered a landslide defeat. One of the main reasons for this outcome of the elections was the clear dissatisfaction of the American people with the Carter Administration for those actions which had brought about an exacerbation of international tension, which eliminated much that had been achieved as a result of the development of the process of detente and which strengthened the danger of a nuclear war. The NEW YORK TIMES wrote on the question of Carter's defeat: "Everything was out of place: the vacillating from side to side, the excessive militancy and the Presidential Directive No 59 on the 'Limited' Nuclear War which was intentionally announced on the eve of the National Democratic Congress. As a result they ceased to bet on Carter."

A broad public movement against the dangerous, adventurist course of the U.S. ruling circles has been growing in England, the FRG, Belgium, Italy and other Western European countries. The population of these countries does not want to play the role of the hostages of Washington's nuclear adventurism.

One of the most vivid manifestations of the concern of peoples over the doctrine of "limited" nuclear war was the approval of the appeal on behalf of the delegates of 134 states and more than 100 international organizations at the World Parliament of Peoples for Peace held in Sofia on 23-26 September 1980. "The peoples of the world," states this document, "are profoundly alarmed. The danger of a world nuclear war



has never been so acutely felt.... The new nuclear strategy is a perfidious deception of the peoples with an attempt being made to convince them of the possibility of conducting a limited or local nuclear war without its development into a global nuclear catastrophe. We categorically reject this dangerous, misanthropic doctrine!"

As for the USSR, it has never before permitted and will not allow in the future that anyone deal with it "from a position of strength." Attempts to achieve military superiority over our nation at present are even more hopeless than before. The USSR, in a fraternal military alliance with all the nations of the socialist commonwealth, is capable of responding to any challenge from imperialism and the reaction. There is not the slightest doubt of this.

The achieved military-strategic equilibrium between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism, as was pointed out at the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee is a victory of fundamental historical significance. It serves as a factor restraining the aggressive drives of imperialism and this meets the fundamental interests of all peoples. The plans to upset this equilibrium are doomed to failure. The plenum instructed the Central Committee Politburo in the present situation when the adventuristic actions of the United States and its supporters have intensified the military danger, to unswervingly carry out the course of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses aimed at the following: the greatest possible strengthening of the fraternal alliance of the socialist states, the support of the just struggle of the peoples for freedom and independence, for peaceful coexistence, the restraining of the arms race, the preservation and development of international détente and mutually advantageous cooperation in the economic, scientific and cultural fields. At the same time the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized that the intrigues of imperialism and the other enemies of peace demand constant vigilance and the greatest possible strengthening of the defense capability of our state in order to thwart the plans of imperialism to achieve military superiority and to dictate to the world. In their daily activities the men of the Soviet Armed Forces and all the Soviet people are strictly guided by these instructions of the party.

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